Soviet AIR FORCE development in FFO
        It is well known that, when Barbarossa struck, the Soviet Air Force (V-VS) and the equivalent of the Air-Defence command (IA-PVO) were reequipping with modern planes. By June 22nd 1941 2829 modern planes have been delivered of which 111 Mig-1, 1289 MiG-3, 399 Yak-1, 322 LaGG-3 fighters, 249 Il-2 attack planes and 459 Pe-2 fast light bombers. Limited production of a heavy 4-engined bomber, the TB-7/Pe-8 was under way. Quite interestingly the nearly 100 Yermolaev medium bombers were NOT counted as "modern" planes even if by their design they clearly belong to such a category.
The command structure was also in a state of deep rebuilding. The V-VS commander, General Smushkevich has been arrested early in 1940 for the failure during the Winter War. He was replaced by P. Ryshagov who, in OTL, was also replaced in July 1941 after the destruction of part of the VVS during the first two weeks of the war. Ryshagov was not a bad officer but clearly lacked experience when appointed in 1940. This would have been obvious by summer 1941 and there is a strong probability that he would have been dismissed (but not arrested) and replaced by F. Zhigarev by fall 1941 after summer full-scale exercises. The OTL successor of Zhigarev, Gen. Novikov, who was Leningrad VO VVS chief of Staff in June 1941 would probably have been appointed as first-deputy early 1942 as he had been identified as soon as 1940 as an exceptionally competent young officer and had gained strong support among military and political authorities.
With a much less traumatic initial period of war in this time line he would have succeeded Zhigarev by late 42/early 43. Zhigarev was a good organizer as demonstrated by the fact that once sent to the Soviet Far-East he created the infrastructure used for the August 1945 offensive against Japanese forces in Manchuria. General Nikitin who was in charge of training in 1941 made a very good assessment of VVS deficiencies in OTL. His report was fully endorsed by Soviet Authorities. Unfortunately it really was at the 11th hour as this report was written by early May 1941 (and can be found in Military Archives in fond 35). In this time line the Nikitin report would have translated into new patterns of training by June/July 1942. By May 1942 VVS crews would then have been much better trained they were in OTL.
        In OTL, production rates were gaining speed very fast for all concerned "modern" planes, with monthly production of over 100 planes for just one factory frequently the minimum figure. Of course, without the war in 1941, the deep and fast advance of axis forces into Soviet Union and the need to relocate factories East and specialise on a very limited number of types, Soviet air equipment would have evolved differently from what we know. Using here books of memories written by Soviet engineers, we assume the following development scenario till end April 1942:
I: Equipment.
Changes induced by FFO are two pronged. First, obviously, Soviet plane production is to develop between June 1941 and late April 1942. This implies a much greater number of modern planes at the beginning of the war. But there is another dimension of the FFO reality. If the beginning of the war is not as catastrophic it was in OTL and if most plants and design office are not to be hastily relocated, then designs already in production in 1941 would have matured more smoothly than in OTL and advanced variants would have been developed faster than in OTL.
I.I.Fighters:
MIG
The MiG 1/3 was the most numerous "modern" fighter plane in VVS inventory by 22nd June 1941. This plane was ill suited for tactical air operations, but was a great plane over 5,000m. It was also a largely underdeveloped airframe and the improvement program launched by Mikoyan and Gurevich had to be curtailed and postponed because of Barbarossa. On the face of OTL data we assume that 2,625 planes would have been produced between July 1st 1941 and May 15th 1942 of which probably at least 800 would have been the improved Mig-3U (sometimes called also the 3D and known as the I-230), armed with 2 x 20mm ShVaK guns and with a speed of 660 km/h at 6,000m and ability to reach 11,500m. MIG-3s and 3Us would have played top-cover for other planes, enabling Soviet pilots to use the "Dive and Zoom" tactics they had used against their Japanese opponents at Nomonhan (Khalkhin Ghol) in 1939. IA-PVO units would have been mounted on MiG fighters.
Without the massive industrial disruption Barbarossa caused in OTL (even if in this time line the German attack is to cause some industrial disruption) two improved derivative of the MIG-3 would most probably have entered production by 1943. The first one would have, been the M-82A radial engine powered I-211 Ye. MIG design bureau converted hastily a MIG-3 airframe to the M-82A engine in December 1941. The result was unsatisfactory, but proved it could be done. MIG was unable to refine the design before late 1942 because of the then tragic situation. However by 1943 they produced a vastly improved plane, the I-211 Ye, which proved to be vastly superior to the La-5FN by then in production. This plane was built in limited numbers (10 units) and battle-tested on the Kalinin Front where it proved to be superior to the FW-190A. However, by this time, no more MIG fighter were in production, so commonality with the MIG-3U airframe was not an asset. The design was dropped in 1944. However, had MIG design office worked in a more stabilised situation, the I-211 Ye would have appeared by early spring 1942 and then would certainly have entered production because factories already building the MIG-3 would have converted easily to the new plane. It would probably have been called the MiG-9 and was much superior to the 1943 La-5 and 5FN, and certainly made mandatory for Lavochkin people to refine the La-5 into the La-7 earlier than in OTL. The second project which flew in OTL but was not produced, and which would most certainly have entered production is the high-altitude I-220A (sometimes called the MiG-11). This plane was thought as a follow-on for the MIG-3 requirement and is not to be confused with very-high altitude projects MIG developed between 1942 to 1945. The I-220 flew with both an AM-38 and an AM-39 engine. It did in OTL its first flight in July 1943. In FFO the plane would certainly have flown earlier as it was designed actually early 1942. If we assume that the first flight could have taken place either in December 1942 or January 1943 (the plane still had a lot of common parts with the MIG-3U), it would most certainly have entered into production by late 1943, re-equipping IA-PVO units by early 1944.
Max speed was 697 km/h at 7000m and the plane reached 6,000m in 4min 30sec. It would then have replaced the MiG-3/3U as the standard "top-cover" fighter in the VVS.
Another MIG design would have most certainly matured to production in FFO, the DIS-200 heavy escort fighter. The requirement for a long-range twin-engined fighter was formulated in 1939 and the newly formed MIG design office reacted by producing a very interesting plane. The DIS-200 mad its first flight in May 1941. It was powered by two AM-37 engine and reached 620 km/h. Armament was to include 4 x 7.62-mm ShKas, 2 x 12.7mm UBS and 1 x 23mm VYa gun. This last was poded under the plane belly and was to replace by either a bomb (500kg or 1000kg) or a torpedo. Another prototype powered with 2 x M-82F engine flew in January 1942 after all the MIG OKB had been re-located to Kazan. In the then prevailing conditions, the plane was abandoned, but test flights had demonstrated the soundness of the design. The concept of a long-range fighter escorting heavy bomber had most much of its interest for the VVS as the strategic ADD force was actually equipped mostly with limited range twin-engined bombers. However, the Naval Aviation VMF-VVS was definitely interested by the M-82F powered plane, which could have been a very powerful strike fighter.
One can then reasonably assume that under FFO conditions, the M-82F powered plane would have flown earlier (probably October 1941) and would have entered limited production, most probably with improved engine cowlings as designed for the I-211 Ye/MIG 9.
By July 1942, 3 to 4 pre-production planes (hand-built by the prototype workshop) would have been sent to the Black-Sea Fleet for operational trials (the VMF-VVS being then the main programme sponsor) and, by June 1943 production planes would have reached operational units. Armament would have probably evolved to 4 x 12.7mm BS machine-guns and 2 x VYa 23-mm guns, these last could be replaced by one large bomb (500kg or 1000kg) or one torpedo. Wings would most certainly have been fitted with rails for 4 x 132mm rockets each. The VYa-23 designed by Volkov and Yartsev, fired a 0.200kg shell at 905-m/sec with a 600rpm rate. The belly-mounted gun pod idea was typically MIG and would have given a great flexibility to the plane, which could by 1943 have been armed with one NS-37 37mm gun and by early 1944 by one NS-45 45mm gun. Both weapons would have had the same weight than 2 x VYa-23 and would have fired more powerful shells, quite useful against enemy light shipping (MTBs, light boats, Siebel Ferries and barges).
Probably no more than 350-500 planes would have been produced between June 1943 and June 1944, when the plane, by then called MIG-5, would have been progressively replaced by advanced variants of the Tu-2.
Yak
The Yak-1 was the archetypal Soviet "frontal" fighter. By spring 1941 it was built in Moscow and the Saratov factory had achieved tooling-up. At "peacetime" rate, at least 2,300 planes would have been built between late June 1941 and mid-May 1942. Improved variants (with the Klimov 105 PF engine would probably have accounted for 700 to 800 of this total. Without the urgency of the war the Yak-7 would have just been a fighter-trainer (2 seats) and no single-seat version would have been developed. However, the Yak-7R reconnaissance plane would certainly have been developed and probably 50 would have been put into service by late April 1942, progressively replacing the Yak-4 as tactical reconnaissance plane.
A specialised Yak-1 variant is most probably to have been developed during winter 1941-42 as the Naval aviation had a requirement for a I-16SB replacement. The I-16 SB was the variant carried by ANT-3 aviamatka mother planes and was carrying 2 x 250kg bombs. It would then have been logical to develop a specialised dive-bomber from the Yak-1 to be carried by the Pe-8 aviamatka. The main difference with a standard Yak-1 would have been a light-alloy main spar and shackles for 2 x 250-kg bombs.
The follow-on Yak-9, which in OTL appeared over Stalingrad, would have been ready to replace the Yak-1 at the Saratov plant by May 1942. Again, without all the pressures of the war and factory evacuations of 1941 Klimov's design office would probably have debugged the VK-107 engine earlier. There is then a strong possibility that the Yak-9U with duralumin main spars and the VK-107 engine would have appeared by late spring/early summer 1944 and not late 1944/early 1945.
The "lightened" Yak-1M would certainly have existed as in OTL and have given birth to the Yak-3, but here again probably earlier, with an IOC date by January/February 1943. The improved Yak-3U, powered by the VK-107 engine could possibly have entered production by late spring 1944.
Lavochkin
The LaGG-3 was the less satisfactory of the "new" Soviet fighters. Planning to use the more powerful radial M-82 engines was discussed before Barbarossa in OTL but, because of disruptions induced by the fast German advance, the La-5 did not pass State Acceptance Trials before May 1942. In this time line, we assume that LaGG-3 would have been terminated by late 1941 with 778 more planes (for a 1,100 total including planes built before June 22nd 1941) and transition to the La-5 would have been done by February-March 1942, with something like 150 to 200 of the new type produced before late April 1942.
Because of the competition coming from the MiG-9 (the I-211 Ye), evolution toward the La-7 would have occurred earlier than in OTL, with the improved Lavochkin fighter emerging probably by summer or fall 1943. It is to be known that the La-7 used the same aerodynamic data than the I-211 Ye, test results of this last having been communicated to the Lavochkin OKB. The I-120/La-7 prototype flew in OTL by November 1943. With an earlier I-211 Ye, there is a strong probability to have an earlier La-7, with the prototype making its first flight by June 1943 and production plane being delivered from February 1944 onward. Some specialised variant of the La-7 would have been developed including the La-7R with a rocket engine the Korolev and Glushko designed RD-1KhZ of 300-kg thrust for 3 minutes. Testing would have taken place during summer 1944 as an insurance against German jet-powered planes. The La-120R powered by a developed variant of the Korolev-Glushko jet engine is known to have reached 461-mph at 3,000m.
The much improved La-9, combining a modified La-7 fuselage and a new all-metal laminar flow wing, would probably have appeared by late fall 1944, too late to take part in the war in Europe but in time to be engaged against Japanese forces.
I.II. Attack and bombardment
The Il-2 Shturmovik was just entering into service by Barbarossa outbreak with only one regiment operational. Production would certainly have gained tempo and probably as much as 2,000 planes would have been built from the Voronezh and the Leningrad factories before mid-May 1942. However, without war experience, the two-seater variant would not have been developed as it was by late 1941. All Il-2 in VVS regiments would then have been quite vulnerable single seaters at the beginning of the war. The two-seater variant would have probably appeared in operational units by January/February 1943. The Shturmovik successor, the Il-10 would have been designed by 1943 and would have entered production by late fall 1944, too late to be used in Europe but equipping some VVS units against Japan.
Pe-2 light bombers were beginning to replace older Tupolev SBs. At May 1941 production rate, certainly more than 1150 planes would have been produced between late June 41 and mid-April 1942, adding to those already produced. Aerodynamical improvements, which, in OTL were deferred till 1943, would have been progressively introduced during fall 1941. Among Pe-2 some would have been the long-range recce variant (Pe-2 R or Razvedchik)
An Heavy/Night fighter variant known as the Pe-3 was built from mid-1941 onwards. A probable 200 planes production run would have been completed by April 1942.
Tu-2: this fast advanced bomber did not appear in VVS service before 1944 in OTL because disruption of the production after Barbarossa. The prototype ANT-58 had flown in January 1941 and the pre-production, M-82 powered ANT-60 would have been ready by summer 1941 but for Barbarossa (it flew in OTL in December 1941). It is then reasonable to assume that Zavod-156 (plant n156) would have been able to produce what was to become the Tu-2 by early 1942. May be up to 150 planes could have been delivered by late April 1942. The Tu-2 would then have replaced older medium bombers much faster, becoming the VVS standard medium bomber by early 1943. The Tu-2 accelerated (or more precisely "normal") development would most certainly have pushed the Yermolaev Yer-2 medium-bomber out of production. The VVS staff had high expectations for this long-range twin-engined bomber but the plane never reached its contractual performances. Then even without the 1941 disruption on production facilities no more than 100 Yermolaev would have been built. They would have been used a night-bombers.
Without the nearly 15 months interruption the plane suffered in OTL because an ill-advised attempt to relocate the factory in the Urals, and then to move oit back to Moscow, its much more advanced developments would have appeared by early 1943 to early 1944. Three variants would logically have been developed.
The first one would have been a "strike" variant of the Tu-2S with the navigator-bomb aimer position deleted and replaced by two 23mm guns, and dive-brakes added. This variant was to supplement the Pe-2 as a tactical bomber/dive-bomber and received the designation Tu-2Sh. First planes were to appear by March 1943.
The second one would have been what was called in OTL the ANT-62 with a high-fineness ratio wing giving to the plane a longer operational radius of action. Either fuel capacity or bomb load could be increased, and the plane was intended to carry either a 2,205lb (1,000kg) bomb load over a 932 miles (1,500km) radius of action or up to 8,818 lb (4,000kg) bomb load over a 435 miles (700km) radius of action. This was making it a perfect DB3/Il-4 replacement for the Navy and as a night bomber (call it the Tu-2-DD when used by the VVs and the Tu-2-T for the VMF).
A third variant would have been the OTL ANT-63, which retained standard Tu-2S wings, but had a redesigned, and cleaner, fuselage and traded radial engines for two V-12 Mikulin AM-39 liquid-cooled engines. The ANT-63, Tupolev described as the Soviet answer to "advanced Ju-88 variants" details of which had been obtained through Intelligence sources, was intended to be used as fast bomber (Skorostnoj Bombardiroschik), a long-range reconnaissance plane (Razvedchik), and a heavy nigh interceptor (Perekhvatchik) using airborne radar developed from German materials. The ANT-63 would have been produced as the Tu-3 SB/R/P.
Assuming the Tu-2-DD prototype could fly by June 1943, it would have been introduced in operational service by the end of the year. The TU-3 would most certainly have been delayed by the need to debug the new Mikulin engine, but the prototype would have flown by October 1943, and the plane would have entered production by late spring 1944. The Tu-3 would have had too a special Naval variant, the Tu-3-T used as strike fighter/torpedo-bomber and replacing the MIG-5.
The Yak-4 light bomber/Reconnaissance plane would have been cancelled after probably a 100 planes production run as in OTL because some deficiencies and a too small bomb load. However existing planes would have been fully converted as tactical reconnaissance planes (they were fast, reaching 550 km/h without bombs at 4,600m).
Pe-8: Barbarossa moved this large 4-engined heavy bomber out of the production. Not only there was not a clear VVS requirement for it but also it used engines desperately needed for the Il-2. In a less tragic context, production of the Pe-8 would have continued at a relatively reduced rate. Probably a total of 150 planes would have been built till late April 1942, half of them going to the 81st Air Division and the other half to the Naval air arm (VVS-VMF) where it is possible that some would have replaced old TB-3s as carrier for I-16 adapted dive bombers (the Zveno system). In OTL, TB-3s and I-16DB launched attacks against bridges and enemy spearheads on the Southern Front. The Pe-8 would have then been the logical TB-3 successor for the VVS-VMF. It is possible that modified Yak-1 fighters would have been used replacing the I-16 as "parasite" fighter-bombers (called then Yak-1 SB or DB). Some Yak-9 has actually been adapted to dive-bombing in OTL. It seems then logical to see the Pe-8 survive in the Naval aviation as aviamatka. In addition to these 150 planes already produced before may 1942, probably 150 more would have been built before the Pe-8 production would have been stopped.
Including then aeroplanes produced before June 22nd, 1941, by late April 1942 VVS, IA-PVO and VVS-VMF would have received 8,175 "modern" fighters of which 4,025 MiG-1/3/3U, 2,700 Yak-1/1M, 1,100 LaGG-3, 150 La-5 and 200 Pe-3. Deliveries of "modern" attack and bombardment planes would have amounted to 4,350 planes with 1,600 Pe-2, 2,250 Il-2, 150 Tu-2 (hypothetical), 100 Yak-4, 100 Yermolaev Yer-2, 150 (at best) Pe-8. Probably 1,800 to 2,000 Il-4/DB-3F would have been delivered, as night-bombers and Torpedo-bombers.
Soviet Union would still have a stock of around 10,000 "obsolescent" but relatively new aeroplanes (airframes and engines with 0 or low hour airframes). Most would have been used as advanced and proficiency trainers and in less exposed garrisons. However, building on the Spanish Civil War experience it is possible that Pavel Ryshagov, the VVS' Commander in 1940/41 and his successor P.F. Zhigarev, would have decided to use I-152 and I-153 fighters as close support aeroplanes (as it was done in OTL early 1942). Actually, RM-82 82mm rockets have been tested on I-153 planes by fall 1940 in OTL. Testing was centred on air-to-air combat, but most lessons were applicable to ground-support. Rocket-equipped I-153s could then have been a valuable addition to Il-2 equipped "attack" regiments.
Some "older" bombers would have been useful, like the Il-4/DB-3, which was quite comparable to an earlier Wellington variant. Some DB-3s were used a torpedo-bombers by the Soviet Naval Aviation. Others were used as night bombers.
I.III. Maritime Reconnaissance flying boats.
The VVS-VMF would have used as in OTL a considerable number of old, but reliable MBR-2. However, with Taganrog quite safe from German depredations the MDR-6 production is to have considerably exceeded the 17 units built in OTL. The MDR-6 would have complemented and not replaced the GST (a licence Taganrog-built Catalina) in VVS-VMF reconnaissance units.
Ship-based and coastal-reconnaissance units are to use the Beriev developed KOR-2 (Be-4), which was entering production in 1941. The KOR-2 would have progressively replaced the MBR-2 as a short-range ASW patrol flying-boat and would have been used from Soviet cruisers.
Because flying-boats would not have been a production priority, there is a strong possibility that Tanganrog-built GST would have been supplemented by 138 Lend-Lease PBY5 as in OTL.
I.IV. Transport planes
Without Barbarossa by June 1941, production of the DC-3 licence-copy (the Li-2) would have been more important. By mid-May 1942 at least 150 Li-2 would have been in VVS and Aeroflot service. This would still have been too small a transport plane force for the 5 airborne corps, but, with the addition of old TB-3 bombers used either as transport (up to 14 paratroopers) or as glider-tugs (with the development of the 9 seats Antonov A-7 assault glider maturing by late 41 and production beginning by early 42, and probably a productionised variant of the Gribovsky G-11 able to carry up to 20 troops or 2,000kg of freight), the situation would have been significantly different than in OTL.
Soviet Union would still have needed Lend-lease planes. In OTL it got more than 700 DC-3. We assume that a similar number of planes would have been delivered. However, the VVS would probably have required something bigger than the DC-3 /C-47 and could have received some Curtiss C-46. As the VVS would not have needed the large number of P-40 it consumed in OTL, it is possible that some production capacities at Curtiss could have allowed for 100 C-46 to be delivered in 1943 and 1944.
Soviet WWII use of paratroopers never exceeded a battalion-size drop. Sometimes up to three airdrops operations would have to be launched to achieve a regiment-sized force on the ground. Here, a full regiment-sized airdrop could have been possible; and may be more. The pre-war Soviet doctrine was advocating the use of airborne troops either during the very initial stage of the war (at best just before the official declaration of War) to seize vital command posts and key installations or, in a "hot-pursuit" operations to seize bridges and prevent their destruction.
Light transport would still have been done by the famed Po-2 and by the light twin-engined Yakovlev Yak-6.
I.V. Electronics:
Soviet Union had deployed 2 radar types by June 1941, the RUS-1 "Reven" (rhubarb) and the RUS-2 "Redut" (redoubt). This later was the only real effective one and by June 1941 just 6 were ready. By April 1942 however the improved Redut-41 would have been deployed, with probably between 30 to 45 sets operational. They had a 95km to 120 km range and were quite mobile, requiring 2 trucks (+ 4 others for generators and radar crew) for a complete radar station.
A much-improved RUS-2 called "Pegmatit" was developed during fall 1941. Heavier than "Redut" it had a greater range but was not so easily mobile. Height finding was added in OTL by mid-42 but would have appeared sooner without Barbarossa which disrupted the research work done at Leningrad on the new radar. By April 1942 probably as much as 10 improved "Pegmatit" radars could have been deployed.
One thing which is difficult to precisely assess is the possibility that Germany would have had to sell some Freya or Wurzburg type radars to Soviet Union as payment for more oil and grains in 1941. If the German government had actually sent to the Japanese documentation and even some examples of Freya and Wurzburg radar-sets, it could have done it only through Soviet-Union. At the very least Soviet specialists would have been well aware of German radar technology by winter 41/42. Germany was lagging behind GB in magnetron-equipped radars (centimetric types). However in the 150cm to 50cm bandwidth, the German industry was on par with the British or the US one. The impact of German technology on "Redut" and "Pegmatit" types radar is then highly possible, with improved performances as a result.
Soviet engineers were well aware of RUS-1 and RUS-2 limitations in OTL and were working feverishly to correct them. What disrupted most Soviet radar researches in OTL was the Leningrad siege as research and development facilities were in Leningrad. It is here more than probable that various improvements would have appeared by 1942.
The first one would have been a modification enabling the RUS-2 to give indications of the target altitude. This would have been introduced by late spring 1942.
The second one was the very long-range version of the RUS-2 called P-2M or Redut-D. In OTL it entered production in 1943. We can reasonably assume it would have been here deployed since winter 42/43.
A naval variant of the RUS-2 was mounted on cruiser Molotov early 1942 and used operationally in OTL. This RUS-2K would have been standard equipment for large VMF units by May 1942.
The RUS-2 successor, the P-3 Biryuza, was not introduced in operational service before early 1947 in OTL. Some sets could have reached operational status here by mid 1944.
If information could have been gained on the German Wurzburg series early 1942, two lines of development would most probably have been followed. The first one would have been the direct copy of Wurzburg and Wurzburg-Rieze radar-sets both for AA guns and for fighter-direction. The second one, if good contacts with GB had been established after the outbreak of the war with Germany, would have been to combine centimetric technology with German derived antennas, more or less like the German industry tried to do with the "Berlin" series.
From post-war radar type designators, we can infer that the initial Wurzburg copy could have been the PR-1 radar, Wurzburg-Rieze copy would have been called PR-2 and the wedding of a British magnetron to a Wurzburg antenna the PR-3. A special "height-finder" radar could have been developed from the PR-3, with an "orange-peel" antenna, and would have been probably called the PRV-4.
A last development could have been airborne radar-sets derived from German ones, both for night-fighters and for maritime reconnaissance. From the Lichtenstein series some NF radar sets could have been developed by 1943 to equip Pe-3 and then Tu-3P night-fighters. ASV radar would have appeared on Il-4 and Tu-2T also by late 1943.
I.VI. AA guns and airfield protection.
One probable major change between June 1941 and April 1942 would have been the deployment of more effective AA guns around high-value targets like airfields and depots.
The 37mm automatic AA gun would have been in full production. In OTL 1,382 37mm Mod-1939 were in service at the outbreak of war. By mid-May 1942 one can reasonably assume that 2,500 37mm guns would have been in service, still far short than the 5,000 guns requirement. The 25mm single, mod-1940 would have entered production but probably no more than 500 to 600 would have been built.
As a stopgap it is possible that the 12,7mm heavy machine-gun (the DShK-38, which was using a 12.7 x 108 mm round more powerful than the US 0.50in one) would have been more extensively produced than in OTL either with a single light tripod mount or with a quad one.
The 85mm Mod39 would have more fully replaced earlier 76/55 guns (mod-31 and mod-3
.
A PVO light battalion would have protected Front airfields (that is airfields at less than 50 km from the Forward Edge of Battle Area) with 8 x 37mm and 8 x quad 7,62mm mg (this last possibly replaced progressively by 12,7mm DShK-38 mg). Larger airfields and depots would have been protected by PVO artillery regiments with 24 x 37mm and 12 x 85mm AAG. In some AA units, guns would have been linked to mechanical "predictor" machines.
Lack of AA defence was a key factor in the German initial counter-air strike success on June 22nd, 1941. With improved AA defence and some radar warning the initial strike on airfields would have been less effective and costlier.
I.VII. Infrastructures:
By late 1940 it was obvious that airfield construction, logistics and technical services required extensive reform. The V-VS General Staff has clearly acknowledged this problem and created "air base region" (Rajon Aviacionnogo Bazirovanija or RAB) by late 1940 to support air-divisions. By June 1941 no less than 36 RAB has been established and in March 1941 25,000 workers had been transferred to airfield construction. With the German attack postponed to mid-May 1942 this belated effort would have paid dividends and each regiment, at least in most exposed Voennyj Okrug would have been provided with 3 airfields (a main one, a standby one and a field facility).
Maintenance would have been much improved by the creation, early 1941, of special maintenance units called Batal'on Aerodromnogo Obsluzhenija or BAO. When one reads books written by French Normandie-Nemen fighter pilots it is quite clear that the BAO was a very effective tool for support and maintenance, even in a relatively fluid situation. Here again this reform had happened too late in OTL but, in this time line, would have had deep consequences on V-VS planes availability and daily rate of operation by 1942.
Third, the V-VS was beginning to address the training issue by late 1940/spring 1941, dramatically increasing monthly training flight time (one recommendation of the Nikitin report) and creating a whole network of special schools providing more extensive and demanding training curricula. This would have translated by mid-May 1942 into a significant increase of flying proficiency and a large pool of decently trained crews coming from schools they have entered in July 1941 by spring 1943.
        It is well known that, when Barbarossa struck, the Soviet Air Force (V-VS) and the equivalent of the Air-Defence command (IA-PVO) were reequipping with modern planes. By June 22nd 1941 2829 modern planes have been delivered of which 111 Mig-1, 1289 MiG-3, 399 Yak-1, 322 LaGG-3 fighters, 249 Il-2 attack planes and 459 Pe-2 fast light bombers. Limited production of a heavy 4-engined bomber, the TB-7/Pe-8 was under way. Quite interestingly the nearly 100 Yermolaev medium bombers were NOT counted as "modern" planes even if by their design they clearly belong to such a category.
The command structure was also in a state of deep rebuilding. The V-VS commander, General Smushkevich has been arrested early in 1940 for the failure during the Winter War. He was replaced by P. Ryshagov who, in OTL, was also replaced in July 1941 after the destruction of part of the VVS during the first two weeks of the war. Ryshagov was not a bad officer but clearly lacked experience when appointed in 1940. This would have been obvious by summer 1941 and there is a strong probability that he would have been dismissed (but not arrested) and replaced by F. Zhigarev by fall 1941 after summer full-scale exercises. The OTL successor of Zhigarev, Gen. Novikov, who was Leningrad VO VVS chief of Staff in June 1941 would probably have been appointed as first-deputy early 1942 as he had been identified as soon as 1940 as an exceptionally competent young officer and had gained strong support among military and political authorities.
With a much less traumatic initial period of war in this time line he would have succeeded Zhigarev by late 42/early 43. Zhigarev was a good organizer as demonstrated by the fact that once sent to the Soviet Far-East he created the infrastructure used for the August 1945 offensive against Japanese forces in Manchuria. General Nikitin who was in charge of training in 1941 made a very good assessment of VVS deficiencies in OTL. His report was fully endorsed by Soviet Authorities. Unfortunately it really was at the 11th hour as this report was written by early May 1941 (and can be found in Military Archives in fond 35). In this time line the Nikitin report would have translated into new patterns of training by June/July 1942. By May 1942 VVS crews would then have been much better trained they were in OTL.
        In OTL, production rates were gaining speed very fast for all concerned "modern" planes, with monthly production of over 100 planes for just one factory frequently the minimum figure. Of course, without the war in 1941, the deep and fast advance of axis forces into Soviet Union and the need to relocate factories East and specialise on a very limited number of types, Soviet air equipment would have evolved differently from what we know. Using here books of memories written by Soviet engineers, we assume the following development scenario till end April 1942:
I: Equipment.
Changes induced by FFO are two pronged. First, obviously, Soviet plane production is to develop between June 1941 and late April 1942. This implies a much greater number of modern planes at the beginning of the war. But there is another dimension of the FFO reality. If the beginning of the war is not as catastrophic it was in OTL and if most plants and design office are not to be hastily relocated, then designs already in production in 1941 would have matured more smoothly than in OTL and advanced variants would have been developed faster than in OTL.
I.I.Fighters:
MIG
The MiG 1/3 was the most numerous "modern" fighter plane in VVS inventory by 22nd June 1941. This plane was ill suited for tactical air operations, but was a great plane over 5,000m. It was also a largely underdeveloped airframe and the improvement program launched by Mikoyan and Gurevich had to be curtailed and postponed because of Barbarossa. On the face of OTL data we assume that 2,625 planes would have been produced between July 1st 1941 and May 15th 1942 of which probably at least 800 would have been the improved Mig-3U (sometimes called also the 3D and known as the I-230), armed with 2 x 20mm ShVaK guns and with a speed of 660 km/h at 6,000m and ability to reach 11,500m. MIG-3s and 3Us would have played top-cover for other planes, enabling Soviet pilots to use the "Dive and Zoom" tactics they had used against their Japanese opponents at Nomonhan (Khalkhin Ghol) in 1939. IA-PVO units would have been mounted on MiG fighters.
Without the massive industrial disruption Barbarossa caused in OTL (even if in this time line the German attack is to cause some industrial disruption) two improved derivative of the MIG-3 would most probably have entered production by 1943. The first one would have, been the M-82A radial engine powered I-211 Ye. MIG design bureau converted hastily a MIG-3 airframe to the M-82A engine in December 1941. The result was unsatisfactory, but proved it could be done. MIG was unable to refine the design before late 1942 because of the then tragic situation. However by 1943 they produced a vastly improved plane, the I-211 Ye, which proved to be vastly superior to the La-5FN by then in production. This plane was built in limited numbers (10 units) and battle-tested on the Kalinin Front where it proved to be superior to the FW-190A. However, by this time, no more MIG fighter were in production, so commonality with the MIG-3U airframe was not an asset. The design was dropped in 1944. However, had MIG design office worked in a more stabilised situation, the I-211 Ye would have appeared by early spring 1942 and then would certainly have entered production because factories already building the MIG-3 would have converted easily to the new plane. It would probably have been called the MiG-9 and was much superior to the 1943 La-5 and 5FN, and certainly made mandatory for Lavochkin people to refine the La-5 into the La-7 earlier than in OTL. The second project which flew in OTL but was not produced, and which would most certainly have entered production is the high-altitude I-220A (sometimes called the MiG-11). This plane was thought as a follow-on for the MIG-3 requirement and is not to be confused with very-high altitude projects MIG developed between 1942 to 1945. The I-220 flew with both an AM-38 and an AM-39 engine. It did in OTL its first flight in July 1943. In FFO the plane would certainly have flown earlier as it was designed actually early 1942. If we assume that the first flight could have taken place either in December 1942 or January 1943 (the plane still had a lot of common parts with the MIG-3U), it would most certainly have entered into production by late 1943, re-equipping IA-PVO units by early 1944.
Max speed was 697 km/h at 7000m and the plane reached 6,000m in 4min 30sec. It would then have replaced the MiG-3/3U as the standard "top-cover" fighter in the VVS.
Another MIG design would have most certainly matured to production in FFO, the DIS-200 heavy escort fighter. The requirement for a long-range twin-engined fighter was formulated in 1939 and the newly formed MIG design office reacted by producing a very interesting plane. The DIS-200 mad its first flight in May 1941. It was powered by two AM-37 engine and reached 620 km/h. Armament was to include 4 x 7.62-mm ShKas, 2 x 12.7mm UBS and 1 x 23mm VYa gun. This last was poded under the plane belly and was to replace by either a bomb (500kg or 1000kg) or a torpedo. Another prototype powered with 2 x M-82F engine flew in January 1942 after all the MIG OKB had been re-located to Kazan. In the then prevailing conditions, the plane was abandoned, but test flights had demonstrated the soundness of the design. The concept of a long-range fighter escorting heavy bomber had most much of its interest for the VVS as the strategic ADD force was actually equipped mostly with limited range twin-engined bombers. However, the Naval Aviation VMF-VVS was definitely interested by the M-82F powered plane, which could have been a very powerful strike fighter.
One can then reasonably assume that under FFO conditions, the M-82F powered plane would have flown earlier (probably October 1941) and would have entered limited production, most probably with improved engine cowlings as designed for the I-211 Ye/MIG 9.
By July 1942, 3 to 4 pre-production planes (hand-built by the prototype workshop) would have been sent to the Black-Sea Fleet for operational trials (the VMF-VVS being then the main programme sponsor) and, by June 1943 production planes would have reached operational units. Armament would have probably evolved to 4 x 12.7mm BS machine-guns and 2 x VYa 23-mm guns, these last could be replaced by one large bomb (500kg or 1000kg) or one torpedo. Wings would most certainly have been fitted with rails for 4 x 132mm rockets each. The VYa-23 designed by Volkov and Yartsev, fired a 0.200kg shell at 905-m/sec with a 600rpm rate. The belly-mounted gun pod idea was typically MIG and would have given a great flexibility to the plane, which could by 1943 have been armed with one NS-37 37mm gun and by early 1944 by one NS-45 45mm gun. Both weapons would have had the same weight than 2 x VYa-23 and would have fired more powerful shells, quite useful against enemy light shipping (MTBs, light boats, Siebel Ferries and barges).
Probably no more than 350-500 planes would have been produced between June 1943 and June 1944, when the plane, by then called MIG-5, would have been progressively replaced by advanced variants of the Tu-2.
Yak
The Yak-1 was the archetypal Soviet "frontal" fighter. By spring 1941 it was built in Moscow and the Saratov factory had achieved tooling-up. At "peacetime" rate, at least 2,300 planes would have been built between late June 1941 and mid-May 1942. Improved variants (with the Klimov 105 PF engine would probably have accounted for 700 to 800 of this total. Without the urgency of the war the Yak-7 would have just been a fighter-trainer (2 seats) and no single-seat version would have been developed. However, the Yak-7R reconnaissance plane would certainly have been developed and probably 50 would have been put into service by late April 1942, progressively replacing the Yak-4 as tactical reconnaissance plane.
A specialised Yak-1 variant is most probably to have been developed during winter 1941-42 as the Naval aviation had a requirement for a I-16SB replacement. The I-16 SB was the variant carried by ANT-3 aviamatka mother planes and was carrying 2 x 250kg bombs. It would then have been logical to develop a specialised dive-bomber from the Yak-1 to be carried by the Pe-8 aviamatka. The main difference with a standard Yak-1 would have been a light-alloy main spar and shackles for 2 x 250-kg bombs.
The follow-on Yak-9, which in OTL appeared over Stalingrad, would have been ready to replace the Yak-1 at the Saratov plant by May 1942. Again, without all the pressures of the war and factory evacuations of 1941 Klimov's design office would probably have debugged the VK-107 engine earlier. There is then a strong possibility that the Yak-9U with duralumin main spars and the VK-107 engine would have appeared by late spring/early summer 1944 and not late 1944/early 1945.
The "lightened" Yak-1M would certainly have existed as in OTL and have given birth to the Yak-3, but here again probably earlier, with an IOC date by January/February 1943. The improved Yak-3U, powered by the VK-107 engine could possibly have entered production by late spring 1944.
Lavochkin
The LaGG-3 was the less satisfactory of the "new" Soviet fighters. Planning to use the more powerful radial M-82 engines was discussed before Barbarossa in OTL but, because of disruptions induced by the fast German advance, the La-5 did not pass State Acceptance Trials before May 1942. In this time line, we assume that LaGG-3 would have been terminated by late 1941 with 778 more planes (for a 1,100 total including planes built before June 22nd 1941) and transition to the La-5 would have been done by February-March 1942, with something like 150 to 200 of the new type produced before late April 1942.
Because of the competition coming from the MiG-9 (the I-211 Ye), evolution toward the La-7 would have occurred earlier than in OTL, with the improved Lavochkin fighter emerging probably by summer or fall 1943. It is to be known that the La-7 used the same aerodynamic data than the I-211 Ye, test results of this last having been communicated to the Lavochkin OKB. The I-120/La-7 prototype flew in OTL by November 1943. With an earlier I-211 Ye, there is a strong probability to have an earlier La-7, with the prototype making its first flight by June 1943 and production plane being delivered from February 1944 onward. Some specialised variant of the La-7 would have been developed including the La-7R with a rocket engine the Korolev and Glushko designed RD-1KhZ of 300-kg thrust for 3 minutes. Testing would have taken place during summer 1944 as an insurance against German jet-powered planes. The La-120R powered by a developed variant of the Korolev-Glushko jet engine is known to have reached 461-mph at 3,000m.
The much improved La-9, combining a modified La-7 fuselage and a new all-metal laminar flow wing, would probably have appeared by late fall 1944, too late to take part in the war in Europe but in time to be engaged against Japanese forces.
I.II. Attack and bombardment
The Il-2 Shturmovik was just entering into service by Barbarossa outbreak with only one regiment operational. Production would certainly have gained tempo and probably as much as 2,000 planes would have been built from the Voronezh and the Leningrad factories before mid-May 1942. However, without war experience, the two-seater variant would not have been developed as it was by late 1941. All Il-2 in VVS regiments would then have been quite vulnerable single seaters at the beginning of the war. The two-seater variant would have probably appeared in operational units by January/February 1943. The Shturmovik successor, the Il-10 would have been designed by 1943 and would have entered production by late fall 1944, too late to be used in Europe but equipping some VVS units against Japan.
Pe-2 light bombers were beginning to replace older Tupolev SBs. At May 1941 production rate, certainly more than 1150 planes would have been produced between late June 41 and mid-April 1942, adding to those already produced. Aerodynamical improvements, which, in OTL were deferred till 1943, would have been progressively introduced during fall 1941. Among Pe-2 some would have been the long-range recce variant (Pe-2 R or Razvedchik)
An Heavy/Night fighter variant known as the Pe-3 was built from mid-1941 onwards. A probable 200 planes production run would have been completed by April 1942.
Tu-2: this fast advanced bomber did not appear in VVS service before 1944 in OTL because disruption of the production after Barbarossa. The prototype ANT-58 had flown in January 1941 and the pre-production, M-82 powered ANT-60 would have been ready by summer 1941 but for Barbarossa (it flew in OTL in December 1941). It is then reasonable to assume that Zavod-156 (plant n156) would have been able to produce what was to become the Tu-2 by early 1942. May be up to 150 planes could have been delivered by late April 1942. The Tu-2 would then have replaced older medium bombers much faster, becoming the VVS standard medium bomber by early 1943. The Tu-2 accelerated (or more precisely "normal") development would most certainly have pushed the Yermolaev Yer-2 medium-bomber out of production. The VVS staff had high expectations for this long-range twin-engined bomber but the plane never reached its contractual performances. Then even without the 1941 disruption on production facilities no more than 100 Yermolaev would have been built. They would have been used a night-bombers.
Without the nearly 15 months interruption the plane suffered in OTL because an ill-advised attempt to relocate the factory in the Urals, and then to move oit back to Moscow, its much more advanced developments would have appeared by early 1943 to early 1944. Three variants would logically have been developed.
The first one would have been a "strike" variant of the Tu-2S with the navigator-bomb aimer position deleted and replaced by two 23mm guns, and dive-brakes added. This variant was to supplement the Pe-2 as a tactical bomber/dive-bomber and received the designation Tu-2Sh. First planes were to appear by March 1943.
The second one would have been what was called in OTL the ANT-62 with a high-fineness ratio wing giving to the plane a longer operational radius of action. Either fuel capacity or bomb load could be increased, and the plane was intended to carry either a 2,205lb (1,000kg) bomb load over a 932 miles (1,500km) radius of action or up to 8,818 lb (4,000kg) bomb load over a 435 miles (700km) radius of action. This was making it a perfect DB3/Il-4 replacement for the Navy and as a night bomber (call it the Tu-2-DD when used by the VVs and the Tu-2-T for the VMF).
A third variant would have been the OTL ANT-63, which retained standard Tu-2S wings, but had a redesigned, and cleaner, fuselage and traded radial engines for two V-12 Mikulin AM-39 liquid-cooled engines. The ANT-63, Tupolev described as the Soviet answer to "advanced Ju-88 variants" details of which had been obtained through Intelligence sources, was intended to be used as fast bomber (Skorostnoj Bombardiroschik), a long-range reconnaissance plane (Razvedchik), and a heavy nigh interceptor (Perekhvatchik) using airborne radar developed from German materials. The ANT-63 would have been produced as the Tu-3 SB/R/P.
Assuming the Tu-2-DD prototype could fly by June 1943, it would have been introduced in operational service by the end of the year. The TU-3 would most certainly have been delayed by the need to debug the new Mikulin engine, but the prototype would have flown by October 1943, and the plane would have entered production by late spring 1944. The Tu-3 would have had too a special Naval variant, the Tu-3-T used as strike fighter/torpedo-bomber and replacing the MIG-5.
The Yak-4 light bomber/Reconnaissance plane would have been cancelled after probably a 100 planes production run as in OTL because some deficiencies and a too small bomb load. However existing planes would have been fully converted as tactical reconnaissance planes (they were fast, reaching 550 km/h without bombs at 4,600m).
Pe-8: Barbarossa moved this large 4-engined heavy bomber out of the production. Not only there was not a clear VVS requirement for it but also it used engines desperately needed for the Il-2. In a less tragic context, production of the Pe-8 would have continued at a relatively reduced rate. Probably a total of 150 planes would have been built till late April 1942, half of them going to the 81st Air Division and the other half to the Naval air arm (VVS-VMF) where it is possible that some would have replaced old TB-3s as carrier for I-16 adapted dive bombers (the Zveno system). In OTL, TB-3s and I-16DB launched attacks against bridges and enemy spearheads on the Southern Front. The Pe-8 would have then been the logical TB-3 successor for the VVS-VMF. It is possible that modified Yak-1 fighters would have been used replacing the I-16 as "parasite" fighter-bombers (called then Yak-1 SB or DB). Some Yak-9 has actually been adapted to dive-bombing in OTL. It seems then logical to see the Pe-8 survive in the Naval aviation as aviamatka. In addition to these 150 planes already produced before may 1942, probably 150 more would have been built before the Pe-8 production would have been stopped.
Including then aeroplanes produced before June 22nd, 1941, by late April 1942 VVS, IA-PVO and VVS-VMF would have received 8,175 "modern" fighters of which 4,025 MiG-1/3/3U, 2,700 Yak-1/1M, 1,100 LaGG-3, 150 La-5 and 200 Pe-3. Deliveries of "modern" attack and bombardment planes would have amounted to 4,350 planes with 1,600 Pe-2, 2,250 Il-2, 150 Tu-2 (hypothetical), 100 Yak-4, 100 Yermolaev Yer-2, 150 (at best) Pe-8. Probably 1,800 to 2,000 Il-4/DB-3F would have been delivered, as night-bombers and Torpedo-bombers.
Soviet Union would still have a stock of around 10,000 "obsolescent" but relatively new aeroplanes (airframes and engines with 0 or low hour airframes). Most would have been used as advanced and proficiency trainers and in less exposed garrisons. However, building on the Spanish Civil War experience it is possible that Pavel Ryshagov, the VVS' Commander in 1940/41 and his successor P.F. Zhigarev, would have decided to use I-152 and I-153 fighters as close support aeroplanes (as it was done in OTL early 1942). Actually, RM-82 82mm rockets have been tested on I-153 planes by fall 1940 in OTL. Testing was centred on air-to-air combat, but most lessons were applicable to ground-support. Rocket-equipped I-153s could then have been a valuable addition to Il-2 equipped "attack" regiments.
Some "older" bombers would have been useful, like the Il-4/DB-3, which was quite comparable to an earlier Wellington variant. Some DB-3s were used a torpedo-bombers by the Soviet Naval Aviation. Others were used as night bombers.
I.III. Maritime Reconnaissance flying boats.
The VVS-VMF would have used as in OTL a considerable number of old, but reliable MBR-2. However, with Taganrog quite safe from German depredations the MDR-6 production is to have considerably exceeded the 17 units built in OTL. The MDR-6 would have complemented and not replaced the GST (a licence Taganrog-built Catalina) in VVS-VMF reconnaissance units.
Ship-based and coastal-reconnaissance units are to use the Beriev developed KOR-2 (Be-4), which was entering production in 1941. The KOR-2 would have progressively replaced the MBR-2 as a short-range ASW patrol flying-boat and would have been used from Soviet cruisers.
Because flying-boats would not have been a production priority, there is a strong possibility that Tanganrog-built GST would have been supplemented by 138 Lend-Lease PBY5 as in OTL.
I.IV. Transport planes
Without Barbarossa by June 1941, production of the DC-3 licence-copy (the Li-2) would have been more important. By mid-May 1942 at least 150 Li-2 would have been in VVS and Aeroflot service. This would still have been too small a transport plane force for the 5 airborne corps, but, with the addition of old TB-3 bombers used either as transport (up to 14 paratroopers) or as glider-tugs (with the development of the 9 seats Antonov A-7 assault glider maturing by late 41 and production beginning by early 42, and probably a productionised variant of the Gribovsky G-11 able to carry up to 20 troops or 2,000kg of freight), the situation would have been significantly different than in OTL.
Soviet Union would still have needed Lend-lease planes. In OTL it got more than 700 DC-3. We assume that a similar number of planes would have been delivered. However, the VVS would probably have required something bigger than the DC-3 /C-47 and could have received some Curtiss C-46. As the VVS would not have needed the large number of P-40 it consumed in OTL, it is possible that some production capacities at Curtiss could have allowed for 100 C-46 to be delivered in 1943 and 1944.
Soviet WWII use of paratroopers never exceeded a battalion-size drop. Sometimes up to three airdrops operations would have to be launched to achieve a regiment-sized force on the ground. Here, a full regiment-sized airdrop could have been possible; and may be more. The pre-war Soviet doctrine was advocating the use of airborne troops either during the very initial stage of the war (at best just before the official declaration of War) to seize vital command posts and key installations or, in a "hot-pursuit" operations to seize bridges and prevent their destruction.
Light transport would still have been done by the famed Po-2 and by the light twin-engined Yakovlev Yak-6.
I.V. Electronics:
Soviet Union had deployed 2 radar types by June 1941, the RUS-1 "Reven" (rhubarb) and the RUS-2 "Redut" (redoubt). This later was the only real effective one and by June 1941 just 6 were ready. By April 1942 however the improved Redut-41 would have been deployed, with probably between 30 to 45 sets operational. They had a 95km to 120 km range and were quite mobile, requiring 2 trucks (+ 4 others for generators and radar crew) for a complete radar station.
A much-improved RUS-2 called "Pegmatit" was developed during fall 1941. Heavier than "Redut" it had a greater range but was not so easily mobile. Height finding was added in OTL by mid-42 but would have appeared sooner without Barbarossa which disrupted the research work done at Leningrad on the new radar. By April 1942 probably as much as 10 improved "Pegmatit" radars could have been deployed.
One thing which is difficult to precisely assess is the possibility that Germany would have had to sell some Freya or Wurzburg type radars to Soviet Union as payment for more oil and grains in 1941. If the German government had actually sent to the Japanese documentation and even some examples of Freya and Wurzburg radar-sets, it could have done it only through Soviet-Union. At the very least Soviet specialists would have been well aware of German radar technology by winter 41/42. Germany was lagging behind GB in magnetron-equipped radars (centimetric types). However in the 150cm to 50cm bandwidth, the German industry was on par with the British or the US one. The impact of German technology on "Redut" and "Pegmatit" types radar is then highly possible, with improved performances as a result.
Soviet engineers were well aware of RUS-1 and RUS-2 limitations in OTL and were working feverishly to correct them. What disrupted most Soviet radar researches in OTL was the Leningrad siege as research and development facilities were in Leningrad. It is here more than probable that various improvements would have appeared by 1942.
The first one would have been a modification enabling the RUS-2 to give indications of the target altitude. This would have been introduced by late spring 1942.
The second one was the very long-range version of the RUS-2 called P-2M or Redut-D. In OTL it entered production in 1943. We can reasonably assume it would have been here deployed since winter 42/43.
A naval variant of the RUS-2 was mounted on cruiser Molotov early 1942 and used operationally in OTL. This RUS-2K would have been standard equipment for large VMF units by May 1942.
The RUS-2 successor, the P-3 Biryuza, was not introduced in operational service before early 1947 in OTL. Some sets could have reached operational status here by mid 1944.
If information could have been gained on the German Wurzburg series early 1942, two lines of development would most probably have been followed. The first one would have been the direct copy of Wurzburg and Wurzburg-Rieze radar-sets both for AA guns and for fighter-direction. The second one, if good contacts with GB had been established after the outbreak of the war with Germany, would have been to combine centimetric technology with German derived antennas, more or less like the German industry tried to do with the "Berlin" series.
From post-war radar type designators, we can infer that the initial Wurzburg copy could have been the PR-1 radar, Wurzburg-Rieze copy would have been called PR-2 and the wedding of a British magnetron to a Wurzburg antenna the PR-3. A special "height-finder" radar could have been developed from the PR-3, with an "orange-peel" antenna, and would have been probably called the PRV-4.
A last development could have been airborne radar-sets derived from German ones, both for night-fighters and for maritime reconnaissance. From the Lichtenstein series some NF radar sets could have been developed by 1943 to equip Pe-3 and then Tu-3P night-fighters. ASV radar would have appeared on Il-4 and Tu-2T also by late 1943.
I.VI. AA guns and airfield protection.
One probable major change between June 1941 and April 1942 would have been the deployment of more effective AA guns around high-value targets like airfields and depots.
The 37mm automatic AA gun would have been in full production. In OTL 1,382 37mm Mod-1939 were in service at the outbreak of war. By mid-May 1942 one can reasonably assume that 2,500 37mm guns would have been in service, still far short than the 5,000 guns requirement. The 25mm single, mod-1940 would have entered production but probably no more than 500 to 600 would have been built.
As a stopgap it is possible that the 12,7mm heavy machine-gun (the DShK-38, which was using a 12.7 x 108 mm round more powerful than the US 0.50in one) would have been more extensively produced than in OTL either with a single light tripod mount or with a quad one.
The 85mm Mod39 would have more fully replaced earlier 76/55 guns (mod-31 and mod-3
A PVO light battalion would have protected Front airfields (that is airfields at less than 50 km from the Forward Edge of Battle Area) with 8 x 37mm and 8 x quad 7,62mm mg (this last possibly replaced progressively by 12,7mm DShK-38 mg). Larger airfields and depots would have been protected by PVO artillery regiments with 24 x 37mm and 12 x 85mm AAG. In some AA units, guns would have been linked to mechanical "predictor" machines.
Lack of AA defence was a key factor in the German initial counter-air strike success on June 22nd, 1941. With improved AA defence and some radar warning the initial strike on airfields would have been less effective and costlier.
I.VII. Infrastructures:
By late 1940 it was obvious that airfield construction, logistics and technical services required extensive reform. The V-VS General Staff has clearly acknowledged this problem and created "air base region" (Rajon Aviacionnogo Bazirovanija or RAB) by late 1940 to support air-divisions. By June 1941 no less than 36 RAB has been established and in March 1941 25,000 workers had been transferred to airfield construction. With the German attack postponed to mid-May 1942 this belated effort would have paid dividends and each regiment, at least in most exposed Voennyj Okrug would have been provided with 3 airfields (a main one, a standby one and a field facility).
Maintenance would have been much improved by the creation, early 1941, of special maintenance units called Batal'on Aerodromnogo Obsluzhenija or BAO. When one reads books written by French Normandie-Nemen fighter pilots it is quite clear that the BAO was a very effective tool for support and maintenance, even in a relatively fluid situation. Here again this reform had happened too late in OTL but, in this time line, would have had deep consequences on V-VS planes availability and daily rate of operation by 1942.
Third, the V-VS was beginning to address the training issue by late 1940/spring 1941, dramatically increasing monthly training flight time (one recommendation of the Nikitin report) and creating a whole network of special schools providing more extensive and demanding training curricula. This would have translated by mid-May 1942 into a significant increase of flying proficiency and a large pool of decently trained crews coming from schools they have entered in July 1941 by spring 1943.
