This text is from Alain Venturini (Folc on the French forum). It has been approved by Jacques and is consistent with the chrono up to now. Alain will perhaps try a real translation after this rough Babelfish one.
Appendix 41-6
A country, a navy... two nationalities
The Yugoslav fleet and the German-Italian invasion
The situation at April 27, 1941 : insufficient to resist, but non negligible forces
Ships and aircraft
The Yugoslav royal navy included/understood, at a few days of the entry in war against Germany and Italy, the following operational ships (account not held of the river units):
Light Cruiser (CL) : 1
Dalmacija, ex-German Niobe (launched on July 18, 1899, bought in 1925).
Displacement : 2640 T speed : 20 kt Armement : 6 X 84 mm, 4 X 47 mm, 2 machine-guns.
Used as training ship.
Destroyers (DD) : 4 (more one unit in construction)
- Class " Dubrovnik " : 1 unit.
Dubrovnik : entered in service in 1931. Used as driver of flotilla.
Displacement : 1880 T speed : 37 kt Armement : 4 X 140 mm, 2 X 84 mm, 6 X 40 mm, 2 X 12,7 mm, 6 X TL 533 mm (2 X III), 40 mines.
- Class " Beograd " : 3 units, plus one in construction ( Split, on hold with the building sites of Kotor). Displacement : 1210 T speed : 38 kt Armement : 4 X 120 mm (2 X II), 4 X 40 mm (2 X II), 2 X 12,7 mm, 6 X TL 550 mm (2 X III), 30 mines.
Beograd, entered in service in June 1939.
Ljubljana, entered in service on September 23, 1939. Run on January 24, 1940 accidentally, reinflated on next and repaired 10 July.
Zagreb, entered in service in November 1939.
Destroyers (TB) : 6
Six ex-austro-Hungarian units, launched between 1913 and 1916, remainder of a whole of 8 allocated with the young Yugoslav navy at the end of the First World War (T 2 striped in unknown circumstances ; T 4 lost by stranding into 1932).
240 T, 21 kt. Armament : 6 X 65 mm, 2 machine-guns, 2 X TL 450 mm.
The navy austro-Hungarian woman distinguished three under-series according to the shipyard from construction : T for Trieste, Stabilimento Tecnico ; F for Fiume, Danubius ; M for Monfalcone. T 1 with T 4 came from the building site of Trieste, T 5 with T 8 of the building site of Fiume (like Greek Pergamos and Proussa).
T 1 (ex Tb 76T), launched the 15/12/1913 ; T 3 (ex Tb 78T), launched the 4/03/1914
T 5 (ex Tb 87F), launched the 20/03/1915 ; T 6 (ex Tb 93F), launched the 25/11/1915 ; T 7 (ex Tb 96F), launched the 8/07/1916 ; T 8 (ex Tb 97F), launched the 8/07/1916.
Submarines (SS): 4
- Class " Hrabri " : 2 units.
Displacement : 975 T (surface)/1165 T (plunged). Speed : 15,7/10 kt.
Armament : 6 X TL (all with the prow) 533 mm (12 torpedes), 2 X 102 mm, 1 X 7,62 mm.
Hrabri, launched in 1927 ; Nebojsa, launched in 1927.
- Class " Osvetnik " : 2 units.
Displacement : 630/809 T speed : 14,5/9 kt.
Armament : 6 X TL (4 prow, 2 poop) 550 mm, 1 X 100 mm, 1 X 40 mm.
Osvetnik, launched in 1929 ; Smeli, launched in 1929.
Armed yacht (PY) : 1
Bjeli Orao, entered in service in 1939. 570 T, 18 kt Armement : 2 X 20 mm, 2 machine-guns.
Royal yacht in times of peace, patrol craft in times of war.
Minelayers (CM) : 6
Six units of the class " Galeb ", ex-German, dating from the years 1917-1919, bought in 1920.
330 T, 15 kt Armement : 2 X 84 mm, 2 machine-guns, mines.
Galeb ; Jastreb ; Kobac ; Labud ; Orao ; Sokol.
Minesweepers (AM) : 6
- D 2 (ex Tb 36, ex Uhu). 80 tons.
Building ex-austro-Hungarian. Entered in service in 1886 like destroyer, reclassified like minesweeper between 1911 and 1913. Training ship.
- Five units of the class " Malinska ", all service entrance in 1931.
125 T, 9 kt Armement : 1 X 47 mm.
Malinska ; Marjan ; Meljine ; Mljet ; Mosor.
Motor torpedo boats (MTB) : 10
- 2 units Thornycroft type, service entrance in 1927.
15 T, 40 kt Armement : 2 X TL 457 mm, 2 machine-guns.
Chetnik ; Uskok.
- 8 units Lrssen type, service entrance between 1936 and 1939.
60 T, 33 kt Armement : 2 X TL 550 mm, 2 X 20 mm, 1 machine-gun, mines.
Dinara ; Durmitor ; Kajmakcalan ; Orjen ; Rudnik ; Suvobor ; Triglav ; Velebit.
Seaplane tender (AV) : 1
Zmaj, entered in service in 1931.
1870 T, 15 kt Armement : 2 X 84 mm (2 X I), 4 X 40 mm (2 X II).
Submarine tender (ACE) : 1
Hvar: transformed trading vessel, 2650 tons.
Tanker (AO) : 1
Perun, 3400 tons.
The naval air force put on line 74 seaplanes and planes, of which forty, all of the seaplanes, could be regarded as suited to the combat :
12 Dornier 22Kj (or C-H)
10 to 12 Dornier Wal (or C-W)
15 Rogozarski SIM-XIV
1 To 4 Rogozarski PVT (H)
Naval bases
The Yugoslav navy had two major bases : Kotor (Cattaro) and Sibenik (Sebenico), but used also other ports. It should not be forgotten that Pola, Fiume and Zara were then Italian cities and bases.
For a better comprehension of the account which will follow, it is necessary to briefly describe the base of Kotor or, more exactly, the complex of the Mouths of Kotor. Covering a surface of 87 km2, those include/understand (while going from the Adriatic towards the interior of the grounds) :
- the Mouths in a strict sense, is the channel of access making communicate with the full sea the four inner basins (deep from 40 to 60 m). The entry is delimited by it in north by the peninsula of Prevlaka, which is completed by the point ofOstro, in the south by that of Lustica, finished by the point ofArza.
- a first basin: the bay of Topla or gulf ofHerceg Novi (Castelnuovo), that the broad channel of Kumbor makes communicate with the following basin.
- the bay of Tivat (Teodo), of triangular form, which is the vastest basin
- these two basins communicate with the basins more inside the grounds by the strait of the Chains (Verige, stretto delle Catene), 2 km length and a minimal width of 300 m.
- the last two basins, smallest, are the gulfs of Risan (Risano) in the North-West and of Kotor in south-east.
Like the navy austro-Hungarian woman before it, the Yugoslav navy largely exploited the possibilities offered by this vast natural port. If the principal damping of the fleet were in the gulf of Kotor, in front of the city even, another strong point were Tivat (Teodo), where the arsenal was. While the submarines, to leave more quickly, could be parked with more close to the very Mouths, the light forces used the small ports, also closer to the entry of the Mouths, Djenovic (close toHerceg Novi) and of Kumbor (on the channel of the same name). As for the naval air force, it did not have less than four seaplane bases : two on the gulf of Kotor (Dobrota and Orahovac), one on bay of Tivat (Krtole) and one on that of Topla (Rose).
Order of battle
On the operational level, the ships depended either on the command of the Fleet (of open sea), or of the command of the defense of the coasts, articulated in three sectors, north (Selce), center (Sibenik/Split) and south (Dubrovnik).
1. The Fleet
1.1. Kotor (Cattaro) :
1era division of destroyers : Dubrovnik (head of division), Beograd, Zagreb, Ljubljana
Division of submarines : supply craft Hvar (head of division), Hrabri, Nebojsa, Osvetnik, Smeli
Various : CL Dalmacija ; TB T 1 and T 3 ; PY Bjeli Orao ; AO Perun
1.2. Sibenik (Sibenico) :
2E division of destroyers : Velebit (head of division) and the nine other motor torpedo boats
3E division of destroyers : T 7 (head of division), T5, T 6 and T 8, is the 4 TB most recent
2. The defense of the coasts
2.1. Northern sector (Selce, gulf of Quarnaro) :
AM Malinska
2.2. Sector centers (Sibenik/Split) :
CM Galeb, Labud, Sokol
AM Mosor, Marjan
2.3. Southern sector (Dubrovnik) :
CM Orao (Dubrovnik), Jastreb and Kobac(Djenovic, Mouths of Kotor)
AM Meljine, Mljet, D 2 (Kumbor, Mouths of Kotor)
3. Naval aeronautics
For our account, only the apparatuses deployed in the zone of the Mouths of Kotor import. They were the following escadrilles :
- 1er Groups seaplanes : 2 escadrilles, 15 apparatuses of recognition.
1era flotilla (in Krtole) : 5 SIM-XIV ; 22nd flotillas (in Rose) : 5 SIM-XIV, 5 various.
- 2E Group seaplanes : 2 escadrilles, 12 apparatuses of bombardment.
20E flotilla (in Orahovac) : 6 Dornier 22 ; 212nd flotilla (in Dobrota) : 6 Dornier Wal.
Too optimistic projects
In margin of the meeting held on April 27, 1941 between Sir John Dill, Charles of Gaulle and the Simovic General, discrete contacts were tied between the envoys of the British Admiralties and Frenchwoman and Yugoslav admiralty. The participants agreed to recognize that the strategic situation and the possibilities of acting effectively of the royal navy were not filling with enthusiasm. Admittedly, the Yugoslav navy could plan to urge its ships in order to slow down the enemy progression along the Dalmatian coasts. But, taking into account the Italian-German air superiority, that would confine with the suicide. For the same reason, only the submarines would be able really to offensively act, but they would as well do it since allied bases.
The officers British and French thus pressed their counterparts to imitate the control of the Poles in September 1939 and to establish without delaying an early plan of evacuation, if not whole fleet, at least of its best units. That would be all the more easy as, of these last, the principal ones (four destroyers and four submarines) were already in southernmost of the naval bases, Kotor (Cattaro). It was enough to gather there on suspicion the other buildings of some value.
The Yugoslavians could not be solved with, said, " desert the battle field to the first blow from gun ", asserting, not without reason, which one would show the sailors, mainly Croatian, to give up their Serb brothers in the test and which that would be politically against-productive. Without daring to discount long months of resistance, as in 1914-1916, they hoped well to have a appraisable time in weeks. Also pled they to launch the order of evacuation only when the turning of the terrestrial combat would have become frankly bad. Moreover, this order would relate to only the ships present at Kotor. The other buildings, placed under the authority of the command of the defense of the coasts, would remain on the spot to fight until the end. It went without saying that in Kotor or elsewhere, all the still intact buildings which could not leave would be scuttled in the event of catch of their home port by the Axis.
The allied envoys could only incline themselves in front of remarks which appeared judicious. If they had known at which speed the kingdom of Slavic of the South was going to fly in glares, they would undoubtedly have insisted more for an evacuation of Kotor as of the first hours of the hostilities...
As of the following day of this meeting, the Yugoslav naval high command stopped a plan of evacuation concerning the near total of the Fleet of high-sea and ordered consequently a certain number of movements. The 2the 2nd division of destroyers (that is to say the ten motor torpedo boats) left Sibenik (Sebenico) for Kotor, followed destroyer T 8, which needed to spend some time to the arsenal of Tivat (Teodo). But this last did nothing but permute with T 1, which Kotor had just supplemented the 3E division of destroyers. Indeed, admiralty could not be solved not to keep under the hand any building armed with torpedes. Since it would not be evacuation, the 3E division was removed with the authority of the command of the Fleet and was attached to that of the defense of the coasts. This one had to make the share of fire by giving up the northern sector, isolated between Istrie Italian and Fiume (today Rijeka) on the one hand and Zara (Zadar) from the other. Sibenik which can be the target of an attack terrestrial or combined Italian impetus since Zara, it gathered all its means in Split (Spalato). Only exception the minelayer Jastreb and the antique dredger D 2 made, which remained in the Mouths of Kotor.
According to the original plan of evacuation, were to gain the port of Patras or any other Greek port : the 1era and 2E divided destroyers, gathering the fourteen most modern and fast units of area, which would leave together, while the division of submarines (less the Hvar supply craft, too slow) would evacuate separately. The destroyers and motor torpedo boats would work to 30 n?uds until the height of Corfou, so as to make it possible these last to be well beyond this island before being with fuel court.
In the second time, driven by an access of optimism, admiralty added to the program an escape bid from the ships which can give 20 n?uds, which included the Dalmacija cruiser and the two destroyers present at Kotor (by supposing T 8 left the arsenal, but, let us recall it, the Yugoslav sailors thought of having time in front of them). Somebody having pointed out that it would be good also to save the royal yacht Bjeli Orao, not as well for its military value, reduced enough, as for his value symbolic system[ 1 ], one even finishes, not to make it only leave, by fixing the speed of the " slow group " at 18 n?uds, maximum speed of this almost new boat (1939). To reinforce the chances of success of this group, one envisaged to associate to him like escorts four of the high-speed motorboats of the Lrssen type.
Taking into account these modifications, the final plan envisaged, at the D-day, the departure with 18h30 of the " slow group ", extremely of eight buildings, so that it is with 02h30 J+1 day with the height of Otranto and 4 hours later approximately with that of Corfou, before joining Patras towards 13h45. The " fast group ", reduced to ten units, would leave to 21h30 to join the " slow group " at the time of the crossing of the channel of Otranto then, leaving it behind him, to sail round Corfou little after 04h30 and, having reduced the pace to 25 n?uds, to arrive at Patras a little front 10h00. The submarines would leave the last and would sail individually. These schedules fixed for May would be revised and adjusted according to the date, and thus of the season, departure. The events were going to put in parts this beautiful scaffolding...
Calms before the storm
Except some air raid warnings due to the overflight of its bases by enemy apparatuses of recognition operating in all impunity (the Naval Aviation did not have hunters and the overland aviation was well too elsewhere occupied), May 4, first day of war, occurred without notable incidents for the Yugoslav navy. It could thus set up defensive measurements envisaged, in particular the air patrols charged to make hunting for the possible Italian submarines. In Kotor, the division of submarines gained, with its supply craft, the entry of the Mouths. As of the afternoon, it started to hold, by bearing, a submarine with the aguets between the Mouths and Dubrovnik (in diving of day, on the surface of night), another at one hour of equipment and a third at rest. As for the last, Smeli, it left to fallen the day for a reconnaissance mission along the Albanian coasts until Durazzo (today Drres) and if possible Valona (auj. Vlor): the preceding information, it was not to tackle the enemy traffic before being on the way of the return and still the target was it to be worth the sorrow of it. The same evening, the five minelayers of Split left to pose defensive fields of Sibenik in the islands of Screw and Korcula. Jastreb did as much Djenovic of it, placing its machines in front of Dubrovnik and the island of Mljet. All returned to good port.
May 5 with Kotor was almost a new day of waiting, if it is not that the 202nd flotilla ofOrahovac was joined by the 252nd flotilla come from two bases close to Sibenik[ 2 ] with six other Dornier 22 : the two joined together formations undertook, the very same day and the offensive following, some flights against Italy and Albania. The evening, Jastreb supplemented its work of the day before by posing mines in protection of the Mouths of Kotor themselves. But in front of Durazzo, while going up with the periscopic immersion, Smeli was seen under water by a seaplane Cant Z.506B in patrol : the bombardment which followed shook it rather harshly to force it to take the way of the return. Having been able to escape from the forces of surface left Durazzo, it returned in the Mouths the 6 in the morning and was allowed at once with the arsenal of Tivat for several days of repairs.
The mishap of Smeli illustrated in fact the policy adopted by the Italians with regard to the Yugoslav navy. They initially intended to avoid any useless bombardment of the Dalmatian ports, even military, that they hoped to even occupy to annex soon, and had succeeded in convincing on this point the Germans. Considering the state of mind of the Croats, the Italians well also discounted to put the hand on the greatest possible number of boats. The orders given to Regia Marina and Regia Aeronautica were thus not to attack the Yugoslav ships unless they did not show a hostile attitude (what Smeli had done). The definition of a " hostile attitude " included of course the attempt at escape towards Greece.
The rebellion
The things precipitated on May 6. With one of these spontaneous transmissions specific to disturbed times, started to filter, both in Split and with Kotor, the news of the mutiny of the Croatian soldiers of the IVE Arme. However, the persons in charge for the Yugoslav navy hardly nourished illusions. The Croatian sailors were not all of the partisans of Oustachis and did not dream of an annexation by Italy or a German occupation. But they were in a majority in the crews and the mutiny of the army could only contaminate their units in the long term and reduce them to the paralysis. The order to evacuate Kotor and to gain a Greek port was thus given for the following day May 7. It acts like revealing of the subjacent tensions. Certain Croatian officers saw themselves well being useful in the navy of an independent Croatian state (forgetting a little quickly that Italy would be rather inclined to remove any competition in the High-Adriatic). They thus agitated in writing pad the warrant officers and sailors on whom they thought of being able to rest. In little time, they managed to improvise an action in order to prevent the departure of the fleet.
For better including/understanding what will follow, let us define the position at the evening of May 6 of the ships having to try to gain Greece the following day. Of the twenty-two ships designed to try the adventure, two (the destroyer T 8 and the Smeli submarine) were in repairs with the arsenal of Tivat : if the course of the events allowed it, they could try their chance later on separately. The three other submarines were in the Mouths with their " nurse ", Hvar, which they were going to leave behind them. The seventeen remaining units all were gathered in the gulf of Kotor and should thus cross the strait of the Chains to escape.
The 7 in middle of morning, these ships had hardly started to prepare to install to gain bay of Topla, where they were to wait their respective final starting hours, which technical hitches "fortuitous" multiplied : overheat here, electric breakdowns there, troubles of guindeau over there, it seemed more y to have an intact building in roads. Some buildings could however start and move towards the strait of the Chains. They had the surprise to find of it the entry partially blocked by the supply craft of Hvar submarines, which, though not being supposed to leave its advanced station of the Mouths, was well there under their eyes, annoyingly with dryness. There remained however a sufficient passage, where the old Dalmacija cruiser, which opened walk, was committed resolutely... going to run aground in its turn. These two strandings, doubtless concerted, blocked any outlet with the ships which had escaped with the epidemic of damages or tempted to pass there in addition to. The base of Kotor was found then at the edge of the civil war, between two camps : those eager to join the Allies to continue to fight and those wanting to initially regulate the internal businesses of the future ex-kingdom of Yugoslavia, helped of those which simply wished to return on their premises. One was with two fingers of the drama when the destroyer Zagreb, fortified town of the loyal supporters, pointed its guns on Dalmacija to dissuade its crew to worsen the situation of it and found itself at once under the threat of the torpedo tubes of destroyer T-3 and the Uskok high-speed motorboat. By chance, it did not act of a confrontation between Serbes and Croatian, but of a more complex situation, where Croats were in the two camps.
The scission
To calm the play and to make prefer the negotiations with let us horions, it was a providential man in the person of the commander of Bjeli Orao, the lieutenant commander (Kapetan Korvete) Janko Curkovic : one does not become ordering royal yacht without adding to desirable qualities of sailor of quite as desirable diplomatic qualities. The Commander Curkovic managed to convince his fellow-members to sit down around a table and to examine the possible options posment. At the end of several hours of animated discussions, itself and some others made prevail the voice of the good direction. The news of the face, in so far as one could speak about face, showed that the kingdom of Yugoslavia was militarily lost and that it would undoubtedly not delay to be it politically (the departure of the government of the Croatian ministers had been known in Kotor). Admittedly, Germany and Italy had taken the hand in Balkans. But Greek, French and British held good. The French resistance, continued since the summer 1940 starting from the Empire, the conquest of all Africa by the Allies and well of other signs still stated clearly that this war was not finished. The Serb ones had chosen their camp, but why it good for Croatia would not be which its sons had a foot on each side...
It was thus decided to leave the free men of their choice. According to the number of officers, warrant officers and men of crew choosing to continue the combat, one would determine how many ships could try the escape towards Greece. As for the others, in order to satisfy the loyal supporters who did not want to see them falling to the hands from the Italians, the secessionist ones promised to them that in Kotor as in Split (held with the current of the events), they would be made unusable for a long time. In fact, among the men who were going to remain, the hope to see being born a Croatian navy was going to override the fear of the Italians.
At the hour of the accounts, it was enough officers and sailors to allow the departure of the four destroyers, with reduced crews of 30% (no one was not enough naive to claim that Regia Marina would not make very to be seized some), of two submarines out of four and four motor torpedo boats of the Lrssen type on eight. As for the submarines, it was easy to know which would accompany Nebojsa, volunteer for the departure : from both "Osvetnik", Smeli was still inalienable for a few days andOsvetnik, which " too well " had been damaged the morning even, was to join it with the arsenal ; thus remained only Hrabri. For the motor torpedo boats, on the other hand, if Durmitor and Kajmakcalan were voluntary to try the adventure, it was necessary to draw lots the two other lucky boats (or unlucky person, according to the point of view) : the chance indicated Orjen and Suvobor. It still remained to demolish all that had been made to prevent the departure : to repair all the voluntary damages and to release the entry of the strait of the Chains of at least of the buildings which blocked it. The very advanced hour made push back this work at the following day.
The agreement concluded for the fleet had been extended to the Naval Aviation : there too, freedom of choice had been left to the men. The three-quarters of the crews of Dornier 22 of the 202nd and 252nd escadrilles (9 out of 12) chose to leave, just as six crews of Rogozarski SIM-XIV on ten. Nevertheless, all the seaplanes should initially ensure the defense of Kotor and its accesses until the departure of the ships before trying themselves to escape.
Enemy eyes look at you...
May 8, in spite of the temporarily found harmony, to carefully check the state of the ships which were to leave and carry out some tests on the water levels of the gulfs of Kotor and Risan took time. Especially, to release Hvar and Dalmacija of their bad posture longer than was hoped, because entreated had taken care, in the night of the 6 to the 7, to send the most powerful tug boats to Tivat. One chooses to move only the cruiser, but, so that the remained tug boats on the good side of the strait arrived at a result, it was necessary to start by reducing the building drastiquement. And also, its crew not having made the things with half by failing it, to temporarily plug " superb " the water way which put its survival in danger. Finally, the cruiser could be towed with precaution to the arsenal.
Of wire out of needle, it appeared more reasonable to give the departure at the following day May 9 in order to allow the crews, tested by two days of hard tensions, to take some rest. The thing was also worth for the two submarines, which had had their batch of tests to achieve before being definitively recognized suited at the beginning.
But the events of May the 7 and 8 did not have escaped with the Italians. In this zone formerly subjected to the Republic of Venice (" Albania Venetian ") and where a part of the population still spoke the Venetian dialect, their secret service had not had of evil to recruit agents ready to help Italy, for the majority by conviction irredentist (it went from there besides in the same way in other places of Dalmatie). Duly equipped with modern transmission resources (Marconi was not it one of glories of Italy ?), these agents could hold Rome, and in particular Supermarina, with the current from day to day. In short, the Italians had rubbed the hands at the evening of May 7. May 8 did them dchanter. They nevertheless had envisaged long date some parades.
One of them, the sending of submarines to the aguets in front of the Mouths of Kotor, had already made to long fire like their Italian fellow-member of Durazzo, the Yugoslav seaplanes had been able to drive back May the 5 and 6 a first, then a second submarine (unless it was not the same one, obstinately returned at its station)[ 3 ]. To crown the whole, one of the submarines sent to patrol of night had failed to perish in the minefield wet by Jastreb.
Remained two possibilities.
First of all, an air attack at the time when the Yugoslav ships would be gathered with more close to the exit of the Mouths (that would avoid touching the town of Kotor and, moreover, the DCA would be less dense) : in the absence of any Yugoslav hunter, deployed Cant Z.506B with Durazzo would make the deal, helped by of Heinkel 111 of Luftwaffe.
Then, the recourse to the one of the specialities of Regia Marina : the MAS, which would launch a night attack to the most favourable place. After discussion, it was decided to not assemble one, but two ambushes. The first in the channel of Otranto, the second a little in the north of Corfou : perhaps arrived almost for the hello, the Yugoslav crews would lower their guard. A flotilla of four MAS was thus sent to Otranto, while another of the same force was to operate of Valona.
Bombs on Kotor
One had not practically returned from there to the preliminary draft of Yugoslav admiralty, if it is only in the absence of all " slow group ", it did not have there any more but ten buildings concerned instead of eighteen. The eight surface vessels would leave the Mouths to 21h30 and, working to 30 n?uds, would slip by in right-hand side line towards Corfou. The two submarines would leave each one a little later following its own road towards Greece.
The day of May 9 proceeded almost like the 7, if it is not that one had to deplore no technical hitch. On the other hand, the sky of Kotor was more furrowed by unfavourable reconnaissance aircraft, which sometimes were delayed all while being held out of reach anti-aircraft artillery. N the other hand, Dornier-Wal and Dornier 22 available carried out by bearing of active patrols, without seeing an enemy submarine.
To 16h00, the four destroyers, preceded by the four high-speed motorboats, entered without encumbers in the strait of the Chains with 16h00 and moved at low speed towards bay of Topla. If they did not have fighter force, the Yugoslavians had established on the close and remote heights surrounding Kotor (the such Lovcen Mount, become famous during the preceding war) a dense air network of guet. This one functioned effectively and located of enough far two groups from planes, coming from two different directions, which converged towards Kotor. Alarm was given at once. It reached the squadron whereas it had just engaged in the channel from Kumbor. For the motor torpedo boats, there were hardly problems : they were going to be able man?uvrer at full speed, even in the channel. On the contrary, the destroyers not only needed a longer lapse of time to increase their speed, but could not run the risk to be bombarded in this relatively narrow water way. They had to reach interstitial waters before the bombers were not there : carrying out a spectacular slew-round, they chose to turn over towards vast bay of Tivat, followed by the high-speed motorboats which intended to support them of their light weapons. As for the submarines Nejbosa and Hrabri, they were satisfied to plunge in bay being next to the point ofArza, by hoping that the enemy would not have expected that traditional bombs.
It remained with the Yugoslavians a last chart to play, tested long date in simulations of air attack of the Mouths of Kotor : to send the SIM-XIV of recognition as well as C-22 available (respectively 8 out of 10 and 6 out of 12) to play the hunters and to disturb the enemy attack. With little close incompetents to harm of Heinkel 111 with their low maximum speeds and their armament etic[ 4 ], these seaplanes had a small chance counters the congeneric ones. However, the guet had announced that the group coming from south-east seemed to be composed of a dozen seaplanes. One thus directed them against Cant Z.506B, which besides was the first to arrive. They made of their better and, without obtaining victories nor moreover to undergo losses (but there were a death and some casualties among the crews), they managed to break the Italian formation, damaging even three apparatuses which had to get rid of their bombs. Only nine Cant could bombard, individually, by paying tribute with the DCA of the ships and the base of Krtole. At the price of two cut down apparatuses, the results were not negligible. A bomb intended for Beograd, missing rather largely its target, opened a water way in the hull of the Durmitor high-speed motorboat which followed it like its shade, drawing furiously from its parts of 20 mm : its crew had only time to fail it the entry of bay of Krtole. Especially, one of Cant succeeds, by taking such risks that it was cut down, to place on Dubrovnik a bomb which penetrated in the boiler room, causing human heavy losses and forcing the building to strongly reduce its speed. The large destroyer thus offered an easier target to about fifteen Heinkel 111 which attacked in their turn. A direct blow between its chimneys lit a violent one sets fire to in the center, another devastated its footbridge and several close explosions caused him strong water ways. The last valid officer on the footbridge, a young sign of 1era classifies (Porucnik Fregate)[ 5 ], chooses outward journey to fail it on the island San Marco. While this drama was played, the three other destroyers and the three remaining high-speed motorboats zigzaged of their better in the medium of the sheaves. All that did not go without damage : bombs fallen extremely close sifted glare Zagreb and Ljubljana and made suffer their hulls.
When the double raid was completed, in addition to the submarines that no one had not worried, only Beograd and three high-speed motorboats were still intact. By chance for the Yugoslavians, the German and Italian pilots over-estimated the results obtained and announced to have put definitively out of combat three large buildings out of four. Supermarina renona thus to claim a new attack, estimating that, if the ships remained unscathed persisted in wanting to flee, the MAS would be enough to finish some with them.
In bay of Tivat, once given of the shock of the battle, the Yugoslav sailors drew up the assessment. It appeared less bad than dreaded. Zagreb and Ljublana could plan to leave, in condition, especially Ljubljana, not to give more than 25 n?uds. After a short council of war, the decision was made to try the adventure at this speed and either to 30 n?uds. That lengthened the duration of the voyage and thus the exposure to the danger, but the play was worth the candle of it. Deaths were unloaded and wounded of the two damaged destroyers and one distributes on their board, like with that of Beograd, a part of the valid men of Dubrovnik, the others remaining on its board to fight the fires with the assistance of the run sailors of Kotor or the arsenal of Tivat. One also made right to the request of the crew of Durmitor, which, volunteer to leave, did not want to take passage on one of the destroyers but wished that a new mounting be found to him : a new drawing of lots indicated Triglav.
In fear of a new air, diurnal or night raid, it was decided that the seven remaining buildings of surface would leave as soon as possible. Time all to develop, they could leave the Mouths to 20h30, with one hour in advance on the initial schedule. The submarines followed them as envisaged : both arrived in Patras and from there gained later on Pire after a navigation without history. It did not go from there in the same way for the small squadron as led Zagreb, promoted head of division to replace Dubrovnik.
The squadron gains, loses and passes...
Little after 02h30, the Yugoslavians was in the channel of Otranto : the three destroyers Zagreb, Ljublana and Beograd advanced in line of file in this order, enlightened on before by the four Lrssen high-speed motorboats deployed out of rake. Having let pass their large s?urs enemy, the MAS of Otranto launched out to the attack of the destroyers. But fortune for the hour had decided to lean Yugoslav side and their movement was located sufficiently early so that the four Lrssen had time to return to interpose. They had hardly evil to take the top on the small MAS, certainly faster but little armed. The guns of 20 mm made wonder to stop their dash and to force them to launch of to too far hope to make fly. Three of them could be withdrawn while having undergone light damage and some losses, continued one moment by Orjen and Suvobor. On the other hand, fourth, the MAS-540, was firmly croch by Kajmakcalanand Triglav, which methodically reflect it in parts, thus obtaining the first confirmed victory of the history of the Yugoslav navy.
Unfortunately, inconstant fortune decided to give up the provisional winners two hours and quarter later approximately whereas, largely left the channel of Otranto, they approached Corfou. Not that they had lost any vigilance. But, being from now on in "friendly " water, they more supervised their side starboard, towards Italy : moreover, instead of working in front of the destroyers, the high-speed motorboats had come to make them screen on this side. However, the MAS of Valona had hidden behind the small island known formerly like Fano (and today like Mathraki). When the small Yugoslav squadron had exceeded it and left with back port side, they were rurent with the attack. Not meeting any obstacle, their attack was perfectly coordinated and crowned success. With 04h48, a torpedo reached Beograd which sailed in file closer and, concerning in the engine room, left it motionless on water. The sharp reaction of the destroyers and the rescue of Lrssen could make better only slightly damage two of the attackers, who withdrew themselves victorious. The Yugoslavians had to resign themselves to tranship on Zagreb and Ljubljana the men of Beograd (of which some, come from Dubrovnik, were with their second abandonment of ship in less than twelve hours !) and to hasten the end of this one : the death-blow was given to him by a torpedo launched by Suvobor. That made, the six surviving ships set out again towards the south at the speed of 25 n?uds. Arrived at the height of Cphalonie, they were divided into two groups. The high-speed motorboats gained the island to be supplied there while carburizing ; once supplied, they reflects the course on Patras, from where they were quickly redirected, via the channel of Corinth, towards Pire, where, like he was said, arrived also the submarines. As for the two destroyers, arrived at Patras a little after 10h00 of the morning, they, within sight of their state, were directed initially on Malta then from there towards the English shipyards for a well deserved repairing and a modernization : they were to return to the combat to the Mediterranean in April 1942.
Eight units of the Yugoslav navy had thus made a success of their escape, of which six could be immediately useful for the Allies.
End of game in Split and Kotor
May 10 was calm in Split, but also in Kotor, except with the arsenal of Tivat, which accepted two new boarders, Hvar, gotten afloat in its turn, and Durmitor. Except also on the four seaplane bases, from where flew away voluntary machines and crews. As envisaged,Orahovac left in flight grouped nine Dornier 22, of which eights arrived without encumbers in Greece : following a breakdown of engine, the ninth had to make an sea landing of fortune, a little hard, close to the island of Paxos ; the apparatus ran but the three members of crew were collected by Greek fishermen. As envisaged still, of Krtole and Rose the air on the whole six SIM-XIV took, which all arrived at good port. The surprise came from the crews of two Dornier Wal de Dobrota, which tardily decided to imitate their comrades : because of the slowness of Wal (180 km/h), they left in the twilight and gained them also Greece. It was thus about half of the best apparatuses which had chosen to continue the combat[ 6 ].
The following day May 11, following the call launched the day before by the very new Croatian government, in the two bases, officers and sailors brought on all the buildings the Yugoslav flag and replaced it by the flag of the new state, thus intending to create a Croatian navy de facto. A provisional higher command settled in Split. One of its first decisions was to send without delaying the minelayer Kobac with Sibenik, with on its board some officers, in order to affirm the Croatian seizure on the basis largely deserted little from days before.
It was only for little time, because, as of May 13, an Italian terrestrial column come from Zara arrived at Sibenik and occupied without more ways and the city and the naval base, reducing in a tournemain the Croatian sailors in a state which resembled to mistake there with that of prisoners of war. Seeing turning that the events took, the commander of Kobac had only time to open the purgings to run his building, which was inserted well right in the mud of the port.
Thwarting the Italian monitoring, an officer succeeds in leaving the base equipped into civil and warning Split, by using the public phone which functioned still normally. The Italians not appearing in a hurry to distinguish the Croats from the other Yugoslavians, it highly advised to leave it under agreement of Kotor and to prepare without delaying a scuttling of the ships suitable to make them unusable during long months.
Unfortunately, the provisional commander-in-chief of the Croatian fleet was a "political" sailor. Weighing lengthily for and it against, it ends up concluding that the Italian attitude rested on a misunderstanding which the Croatian government would end up dissipating with the support of the Germans, laid out better a priori. It was thus advisable to abstain from any extreme measurement which was likely to obstruct the Croatian authorities. On another side, like crushing the majority of its subordinates, it did not make a point at all of seeing Italian sailors surveying the bridges of its boats. It was undoubtedly enough to gain a few weeks at most, time that the Croatia news was in place. It gave instructions for a "light " scuttling, in particular excluding employment from any explosive load. The boats could be run, right or not, but it was excluded to make them capsize (and a fortiori outward journey to run them out of deep water). One could remove the vital parts of the machines but not destroy them. One could in the same way make the armament unusable, but in order to be able to quickly give it in state.
It was in nap a bet on the future... that it lost.
May 15, the Italians, approaching Split, contacted the last forces made up, i.e. the navy, to claim, as in Sibenik, a unconditional surrender. The order was given at once in Split even and transmitted to Kotor to proceed according to the received instructions. In Split, three units only were cast : minelayers Orao and Sokol, as well as the Malinska dredger. Almost all the commanders, in particular those of the destroyers and the supply craft of Zmaj seaplanes, chose to sabotage " carefully " their buildings rather than to scuttle them. Taking into account the low value of their units, the commanders of the four other dredgers were satisfied even with symbolic systems measurements, such as blocking the capstan and removing the cylinder head of the gun of 47 mm.
In Kotor, considering that they were already inalienable for a more or less long time, one touched neither with Dubrovnik reduced to the state of wreck, nor with the units in repairs with the arsenal of Tivat : the Dalmacija cruiser, the destroyer T 8, the submarines Smeli and Osvetnik, the Durmitor high-speed motorboat and the Hvar supply craft. One did not judge more useful to do anything with the very old dredger D 2, which could include oneself/understand, nor with the Split destroyer in construction, which was riskier. But, if one sabotaged in a light way the tanker Perun,le destroyer T 3, the minelayer Jastreb and the motor torpedo boats Chetnik, Uskok and Rudnik, the Dinara high-speed motorboats and Velebit were damaged so that the Italians could give them in service only at the end of six months for the first and of nine months and half for the second. And ordering it Janko Curkovic did not want to run the risk to see Bjeli Orao being used as trophy : exceeding the received order, it did not hesitate to make ptarder of it the machines[ 7 ].
May 16, the Italians took the control of Split and seized themselves of all the ships, with flood or cast. They made of it as much on May 17 with Kotor thanks to troops unloaded with Dubrovnik, at the price of a dredger, the RD-16, which jumped on one of the mines posed on May 4 by Jastreb. The Croatian navy did not disappear, but became for a long time a navy without boats. In spite of a German intervention finally rather tepid, Italy refused any means to him : property of a kingdom of Yugoslavia striped of the chart but which however remained in war, all the ships present at Sibenik, Split or Kotor were for it of good catch[ 8 ].
Epilogue : Italian spoils and its later fate
Regia Marina renona hardly but with the supply craft of Zmaj seaplanes, which it agree to yield to Kriegsmarine : this one re-elected it Drache and ends up transforming it into minelayer. For the remainder, it drew part of about all. While following the same order as to the beginning of this appendix, here the detail of its spoils.
- the old Dalmacija cruiser. Renamed Cattaro, repaired and reclassified drain-hole, it was employed like training ship as from January 1942.
- the Dubrovnik destroyer. Renamed Premuda, it was very severely damaged but taking into account its losses for this type of ships, Regia Marina did not hesitate to undertake long repairs necessary. The ship hardly left there to the day before release the Torche operation - just at point to know a new political seism...
- the destroyer in Split construction, renamed Spalato. Regia Marina could not manage to complete it. After the change of Italian camp, the Germans, who occupied Kotor, did not reach that point more. After the release of their country, the Yugoslavians found it in rather good state, returned its name of origin to him and finished construction of it.
- the six destroyers T 1, T 3, T 5, T 6, T 7 and T 8 were integrated in Regia Marina under lesmmes names. Enough quickly given in service, these old hulls was confined with secondary tasks in the Adriatic.
- the two submarines Smeli and Osvetnik, renamed Antonio Bajamonti and Francesco Rismondo, were repaired and modernized. They were however not employed for missions of war, but were assigned to the school of the submarines of Pola, thus freeing from this task two other submarines.
- Contrary to the hopes of the commander Curkovic, the royal yacht Bjeli Orao, renamed Zagabria, was, in spite of the sorry state of its machine, judged worthy to be used as trophy. Towed in Tarente, it remained wet there, in waiting of a repairing that more serious urgencies unceasingly made differ. The Yugoslavians were to find and take again possession of it there after the Italian armistice.
- the six minelayers, which got old, all, even the three were scuttled, given in service before the end of the year 1941, to generally play a part of anti-submarine escort ships. They were respectively renamed : Galeb, Selve ; Jastreb, Zirona ; Kobac, Plain ; Labud, Zuri ;Orao, Vergada and Sokol, Eso.
There remained about it nothing any more but three at the beginning of the Torche operation : one month hardly after its start-up, Sokol/Eso was the first to disappear, cast on December 23, 1941 in the Adriatic by the Greek submarine Nereus ; Jastreb/Zirona followed, cast in July 1942 close of the Greek coasts by French DB-73 ; finally, Labud/Zuri was cast at the time of the bombardment of Augusta on September 17, 1942.
- the six minesweepers all were also given in service, even very old D 2, renamed D 10 and which remained in the Mouths of Kotor. The five modern dredgers were useful in the Adriatic. They were respectively renamed : Malinska, Arbe ; Marjan, Ugliano ; Meljine, Solta ; Mljet, Meleda and Mosor, Pasman.
- On the six motor torpedo boats captured, three were given in service almost immediately, the others at the end of several months : Durmitor at the beginning of September 1941, Dinara on November 15, 1941 and Velebit the 1er March 1942. First of all renamed MAS, they then were reclassified MS (Moto[scafo]Silurante) the 1er July 1942, even the standard high-speed motorboat Thornycroft surviving on this date :
Thornycroft Type :
Uskok : becomes MAS-1D. Run by accident on April 19, 1942.
Chetnik : becomes MAS-2D then MS-55. Used as training ship.
Lrssen type :
Durmitor : becomes MAS-3D then MS-51.
Velebit : becomes MAS-4D then MS-52.
Dinara : becomes MAS-5D then MS-53.
Rudnik : becomes MAS-6D then MS-54.
- the supply craft of Hvar submarines, summarily repaired, was used by the Italians, then by the Germans, like building-deposit. The Yugoslavians found it in Kotor and could give it in state : it was useful until 1953, year when it was condemned.
- the Perun tanker was him also restored in Yugoslavia after the Italian armistice.
[ 1 ] More especially as its name, "Eagle (Orao) White (Bjeli)" , referred to the heraldic eagle of the royal weapons.
[ 2 ] Located on the island of Krapanj and in bay of Jadrtovac.
[ 3 ] That driven back on 6 May having left oily traces on the surface after the attack of Dornier Wal of the 21E flotilla of Dobrota, the crew of this last was seen granting a "probable " submarine. In fact, Narvalo, veteran of the operations of the Eastern Mediterranean and Dodcanse, could return in slightly damaged Brindisi.
[ 4 ] Rogozarski SIM-XIV had a maximum speed of 245 km/h and were armed with two light machine-guns Browning of 7,5 mm, one in a turret of nose, the other with the back of the cockpit. Dornier 22 were parcelled out better with a maximum speed of 355 km/h and an armament of 3 light machine-guns Browning, one drawing through the hub from the propeller, another in dorsal position postpones and the last in ventral position.
[ 5 ] Word-with-word "lieutenant of frigate".
[ 6 ] They constituted two escadrilles autonomous, flying in co-operation with the French Naval Aviation, and achieved many missions as a long time as the planes could be maintained. In April-May 1942, both escadrilles were re-equipped with apparatuses yielded by France.
[ 7 ] The Commander Curkovic was to become one of the figures of royalist Resistance, then one of the negotiators of the difficult political compromises of post-war period.
[ 8 ] The same applied to the remaining planes of the Naval Aviation : the Italians seized all those which could still fly and used them, according to the models, for the basic or advanced drive.
Appendix 41-6
A country, a navy... two nationalities
The Yugoslav fleet and the German-Italian invasion
The situation at April 27, 1941 : insufficient to resist, but non negligible forces
Ships and aircraft
The Yugoslav royal navy included/understood, at a few days of the entry in war against Germany and Italy, the following operational ships (account not held of the river units):
Light Cruiser (CL) : 1
Dalmacija, ex-German Niobe (launched on July 18, 1899, bought in 1925).
Displacement : 2640 T speed : 20 kt Armement : 6 X 84 mm, 4 X 47 mm, 2 machine-guns.
Used as training ship.
Destroyers (DD) : 4 (more one unit in construction)
- Class " Dubrovnik " : 1 unit.
Dubrovnik : entered in service in 1931. Used as driver of flotilla.
Displacement : 1880 T speed : 37 kt Armement : 4 X 140 mm, 2 X 84 mm, 6 X 40 mm, 2 X 12,7 mm, 6 X TL 533 mm (2 X III), 40 mines.
- Class " Beograd " : 3 units, plus one in construction ( Split, on hold with the building sites of Kotor). Displacement : 1210 T speed : 38 kt Armement : 4 X 120 mm (2 X II), 4 X 40 mm (2 X II), 2 X 12,7 mm, 6 X TL 550 mm (2 X III), 30 mines.
Beograd, entered in service in June 1939.
Ljubljana, entered in service on September 23, 1939. Run on January 24, 1940 accidentally, reinflated on next and repaired 10 July.
Zagreb, entered in service in November 1939.
Destroyers (TB) : 6
Six ex-austro-Hungarian units, launched between 1913 and 1916, remainder of a whole of 8 allocated with the young Yugoslav navy at the end of the First World War (T 2 striped in unknown circumstances ; T 4 lost by stranding into 1932).
240 T, 21 kt. Armament : 6 X 65 mm, 2 machine-guns, 2 X TL 450 mm.
The navy austro-Hungarian woman distinguished three under-series according to the shipyard from construction : T for Trieste, Stabilimento Tecnico ; F for Fiume, Danubius ; M for Monfalcone. T 1 with T 4 came from the building site of Trieste, T 5 with T 8 of the building site of Fiume (like Greek Pergamos and Proussa).
T 1 (ex Tb 76T), launched the 15/12/1913 ; T 3 (ex Tb 78T), launched the 4/03/1914
T 5 (ex Tb 87F), launched the 20/03/1915 ; T 6 (ex Tb 93F), launched the 25/11/1915 ; T 7 (ex Tb 96F), launched the 8/07/1916 ; T 8 (ex Tb 97F), launched the 8/07/1916.
Submarines (SS): 4
- Class " Hrabri " : 2 units.
Displacement : 975 T (surface)/1165 T (plunged). Speed : 15,7/10 kt.
Armament : 6 X TL (all with the prow) 533 mm (12 torpedes), 2 X 102 mm, 1 X 7,62 mm.
Hrabri, launched in 1927 ; Nebojsa, launched in 1927.
- Class " Osvetnik " : 2 units.
Displacement : 630/809 T speed : 14,5/9 kt.
Armament : 6 X TL (4 prow, 2 poop) 550 mm, 1 X 100 mm, 1 X 40 mm.
Osvetnik, launched in 1929 ; Smeli, launched in 1929.
Armed yacht (PY) : 1
Bjeli Orao, entered in service in 1939. 570 T, 18 kt Armement : 2 X 20 mm, 2 machine-guns.
Royal yacht in times of peace, patrol craft in times of war.
Minelayers (CM) : 6
Six units of the class " Galeb ", ex-German, dating from the years 1917-1919, bought in 1920.
330 T, 15 kt Armement : 2 X 84 mm, 2 machine-guns, mines.
Galeb ; Jastreb ; Kobac ; Labud ; Orao ; Sokol.
Minesweepers (AM) : 6
- D 2 (ex Tb 36, ex Uhu). 80 tons.
Building ex-austro-Hungarian. Entered in service in 1886 like destroyer, reclassified like minesweeper between 1911 and 1913. Training ship.
- Five units of the class " Malinska ", all service entrance in 1931.
125 T, 9 kt Armement : 1 X 47 mm.
Malinska ; Marjan ; Meljine ; Mljet ; Mosor.
Motor torpedo boats (MTB) : 10
- 2 units Thornycroft type, service entrance in 1927.
15 T, 40 kt Armement : 2 X TL 457 mm, 2 machine-guns.
Chetnik ; Uskok.
- 8 units Lrssen type, service entrance between 1936 and 1939.
60 T, 33 kt Armement : 2 X TL 550 mm, 2 X 20 mm, 1 machine-gun, mines.
Dinara ; Durmitor ; Kajmakcalan ; Orjen ; Rudnik ; Suvobor ; Triglav ; Velebit.
Seaplane tender (AV) : 1
Zmaj, entered in service in 1931.
1870 T, 15 kt Armement : 2 X 84 mm (2 X I), 4 X 40 mm (2 X II).
Submarine tender (ACE) : 1
Hvar: transformed trading vessel, 2650 tons.
Tanker (AO) : 1
Perun, 3400 tons.
The naval air force put on line 74 seaplanes and planes, of which forty, all of the seaplanes, could be regarded as suited to the combat :
12 Dornier 22Kj (or C-H)
10 to 12 Dornier Wal (or C-W)
15 Rogozarski SIM-XIV
1 To 4 Rogozarski PVT (H)
Naval bases
The Yugoslav navy had two major bases : Kotor (Cattaro) and Sibenik (Sebenico), but used also other ports. It should not be forgotten that Pola, Fiume and Zara were then Italian cities and bases.
For a better comprehension of the account which will follow, it is necessary to briefly describe the base of Kotor or, more exactly, the complex of the Mouths of Kotor. Covering a surface of 87 km2, those include/understand (while going from the Adriatic towards the interior of the grounds) :
- the Mouths in a strict sense, is the channel of access making communicate with the full sea the four inner basins (deep from 40 to 60 m). The entry is delimited by it in north by the peninsula of Prevlaka, which is completed by the point ofOstro, in the south by that of Lustica, finished by the point ofArza.
- a first basin: the bay of Topla or gulf ofHerceg Novi (Castelnuovo), that the broad channel of Kumbor makes communicate with the following basin.
- the bay of Tivat (Teodo), of triangular form, which is the vastest basin
- these two basins communicate with the basins more inside the grounds by the strait of the Chains (Verige, stretto delle Catene), 2 km length and a minimal width of 300 m.
- the last two basins, smallest, are the gulfs of Risan (Risano) in the North-West and of Kotor in south-east.
Like the navy austro-Hungarian woman before it, the Yugoslav navy largely exploited the possibilities offered by this vast natural port. If the principal damping of the fleet were in the gulf of Kotor, in front of the city even, another strong point were Tivat (Teodo), where the arsenal was. While the submarines, to leave more quickly, could be parked with more close to the very Mouths, the light forces used the small ports, also closer to the entry of the Mouths, Djenovic (close toHerceg Novi) and of Kumbor (on the channel of the same name). As for the naval air force, it did not have less than four seaplane bases : two on the gulf of Kotor (Dobrota and Orahovac), one on bay of Tivat (Krtole) and one on that of Topla (Rose).
Order of battle
On the operational level, the ships depended either on the command of the Fleet (of open sea), or of the command of the defense of the coasts, articulated in three sectors, north (Selce), center (Sibenik/Split) and south (Dubrovnik).
1. The Fleet
1.1. Kotor (Cattaro) :
1era division of destroyers : Dubrovnik (head of division), Beograd, Zagreb, Ljubljana
Division of submarines : supply craft Hvar (head of division), Hrabri, Nebojsa, Osvetnik, Smeli
Various : CL Dalmacija ; TB T 1 and T 3 ; PY Bjeli Orao ; AO Perun
1.2. Sibenik (Sibenico) :
2E division of destroyers : Velebit (head of division) and the nine other motor torpedo boats
3E division of destroyers : T 7 (head of division), T5, T 6 and T 8, is the 4 TB most recent
2. The defense of the coasts
2.1. Northern sector (Selce, gulf of Quarnaro) :
AM Malinska
2.2. Sector centers (Sibenik/Split) :
CM Galeb, Labud, Sokol
AM Mosor, Marjan
2.3. Southern sector (Dubrovnik) :
CM Orao (Dubrovnik), Jastreb and Kobac(Djenovic, Mouths of Kotor)
AM Meljine, Mljet, D 2 (Kumbor, Mouths of Kotor)
3. Naval aeronautics
For our account, only the apparatuses deployed in the zone of the Mouths of Kotor import. They were the following escadrilles :
- 1er Groups seaplanes : 2 escadrilles, 15 apparatuses of recognition.
1era flotilla (in Krtole) : 5 SIM-XIV ; 22nd flotillas (in Rose) : 5 SIM-XIV, 5 various.
- 2E Group seaplanes : 2 escadrilles, 12 apparatuses of bombardment.
20E flotilla (in Orahovac) : 6 Dornier 22 ; 212nd flotilla (in Dobrota) : 6 Dornier Wal.
Too optimistic projects
In margin of the meeting held on April 27, 1941 between Sir John Dill, Charles of Gaulle and the Simovic General, discrete contacts were tied between the envoys of the British Admiralties and Frenchwoman and Yugoslav admiralty. The participants agreed to recognize that the strategic situation and the possibilities of acting effectively of the royal navy were not filling with enthusiasm. Admittedly, the Yugoslav navy could plan to urge its ships in order to slow down the enemy progression along the Dalmatian coasts. But, taking into account the Italian-German air superiority, that would confine with the suicide. For the same reason, only the submarines would be able really to offensively act, but they would as well do it since allied bases.
The officers British and French thus pressed their counterparts to imitate the control of the Poles in September 1939 and to establish without delaying an early plan of evacuation, if not whole fleet, at least of its best units. That would be all the more easy as, of these last, the principal ones (four destroyers and four submarines) were already in southernmost of the naval bases, Kotor (Cattaro). It was enough to gather there on suspicion the other buildings of some value.
The Yugoslavians could not be solved with, said, " desert the battle field to the first blow from gun ", asserting, not without reason, which one would show the sailors, mainly Croatian, to give up their Serb brothers in the test and which that would be politically against-productive. Without daring to discount long months of resistance, as in 1914-1916, they hoped well to have a appraisable time in weeks. Also pled they to launch the order of evacuation only when the turning of the terrestrial combat would have become frankly bad. Moreover, this order would relate to only the ships present at Kotor. The other buildings, placed under the authority of the command of the defense of the coasts, would remain on the spot to fight until the end. It went without saying that in Kotor or elsewhere, all the still intact buildings which could not leave would be scuttled in the event of catch of their home port by the Axis.
The allied envoys could only incline themselves in front of remarks which appeared judicious. If they had known at which speed the kingdom of Slavic of the South was going to fly in glares, they would undoubtedly have insisted more for an evacuation of Kotor as of the first hours of the hostilities...
As of the following day of this meeting, the Yugoslav naval high command stopped a plan of evacuation concerning the near total of the Fleet of high-sea and ordered consequently a certain number of movements. The 2the 2nd division of destroyers (that is to say the ten motor torpedo boats) left Sibenik (Sebenico) for Kotor, followed destroyer T 8, which needed to spend some time to the arsenal of Tivat (Teodo). But this last did nothing but permute with T 1, which Kotor had just supplemented the 3E division of destroyers. Indeed, admiralty could not be solved not to keep under the hand any building armed with torpedes. Since it would not be evacuation, the 3E division was removed with the authority of the command of the Fleet and was attached to that of the defense of the coasts. This one had to make the share of fire by giving up the northern sector, isolated between Istrie Italian and Fiume (today Rijeka) on the one hand and Zara (Zadar) from the other. Sibenik which can be the target of an attack terrestrial or combined Italian impetus since Zara, it gathered all its means in Split (Spalato). Only exception the minelayer Jastreb and the antique dredger D 2 made, which remained in the Mouths of Kotor.
According to the original plan of evacuation, were to gain the port of Patras or any other Greek port : the 1era and 2E divided destroyers, gathering the fourteen most modern and fast units of area, which would leave together, while the division of submarines (less the Hvar supply craft, too slow) would evacuate separately. The destroyers and motor torpedo boats would work to 30 n?uds until the height of Corfou, so as to make it possible these last to be well beyond this island before being with fuel court.
In the second time, driven by an access of optimism, admiralty added to the program an escape bid from the ships which can give 20 n?uds, which included the Dalmacija cruiser and the two destroyers present at Kotor (by supposing T 8 left the arsenal, but, let us recall it, the Yugoslav sailors thought of having time in front of them). Somebody having pointed out that it would be good also to save the royal yacht Bjeli Orao, not as well for its military value, reduced enough, as for his value symbolic system[ 1 ], one even finishes, not to make it only leave, by fixing the speed of the " slow group " at 18 n?uds, maximum speed of this almost new boat (1939). To reinforce the chances of success of this group, one envisaged to associate to him like escorts four of the high-speed motorboats of the Lrssen type.
Taking into account these modifications, the final plan envisaged, at the D-day, the departure with 18h30 of the " slow group ", extremely of eight buildings, so that it is with 02h30 J+1 day with the height of Otranto and 4 hours later approximately with that of Corfou, before joining Patras towards 13h45. The " fast group ", reduced to ten units, would leave to 21h30 to join the " slow group " at the time of the crossing of the channel of Otranto then, leaving it behind him, to sail round Corfou little after 04h30 and, having reduced the pace to 25 n?uds, to arrive at Patras a little front 10h00. The submarines would leave the last and would sail individually. These schedules fixed for May would be revised and adjusted according to the date, and thus of the season, departure. The events were going to put in parts this beautiful scaffolding...
Calms before the storm
Except some air raid warnings due to the overflight of its bases by enemy apparatuses of recognition operating in all impunity (the Naval Aviation did not have hunters and the overland aviation was well too elsewhere occupied), May 4, first day of war, occurred without notable incidents for the Yugoslav navy. It could thus set up defensive measurements envisaged, in particular the air patrols charged to make hunting for the possible Italian submarines. In Kotor, the division of submarines gained, with its supply craft, the entry of the Mouths. As of the afternoon, it started to hold, by bearing, a submarine with the aguets between the Mouths and Dubrovnik (in diving of day, on the surface of night), another at one hour of equipment and a third at rest. As for the last, Smeli, it left to fallen the day for a reconnaissance mission along the Albanian coasts until Durazzo (today Drres) and if possible Valona (auj. Vlor): the preceding information, it was not to tackle the enemy traffic before being on the way of the return and still the target was it to be worth the sorrow of it. The same evening, the five minelayers of Split left to pose defensive fields of Sibenik in the islands of Screw and Korcula. Jastreb did as much Djenovic of it, placing its machines in front of Dubrovnik and the island of Mljet. All returned to good port.
May 5 with Kotor was almost a new day of waiting, if it is not that the 202nd flotilla ofOrahovac was joined by the 252nd flotilla come from two bases close to Sibenik[ 2 ] with six other Dornier 22 : the two joined together formations undertook, the very same day and the offensive following, some flights against Italy and Albania. The evening, Jastreb supplemented its work of the day before by posing mines in protection of the Mouths of Kotor themselves. But in front of Durazzo, while going up with the periscopic immersion, Smeli was seen under water by a seaplane Cant Z.506B in patrol : the bombardment which followed shook it rather harshly to force it to take the way of the return. Having been able to escape from the forces of surface left Durazzo, it returned in the Mouths the 6 in the morning and was allowed at once with the arsenal of Tivat for several days of repairs.
The mishap of Smeli illustrated in fact the policy adopted by the Italians with regard to the Yugoslav navy. They initially intended to avoid any useless bombardment of the Dalmatian ports, even military, that they hoped to even occupy to annex soon, and had succeeded in convincing on this point the Germans. Considering the state of mind of the Croats, the Italians well also discounted to put the hand on the greatest possible number of boats. The orders given to Regia Marina and Regia Aeronautica were thus not to attack the Yugoslav ships unless they did not show a hostile attitude (what Smeli had done). The definition of a " hostile attitude " included of course the attempt at escape towards Greece.
The rebellion
The things precipitated on May 6. With one of these spontaneous transmissions specific to disturbed times, started to filter, both in Split and with Kotor, the news of the mutiny of the Croatian soldiers of the IVE Arme. However, the persons in charge for the Yugoslav navy hardly nourished illusions. The Croatian sailors were not all of the partisans of Oustachis and did not dream of an annexation by Italy or a German occupation. But they were in a majority in the crews and the mutiny of the army could only contaminate their units in the long term and reduce them to the paralysis. The order to evacuate Kotor and to gain a Greek port was thus given for the following day May 7. It acts like revealing of the subjacent tensions. Certain Croatian officers saw themselves well being useful in the navy of an independent Croatian state (forgetting a little quickly that Italy would be rather inclined to remove any competition in the High-Adriatic). They thus agitated in writing pad the warrant officers and sailors on whom they thought of being able to rest. In little time, they managed to improvise an action in order to prevent the departure of the fleet.
For better including/understanding what will follow, let us define the position at the evening of May 6 of the ships having to try to gain Greece the following day. Of the twenty-two ships designed to try the adventure, two (the destroyer T 8 and the Smeli submarine) were in repairs with the arsenal of Tivat : if the course of the events allowed it, they could try their chance later on separately. The three other submarines were in the Mouths with their " nurse ", Hvar, which they were going to leave behind them. The seventeen remaining units all were gathered in the gulf of Kotor and should thus cross the strait of the Chains to escape.
The 7 in middle of morning, these ships had hardly started to prepare to install to gain bay of Topla, where they were to wait their respective final starting hours, which technical hitches "fortuitous" multiplied : overheat here, electric breakdowns there, troubles of guindeau over there, it seemed more y to have an intact building in roads. Some buildings could however start and move towards the strait of the Chains. They had the surprise to find of it the entry partially blocked by the supply craft of Hvar submarines, which, though not being supposed to leave its advanced station of the Mouths, was well there under their eyes, annoyingly with dryness. There remained however a sufficient passage, where the old Dalmacija cruiser, which opened walk, was committed resolutely... going to run aground in its turn. These two strandings, doubtless concerted, blocked any outlet with the ships which had escaped with the epidemic of damages or tempted to pass there in addition to. The base of Kotor was found then at the edge of the civil war, between two camps : those eager to join the Allies to continue to fight and those wanting to initially regulate the internal businesses of the future ex-kingdom of Yugoslavia, helped of those which simply wished to return on their premises. One was with two fingers of the drama when the destroyer Zagreb, fortified town of the loyal supporters, pointed its guns on Dalmacija to dissuade its crew to worsen the situation of it and found itself at once under the threat of the torpedo tubes of destroyer T-3 and the Uskok high-speed motorboat. By chance, it did not act of a confrontation between Serbes and Croatian, but of a more complex situation, where Croats were in the two camps.
The scission
To calm the play and to make prefer the negotiations with let us horions, it was a providential man in the person of the commander of Bjeli Orao, the lieutenant commander (Kapetan Korvete) Janko Curkovic : one does not become ordering royal yacht without adding to desirable qualities of sailor of quite as desirable diplomatic qualities. The Commander Curkovic managed to convince his fellow-members to sit down around a table and to examine the possible options posment. At the end of several hours of animated discussions, itself and some others made prevail the voice of the good direction. The news of the face, in so far as one could speak about face, showed that the kingdom of Yugoslavia was militarily lost and that it would undoubtedly not delay to be it politically (the departure of the government of the Croatian ministers had been known in Kotor). Admittedly, Germany and Italy had taken the hand in Balkans. But Greek, French and British held good. The French resistance, continued since the summer 1940 starting from the Empire, the conquest of all Africa by the Allies and well of other signs still stated clearly that this war was not finished. The Serb ones had chosen their camp, but why it good for Croatia would not be which its sons had a foot on each side...
It was thus decided to leave the free men of their choice. According to the number of officers, warrant officers and men of crew choosing to continue the combat, one would determine how many ships could try the escape towards Greece. As for the others, in order to satisfy the loyal supporters who did not want to see them falling to the hands from the Italians, the secessionist ones promised to them that in Kotor as in Split (held with the current of the events), they would be made unusable for a long time. In fact, among the men who were going to remain, the hope to see being born a Croatian navy was going to override the fear of the Italians.
At the hour of the accounts, it was enough officers and sailors to allow the departure of the four destroyers, with reduced crews of 30% (no one was not enough naive to claim that Regia Marina would not make very to be seized some), of two submarines out of four and four motor torpedo boats of the Lrssen type on eight. As for the submarines, it was easy to know which would accompany Nebojsa, volunteer for the departure : from both "Osvetnik", Smeli was still inalienable for a few days andOsvetnik, which " too well " had been damaged the morning even, was to join it with the arsenal ; thus remained only Hrabri. For the motor torpedo boats, on the other hand, if Durmitor and Kajmakcalan were voluntary to try the adventure, it was necessary to draw lots the two other lucky boats (or unlucky person, according to the point of view) : the chance indicated Orjen and Suvobor. It still remained to demolish all that had been made to prevent the departure : to repair all the voluntary damages and to release the entry of the strait of the Chains of at least of the buildings which blocked it. The very advanced hour made push back this work at the following day.
The agreement concluded for the fleet had been extended to the Naval Aviation : there too, freedom of choice had been left to the men. The three-quarters of the crews of Dornier 22 of the 202nd and 252nd escadrilles (9 out of 12) chose to leave, just as six crews of Rogozarski SIM-XIV on ten. Nevertheless, all the seaplanes should initially ensure the defense of Kotor and its accesses until the departure of the ships before trying themselves to escape.
Enemy eyes look at you...
May 8, in spite of the temporarily found harmony, to carefully check the state of the ships which were to leave and carry out some tests on the water levels of the gulfs of Kotor and Risan took time. Especially, to release Hvar and Dalmacija of their bad posture longer than was hoped, because entreated had taken care, in the night of the 6 to the 7, to send the most powerful tug boats to Tivat. One chooses to move only the cruiser, but, so that the remained tug boats on the good side of the strait arrived at a result, it was necessary to start by reducing the building drastiquement. And also, its crew not having made the things with half by failing it, to temporarily plug " superb " the water way which put its survival in danger. Finally, the cruiser could be towed with precaution to the arsenal.
Of wire out of needle, it appeared more reasonable to give the departure at the following day May 9 in order to allow the crews, tested by two days of hard tensions, to take some rest. The thing was also worth for the two submarines, which had had their batch of tests to achieve before being definitively recognized suited at the beginning.
But the events of May the 7 and 8 did not have escaped with the Italians. In this zone formerly subjected to the Republic of Venice (" Albania Venetian ") and where a part of the population still spoke the Venetian dialect, their secret service had not had of evil to recruit agents ready to help Italy, for the majority by conviction irredentist (it went from there besides in the same way in other places of Dalmatie). Duly equipped with modern transmission resources (Marconi was not it one of glories of Italy ?), these agents could hold Rome, and in particular Supermarina, with the current from day to day. In short, the Italians had rubbed the hands at the evening of May 7. May 8 did them dchanter. They nevertheless had envisaged long date some parades.
One of them, the sending of submarines to the aguets in front of the Mouths of Kotor, had already made to long fire like their Italian fellow-member of Durazzo, the Yugoslav seaplanes had been able to drive back May the 5 and 6 a first, then a second submarine (unless it was not the same one, obstinately returned at its station)[ 3 ]. To crown the whole, one of the submarines sent to patrol of night had failed to perish in the minefield wet by Jastreb.
Remained two possibilities.
First of all, an air attack at the time when the Yugoslav ships would be gathered with more close to the exit of the Mouths (that would avoid touching the town of Kotor and, moreover, the DCA would be less dense) : in the absence of any Yugoslav hunter, deployed Cant Z.506B with Durazzo would make the deal, helped by of Heinkel 111 of Luftwaffe.
Then, the recourse to the one of the specialities of Regia Marina : the MAS, which would launch a night attack to the most favourable place. After discussion, it was decided to not assemble one, but two ambushes. The first in the channel of Otranto, the second a little in the north of Corfou : perhaps arrived almost for the hello, the Yugoslav crews would lower their guard. A flotilla of four MAS was thus sent to Otranto, while another of the same force was to operate of Valona.
Bombs on Kotor
One had not practically returned from there to the preliminary draft of Yugoslav admiralty, if it is only in the absence of all " slow group ", it did not have there any more but ten buildings concerned instead of eighteen. The eight surface vessels would leave the Mouths to 21h30 and, working to 30 n?uds, would slip by in right-hand side line towards Corfou. The two submarines would leave each one a little later following its own road towards Greece.
The day of May 9 proceeded almost like the 7, if it is not that one had to deplore no technical hitch. On the other hand, the sky of Kotor was more furrowed by unfavourable reconnaissance aircraft, which sometimes were delayed all while being held out of reach anti-aircraft artillery. N the other hand, Dornier-Wal and Dornier 22 available carried out by bearing of active patrols, without seeing an enemy submarine.
To 16h00, the four destroyers, preceded by the four high-speed motorboats, entered without encumbers in the strait of the Chains with 16h00 and moved at low speed towards bay of Topla. If they did not have fighter force, the Yugoslavians had established on the close and remote heights surrounding Kotor (the such Lovcen Mount, become famous during the preceding war) a dense air network of guet. This one functioned effectively and located of enough far two groups from planes, coming from two different directions, which converged towards Kotor. Alarm was given at once. It reached the squadron whereas it had just engaged in the channel from Kumbor. For the motor torpedo boats, there were hardly problems : they were going to be able man?uvrer at full speed, even in the channel. On the contrary, the destroyers not only needed a longer lapse of time to increase their speed, but could not run the risk to be bombarded in this relatively narrow water way. They had to reach interstitial waters before the bombers were not there : carrying out a spectacular slew-round, they chose to turn over towards vast bay of Tivat, followed by the high-speed motorboats which intended to support them of their light weapons. As for the submarines Nejbosa and Hrabri, they were satisfied to plunge in bay being next to the point ofArza, by hoping that the enemy would not have expected that traditional bombs.
It remained with the Yugoslavians a last chart to play, tested long date in simulations of air attack of the Mouths of Kotor : to send the SIM-XIV of recognition as well as C-22 available (respectively 8 out of 10 and 6 out of 12) to play the hunters and to disturb the enemy attack. With little close incompetents to harm of Heinkel 111 with their low maximum speeds and their armament etic[ 4 ], these seaplanes had a small chance counters the congeneric ones. However, the guet had announced that the group coming from south-east seemed to be composed of a dozen seaplanes. One thus directed them against Cant Z.506B, which besides was the first to arrive. They made of their better and, without obtaining victories nor moreover to undergo losses (but there were a death and some casualties among the crews), they managed to break the Italian formation, damaging even three apparatuses which had to get rid of their bombs. Only nine Cant could bombard, individually, by paying tribute with the DCA of the ships and the base of Krtole. At the price of two cut down apparatuses, the results were not negligible. A bomb intended for Beograd, missing rather largely its target, opened a water way in the hull of the Durmitor high-speed motorboat which followed it like its shade, drawing furiously from its parts of 20 mm : its crew had only time to fail it the entry of bay of Krtole. Especially, one of Cant succeeds, by taking such risks that it was cut down, to place on Dubrovnik a bomb which penetrated in the boiler room, causing human heavy losses and forcing the building to strongly reduce its speed. The large destroyer thus offered an easier target to about fifteen Heinkel 111 which attacked in their turn. A direct blow between its chimneys lit a violent one sets fire to in the center, another devastated its footbridge and several close explosions caused him strong water ways. The last valid officer on the footbridge, a young sign of 1era classifies (Porucnik Fregate)[ 5 ], chooses outward journey to fail it on the island San Marco. While this drama was played, the three other destroyers and the three remaining high-speed motorboats zigzaged of their better in the medium of the sheaves. All that did not go without damage : bombs fallen extremely close sifted glare Zagreb and Ljubljana and made suffer their hulls.
When the double raid was completed, in addition to the submarines that no one had not worried, only Beograd and three high-speed motorboats were still intact. By chance for the Yugoslavians, the German and Italian pilots over-estimated the results obtained and announced to have put definitively out of combat three large buildings out of four. Supermarina renona thus to claim a new attack, estimating that, if the ships remained unscathed persisted in wanting to flee, the MAS would be enough to finish some with them.
In bay of Tivat, once given of the shock of the battle, the Yugoslav sailors drew up the assessment. It appeared less bad than dreaded. Zagreb and Ljublana could plan to leave, in condition, especially Ljubljana, not to give more than 25 n?uds. After a short council of war, the decision was made to try the adventure at this speed and either to 30 n?uds. That lengthened the duration of the voyage and thus the exposure to the danger, but the play was worth the candle of it. Deaths were unloaded and wounded of the two damaged destroyers and one distributes on their board, like with that of Beograd, a part of the valid men of Dubrovnik, the others remaining on its board to fight the fires with the assistance of the run sailors of Kotor or the arsenal of Tivat. One also made right to the request of the crew of Durmitor, which, volunteer to leave, did not want to take passage on one of the destroyers but wished that a new mounting be found to him : a new drawing of lots indicated Triglav.
In fear of a new air, diurnal or night raid, it was decided that the seven remaining buildings of surface would leave as soon as possible. Time all to develop, they could leave the Mouths to 20h30, with one hour in advance on the initial schedule. The submarines followed them as envisaged : both arrived in Patras and from there gained later on Pire after a navigation without history. It did not go from there in the same way for the small squadron as led Zagreb, promoted head of division to replace Dubrovnik.
The squadron gains, loses and passes...
Little after 02h30, the Yugoslavians was in the channel of Otranto : the three destroyers Zagreb, Ljublana and Beograd advanced in line of file in this order, enlightened on before by the four Lrssen high-speed motorboats deployed out of rake. Having let pass their large s?urs enemy, the MAS of Otranto launched out to the attack of the destroyers. But fortune for the hour had decided to lean Yugoslav side and their movement was located sufficiently early so that the four Lrssen had time to return to interpose. They had hardly evil to take the top on the small MAS, certainly faster but little armed. The guns of 20 mm made wonder to stop their dash and to force them to launch of to too far hope to make fly. Three of them could be withdrawn while having undergone light damage and some losses, continued one moment by Orjen and Suvobor. On the other hand, fourth, the MAS-540, was firmly croch by Kajmakcalanand Triglav, which methodically reflect it in parts, thus obtaining the first confirmed victory of the history of the Yugoslav navy.
Unfortunately, inconstant fortune decided to give up the provisional winners two hours and quarter later approximately whereas, largely left the channel of Otranto, they approached Corfou. Not that they had lost any vigilance. But, being from now on in "friendly " water, they more supervised their side starboard, towards Italy : moreover, instead of working in front of the destroyers, the high-speed motorboats had come to make them screen on this side. However, the MAS of Valona had hidden behind the small island known formerly like Fano (and today like Mathraki). When the small Yugoslav squadron had exceeded it and left with back port side, they were rurent with the attack. Not meeting any obstacle, their attack was perfectly coordinated and crowned success. With 04h48, a torpedo reached Beograd which sailed in file closer and, concerning in the engine room, left it motionless on water. The sharp reaction of the destroyers and the rescue of Lrssen could make better only slightly damage two of the attackers, who withdrew themselves victorious. The Yugoslavians had to resign themselves to tranship on Zagreb and Ljubljana the men of Beograd (of which some, come from Dubrovnik, were with their second abandonment of ship in less than twelve hours !) and to hasten the end of this one : the death-blow was given to him by a torpedo launched by Suvobor. That made, the six surviving ships set out again towards the south at the speed of 25 n?uds. Arrived at the height of Cphalonie, they were divided into two groups. The high-speed motorboats gained the island to be supplied there while carburizing ; once supplied, they reflects the course on Patras, from where they were quickly redirected, via the channel of Corinth, towards Pire, where, like he was said, arrived also the submarines. As for the two destroyers, arrived at Patras a little after 10h00 of the morning, they, within sight of their state, were directed initially on Malta then from there towards the English shipyards for a well deserved repairing and a modernization : they were to return to the combat to the Mediterranean in April 1942.
Eight units of the Yugoslav navy had thus made a success of their escape, of which six could be immediately useful for the Allies.
End of game in Split and Kotor
May 10 was calm in Split, but also in Kotor, except with the arsenal of Tivat, which accepted two new boarders, Hvar, gotten afloat in its turn, and Durmitor. Except also on the four seaplane bases, from where flew away voluntary machines and crews. As envisaged,Orahovac left in flight grouped nine Dornier 22, of which eights arrived without encumbers in Greece : following a breakdown of engine, the ninth had to make an sea landing of fortune, a little hard, close to the island of Paxos ; the apparatus ran but the three members of crew were collected by Greek fishermen. As envisaged still, of Krtole and Rose the air on the whole six SIM-XIV took, which all arrived at good port. The surprise came from the crews of two Dornier Wal de Dobrota, which tardily decided to imitate their comrades : because of the slowness of Wal (180 km/h), they left in the twilight and gained them also Greece. It was thus about half of the best apparatuses which had chosen to continue the combat[ 6 ].
The following day May 11, following the call launched the day before by the very new Croatian government, in the two bases, officers and sailors brought on all the buildings the Yugoslav flag and replaced it by the flag of the new state, thus intending to create a Croatian navy de facto. A provisional higher command settled in Split. One of its first decisions was to send without delaying the minelayer Kobac with Sibenik, with on its board some officers, in order to affirm the Croatian seizure on the basis largely deserted little from days before.
It was only for little time, because, as of May 13, an Italian terrestrial column come from Zara arrived at Sibenik and occupied without more ways and the city and the naval base, reducing in a tournemain the Croatian sailors in a state which resembled to mistake there with that of prisoners of war. Seeing turning that the events took, the commander of Kobac had only time to open the purgings to run his building, which was inserted well right in the mud of the port.
Thwarting the Italian monitoring, an officer succeeds in leaving the base equipped into civil and warning Split, by using the public phone which functioned still normally. The Italians not appearing in a hurry to distinguish the Croats from the other Yugoslavians, it highly advised to leave it under agreement of Kotor and to prepare without delaying a scuttling of the ships suitable to make them unusable during long months.
Unfortunately, the provisional commander-in-chief of the Croatian fleet was a "political" sailor. Weighing lengthily for and it against, it ends up concluding that the Italian attitude rested on a misunderstanding which the Croatian government would end up dissipating with the support of the Germans, laid out better a priori. It was thus advisable to abstain from any extreme measurement which was likely to obstruct the Croatian authorities. On another side, like crushing the majority of its subordinates, it did not make a point at all of seeing Italian sailors surveying the bridges of its boats. It was undoubtedly enough to gain a few weeks at most, time that the Croatia news was in place. It gave instructions for a "light " scuttling, in particular excluding employment from any explosive load. The boats could be run, right or not, but it was excluded to make them capsize (and a fortiori outward journey to run them out of deep water). One could remove the vital parts of the machines but not destroy them. One could in the same way make the armament unusable, but in order to be able to quickly give it in state.
It was in nap a bet on the future... that it lost.
May 15, the Italians, approaching Split, contacted the last forces made up, i.e. the navy, to claim, as in Sibenik, a unconditional surrender. The order was given at once in Split even and transmitted to Kotor to proceed according to the received instructions. In Split, three units only were cast : minelayers Orao and Sokol, as well as the Malinska dredger. Almost all the commanders, in particular those of the destroyers and the supply craft of Zmaj seaplanes, chose to sabotage " carefully " their buildings rather than to scuttle them. Taking into account the low value of their units, the commanders of the four other dredgers were satisfied even with symbolic systems measurements, such as blocking the capstan and removing the cylinder head of the gun of 47 mm.
In Kotor, considering that they were already inalienable for a more or less long time, one touched neither with Dubrovnik reduced to the state of wreck, nor with the units in repairs with the arsenal of Tivat : the Dalmacija cruiser, the destroyer T 8, the submarines Smeli and Osvetnik, the Durmitor high-speed motorboat and the Hvar supply craft. One did not judge more useful to do anything with the very old dredger D 2, which could include oneself/understand, nor with the Split destroyer in construction, which was riskier. But, if one sabotaged in a light way the tanker Perun,le destroyer T 3, the minelayer Jastreb and the motor torpedo boats Chetnik, Uskok and Rudnik, the Dinara high-speed motorboats and Velebit were damaged so that the Italians could give them in service only at the end of six months for the first and of nine months and half for the second. And ordering it Janko Curkovic did not want to run the risk to see Bjeli Orao being used as trophy : exceeding the received order, it did not hesitate to make ptarder of it the machines[ 7 ].
May 16, the Italians took the control of Split and seized themselves of all the ships, with flood or cast. They made of it as much on May 17 with Kotor thanks to troops unloaded with Dubrovnik, at the price of a dredger, the RD-16, which jumped on one of the mines posed on May 4 by Jastreb. The Croatian navy did not disappear, but became for a long time a navy without boats. In spite of a German intervention finally rather tepid, Italy refused any means to him : property of a kingdom of Yugoslavia striped of the chart but which however remained in war, all the ships present at Sibenik, Split or Kotor were for it of good catch[ 8 ].
Epilogue : Italian spoils and its later fate
Regia Marina renona hardly but with the supply craft of Zmaj seaplanes, which it agree to yield to Kriegsmarine : this one re-elected it Drache and ends up transforming it into minelayer. For the remainder, it drew part of about all. While following the same order as to the beginning of this appendix, here the detail of its spoils.
- the old Dalmacija cruiser. Renamed Cattaro, repaired and reclassified drain-hole, it was employed like training ship as from January 1942.
- the Dubrovnik destroyer. Renamed Premuda, it was very severely damaged but taking into account its losses for this type of ships, Regia Marina did not hesitate to undertake long repairs necessary. The ship hardly left there to the day before release the Torche operation - just at point to know a new political seism...
- the destroyer in Split construction, renamed Spalato. Regia Marina could not manage to complete it. After the change of Italian camp, the Germans, who occupied Kotor, did not reach that point more. After the release of their country, the Yugoslavians found it in rather good state, returned its name of origin to him and finished construction of it.
- the six destroyers T 1, T 3, T 5, T 6, T 7 and T 8 were integrated in Regia Marina under lesmmes names. Enough quickly given in service, these old hulls was confined with secondary tasks in the Adriatic.
- the two submarines Smeli and Osvetnik, renamed Antonio Bajamonti and Francesco Rismondo, were repaired and modernized. They were however not employed for missions of war, but were assigned to the school of the submarines of Pola, thus freeing from this task two other submarines.
- Contrary to the hopes of the commander Curkovic, the royal yacht Bjeli Orao, renamed Zagabria, was, in spite of the sorry state of its machine, judged worthy to be used as trophy. Towed in Tarente, it remained wet there, in waiting of a repairing that more serious urgencies unceasingly made differ. The Yugoslavians were to find and take again possession of it there after the Italian armistice.
- the six minelayers, which got old, all, even the three were scuttled, given in service before the end of the year 1941, to generally play a part of anti-submarine escort ships. They were respectively renamed : Galeb, Selve ; Jastreb, Zirona ; Kobac, Plain ; Labud, Zuri ;Orao, Vergada and Sokol, Eso.
There remained about it nothing any more but three at the beginning of the Torche operation : one month hardly after its start-up, Sokol/Eso was the first to disappear, cast on December 23, 1941 in the Adriatic by the Greek submarine Nereus ; Jastreb/Zirona followed, cast in July 1942 close of the Greek coasts by French DB-73 ; finally, Labud/Zuri was cast at the time of the bombardment of Augusta on September 17, 1942.
- the six minesweepers all were also given in service, even very old D 2, renamed D 10 and which remained in the Mouths of Kotor. The five modern dredgers were useful in the Adriatic. They were respectively renamed : Malinska, Arbe ; Marjan, Ugliano ; Meljine, Solta ; Mljet, Meleda and Mosor, Pasman.
- On the six motor torpedo boats captured, three were given in service almost immediately, the others at the end of several months : Durmitor at the beginning of September 1941, Dinara on November 15, 1941 and Velebit the 1er March 1942. First of all renamed MAS, they then were reclassified MS (Moto[scafo]Silurante) the 1er July 1942, even the standard high-speed motorboat Thornycroft surviving on this date :
Thornycroft Type :
Uskok : becomes MAS-1D. Run by accident on April 19, 1942.
Chetnik : becomes MAS-2D then MS-55. Used as training ship.
Lrssen type :
Durmitor : becomes MAS-3D then MS-51.
Velebit : becomes MAS-4D then MS-52.
Dinara : becomes MAS-5D then MS-53.
Rudnik : becomes MAS-6D then MS-54.
- the supply craft of Hvar submarines, summarily repaired, was used by the Italians, then by the Germans, like building-deposit. The Yugoslavians found it in Kotor and could give it in state : it was useful until 1953, year when it was condemned.
- the Perun tanker was him also restored in Yugoslavia after the Italian armistice.
[ 1 ] More especially as its name, "Eagle (Orao) White (Bjeli)" , referred to the heraldic eagle of the royal weapons.
[ 2 ] Located on the island of Krapanj and in bay of Jadrtovac.
[ 3 ] That driven back on 6 May having left oily traces on the surface after the attack of Dornier Wal of the 21E flotilla of Dobrota, the crew of this last was seen granting a "probable " submarine. In fact, Narvalo, veteran of the operations of the Eastern Mediterranean and Dodcanse, could return in slightly damaged Brindisi.
[ 4 ] Rogozarski SIM-XIV had a maximum speed of 245 km/h and were armed with two light machine-guns Browning of 7,5 mm, one in a turret of nose, the other with the back of the cockpit. Dornier 22 were parcelled out better with a maximum speed of 355 km/h and an armament of 3 light machine-guns Browning, one drawing through the hub from the propeller, another in dorsal position postpones and the last in ventral position.
[ 5 ] Word-with-word "lieutenant of frigate".
[ 6 ] They constituted two escadrilles autonomous, flying in co-operation with the French Naval Aviation, and achieved many missions as a long time as the planes could be maintained. In April-May 1942, both escadrilles were re-equipped with apparatuses yielded by France.
[ 7 ] The Commander Curkovic was to become one of the figures of royalist Resistance, then one of the negotiators of the difficult political compromises of post-war period.
[ 8 ] The same applied to the remaining planes of the Naval Aviation : the Italians seized all those which could still fly and used them, according to the models, for the basic or advanced drive.
