Russia
I know weve talked about this but the more and more I research into it the more I have problems with what has been discussed. To try to work this out Ive put my thoughts down on this paper in hopes of getting some answers.
        First problem. With Russias production figures. When in a previous discussion I asked how Russias 1941 production figures could change from historical I was told because of the USAs increase in production the USSR would follow suit. Problem, historically the USSRs production was already above the USs and a doubling of production would be required for the USA to even equal Aircraft Production. As for Tank production, the historical levels in the US were a joke. In FFO this will change but the impact of the increase in production levels should still not be an issue for Russia till 1942. The nice thing is she has a year to move her production east of Moscow.
Problem, using the USSRs Aircraft production as an example. The roughly 10000 aircraft a year that the USSR produced was based on aluminium production allocated to the aircraft industry. To increase aircraft production some other area that had been allocated aluminium would have to do with less. Also if you allocated the total production of aluminium to aircraft production the USSR only had enough to produce between 16000 and 18000 aircraft per year. Not the 20000+ that was discussed. Diversion of Strategic materials by Britain in the fall of 1941 to Russia of Aluminium and regular shipment from Canada and the US in 1942 allowed USSR aircraft production to increase. In fact comparing aluminium volume shipments to USSR and her aircraft production, there is a direct correlation statistically between the two.
Tank production. Using the T-34 as an example. In 1940 the T-34 was to be produced at Factory #183 and the Stalingrad tractor factory 600 tanks. Factory #75 was to produce 2000 V-2 diesel engines. Factory #183 made 115 tanks and Stalingrad made 23 partially completed tanks. Also Factory #75 ran into so many problems with the engines that they ended up manually having to retest each one. They barely produced 10% of what they were told they needed to produce. In October 1940 order #76791 was issued questioning the production of the T-34 and whether mass production should be shifted over to the T-50. For the next 6 months the very future of the T-34 hung in the balance and it was only the Germans attacking in June some feel that kept the main production from being shifted over to the T-50 ( this is in released Russian Documents ). In fact many felt that the production of the T-34 should be completely suspended until the new T-34M was finished. In FFO this will continue to be an issue. BTW tank production and Armour and steel supplies to the USSR are also directly related. USSR steel and armour production could support light, medium and heavy armour units of about 6000 to 7000 units per year on domestic supplies excluding all other production, trains, boats etc.
So now excluding the fact that though the USSR will have newer equipment when Germany attacks in May 1942, I also have a few other issues/questions. Historically in 1941 the USSR had no logistical infrastructure to support her army. Many units after days of fighting had fuel but no ammo, others had the reverse or none of both. With the KV-1 and the T-34 having a max reliability of about 100 hours many were breaking down with no mechanics or spare parts to fix them. There was also little to no means of retrieving these tanks to be brought back to depots for repairs. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that this will change in FFO in 1942. The army maybe better trained and have in some cases better equipment but will have no logistical support network built up within a year for their deployment and upkeep. The BAOs may have begun to be setup in FFO but they will be unable to support an army of the size that Russia had. Not enough trucks or organic transport to do the job will be the main reason. The Committee sent over by the US and Britain in 1941 to see how the Allies could help the USSR put down as their top items Food and Trucks and locomotives/rolling stock. They noted the fact that whole units of KV-1s were being lost due to no way to get them gas or spare parts or mechanics. One unit was noted that of 63 tanks they lost 53 tanks, 11 to battle, 11 without a trace and 34 to mechanical failures or running out of gas. Another unit lost 43 tanks out of 50 (13 to battle, 2 sunk in a swamp and 28 due to breakdowns). Getting the USSR 8000 to 10000 trucks a month plus whatever Britain and Canada sent at the end of 1941 help with this issue immensely. This will still be a big issue in FFO. Nothing in the POD or what the USSR can produce in a year can change this. Also the mobility and tactics still wont be there until the Trucks arrive ( early Russian reports in FFO seem to be treating the army like that of late 1942 1943, with trucks, then one equipped like then but without the supplies and troop mobility it seems, without trucks )
Food. This will be a big issue for Russia more so than historical. Russia cannot support an army much larger that what she had to start the war. Her food production was what dictated that. Only non agricultural areas of labour could be drawn upon to reinforce the army until other food supplies could be found as Lend lease did historically. Now we have the issue of when the attack happened. Historically in Late June all planting is done, Livestock have given birth and are out to pasture and the first cutting of hay is in. In May the livestock is giving birth, fields are being ploughed for planting towards the end of the month. Historically Germany attacking in late June was better for Russia. In FFO Germany attacking in May can cause many more issues down the road. The least of which is that more food shortages could be cause in the fall due to lack of planting or collecting of forage. Remember at least some of the food in the Ukraine was recoverable in 1941 historically. Will it be even planted in FFO? Now if the Allies ship food like they did historically Stalin will be able to have on top of his domestic production over 10 million men fed and clothed.
Lend-Lease. This will be a big issue again in FFO. If it follows like irl a delegation will be sent to the USSR. Unlike the historical delegation it will most likely have French delegates with it as well. This is a nation that effectively sold Poland, France and most of Europe down the river with its pact with Germany. The animosity among the allies will be far stronger than historical towards the USSR imho. Whatever they find the delegation will not return back to the US to present its report till late August. Just in time for Panama and the two east coast attacks on the US. Also unlike the historical timeframe the US is already at war. Her production levels have been set and the Lend- Lease had been divided among the known allies before the USSR was even attacked. Who will get less to send some to the USSR? Then there is the question of whether the USSR will even ask for Lend-Lease? If Stalin has been deluded into thinking he doesnt need it till the fall things will be very bad for Russia. He historically hated Lend lease as he felt it made his country look week. He had entire hordes of political commissars on staff to minimize the public knowledge about lend lease just because of this.
In December 1941 Russia was producing shells with no gunpowder or explosives in them awaiting shipments from Britain and the US because she had already put what supplies she produced into the shells for that month. This will not change in FFO. Absolutely nothing I have read in any document suggests that Russia will be in any better position in 6 to 8 months then she was historically even with another years construction and getting prepared that she got in FFO.
Comments? Answers?
Russ / Roller007
I know weve talked about this but the more and more I research into it the more I have problems with what has been discussed. To try to work this out Ive put my thoughts down on this paper in hopes of getting some answers.
        First problem. With Russias production figures. When in a previous discussion I asked how Russias 1941 production figures could change from historical I was told because of the USAs increase in production the USSR would follow suit. Problem, historically the USSRs production was already above the USs and a doubling of production would be required for the USA to even equal Aircraft Production. As for Tank production, the historical levels in the US were a joke. In FFO this will change but the impact of the increase in production levels should still not be an issue for Russia till 1942. The nice thing is she has a year to move her production east of Moscow.
Problem, using the USSRs Aircraft production as an example. The roughly 10000 aircraft a year that the USSR produced was based on aluminium production allocated to the aircraft industry. To increase aircraft production some other area that had been allocated aluminium would have to do with less. Also if you allocated the total production of aluminium to aircraft production the USSR only had enough to produce between 16000 and 18000 aircraft per year. Not the 20000+ that was discussed. Diversion of Strategic materials by Britain in the fall of 1941 to Russia of Aluminium and regular shipment from Canada and the US in 1942 allowed USSR aircraft production to increase. In fact comparing aluminium volume shipments to USSR and her aircraft production, there is a direct correlation statistically between the two.
Tank production. Using the T-34 as an example. In 1940 the T-34 was to be produced at Factory #183 and the Stalingrad tractor factory 600 tanks. Factory #75 was to produce 2000 V-2 diesel engines. Factory #183 made 115 tanks and Stalingrad made 23 partially completed tanks. Also Factory #75 ran into so many problems with the engines that they ended up manually having to retest each one. They barely produced 10% of what they were told they needed to produce. In October 1940 order #76791 was issued questioning the production of the T-34 and whether mass production should be shifted over to the T-50. For the next 6 months the very future of the T-34 hung in the balance and it was only the Germans attacking in June some feel that kept the main production from being shifted over to the T-50 ( this is in released Russian Documents ). In fact many felt that the production of the T-34 should be completely suspended until the new T-34M was finished. In FFO this will continue to be an issue. BTW tank production and Armour and steel supplies to the USSR are also directly related. USSR steel and armour production could support light, medium and heavy armour units of about 6000 to 7000 units per year on domestic supplies excluding all other production, trains, boats etc.
So now excluding the fact that though the USSR will have newer equipment when Germany attacks in May 1942, I also have a few other issues/questions. Historically in 1941 the USSR had no logistical infrastructure to support her army. Many units after days of fighting had fuel but no ammo, others had the reverse or none of both. With the KV-1 and the T-34 having a max reliability of about 100 hours many were breaking down with no mechanics or spare parts to fix them. There was also little to no means of retrieving these tanks to be brought back to depots for repairs. There is absolutely nothing to suggest that this will change in FFO in 1942. The army maybe better trained and have in some cases better equipment but will have no logistical support network built up within a year for their deployment and upkeep. The BAOs may have begun to be setup in FFO but they will be unable to support an army of the size that Russia had. Not enough trucks or organic transport to do the job will be the main reason. The Committee sent over by the US and Britain in 1941 to see how the Allies could help the USSR put down as their top items Food and Trucks and locomotives/rolling stock. They noted the fact that whole units of KV-1s were being lost due to no way to get them gas or spare parts or mechanics. One unit was noted that of 63 tanks they lost 53 tanks, 11 to battle, 11 without a trace and 34 to mechanical failures or running out of gas. Another unit lost 43 tanks out of 50 (13 to battle, 2 sunk in a swamp and 28 due to breakdowns). Getting the USSR 8000 to 10000 trucks a month plus whatever Britain and Canada sent at the end of 1941 help with this issue immensely. This will still be a big issue in FFO. Nothing in the POD or what the USSR can produce in a year can change this. Also the mobility and tactics still wont be there until the Trucks arrive ( early Russian reports in FFO seem to be treating the army like that of late 1942 1943, with trucks, then one equipped like then but without the supplies and troop mobility it seems, without trucks )
Food. This will be a big issue for Russia more so than historical. Russia cannot support an army much larger that what she had to start the war. Her food production was what dictated that. Only non agricultural areas of labour could be drawn upon to reinforce the army until other food supplies could be found as Lend lease did historically. Now we have the issue of when the attack happened. Historically in Late June all planting is done, Livestock have given birth and are out to pasture and the first cutting of hay is in. In May the livestock is giving birth, fields are being ploughed for planting towards the end of the month. Historically Germany attacking in late June was better for Russia. In FFO Germany attacking in May can cause many more issues down the road. The least of which is that more food shortages could be cause in the fall due to lack of planting or collecting of forage. Remember at least some of the food in the Ukraine was recoverable in 1941 historically. Will it be even planted in FFO? Now if the Allies ship food like they did historically Stalin will be able to have on top of his domestic production over 10 million men fed and clothed.
Lend-Lease. This will be a big issue again in FFO. If it follows like irl a delegation will be sent to the USSR. Unlike the historical delegation it will most likely have French delegates with it as well. This is a nation that effectively sold Poland, France and most of Europe down the river with its pact with Germany. The animosity among the allies will be far stronger than historical towards the USSR imho. Whatever they find the delegation will not return back to the US to present its report till late August. Just in time for Panama and the two east coast attacks on the US. Also unlike the historical timeframe the US is already at war. Her production levels have been set and the Lend- Lease had been divided among the known allies before the USSR was even attacked. Who will get less to send some to the USSR? Then there is the question of whether the USSR will even ask for Lend-Lease? If Stalin has been deluded into thinking he doesnt need it till the fall things will be very bad for Russia. He historically hated Lend lease as he felt it made his country look week. He had entire hordes of political commissars on staff to minimize the public knowledge about lend lease just because of this.
In December 1941 Russia was producing shells with no gunpowder or explosives in them awaiting shipments from Britain and the US because she had already put what supplies she produced into the shells for that month. This will not change in FFO. Absolutely nothing I have read in any document suggests that Russia will be in any better position in 6 to 8 months then she was historically even with another years construction and getting prepared that she got in FFO.
Comments? Answers?
Russ / Roller007
