RAAF Aircraft Program Development
The development of the Australian aviation industry will follow the OTL path from 1936, with the formation of a syndicate of far-sighted men under the leadership of the leading Australian industrialist Mr Essington Lewis and the selection of the NA-33, which became the Wirraway.
The following selection of the Bristol Beaufort as the combat aircraft of the RAAF will follow, as in OTL. The difficulties of this program will also follow the OTL path.
Gloster F9/37 (G39 Reaper) to Australia.
This excellent single seat twin engined fighter was powered by two Taurus engines (1050HP each). The machine was heavily armed (5 x 20mm), docile, manoeuvrable and a delight to fly. However, it could not be built in the UK as Gloster had too many commitments with their jet program.
At POD, the British received an influx of French designers, draftsmen and engineers from the French aviation industry. The Australian government was active at this time, requesting assistance for the reworking of the Bristol Beaufort from a Taurus-engined machine to one powered by twin Wasps (1200HP). A unilateral decision was taken in the Air Ministry to outsource production of the G39 to Australia as a twin-Wasp machine.
From the UK perspective this made sense because this aircraft could not be built in the UK without delaying the jet program. As that program had No.1 priority among all RAF projects, this could not occur. However, this decision left the Australian government incredulous. Having abrogated agreements to deliver most of the complex systems of the Beaufort and forced the local redesign of the machine to take twin Wasps, London proposed to simply dump a second complex (and worse,monocoque) machine on an Australian industry utterly incapable of building it. A reply was fired back that this was an impossible decision to implement unless the aircraft was delivered with full documentation, some tooling, all jigs, French designers, draftsmen and engineers who had at least minimal some experience at Gloster, and machinery to greatly boost CACs ability to build monocoque fuselages.
The chokepoint was the ability to make more monocoque aircraft, Australia concentrated on tubular steel with unstressed skin for very good reason. All of these points were quickly acceded to, and a number of French workers, experienced in stressed-skin construction, were also sent. Algiers followed this development closely, eventually deciding that the concept was worth supporting if only to get a French voice and a small amount of political influence spread a little further.
Even so, production of the F9/37 inevitably reduced the number of Beauforts which could be built and scotched later suggestions to build the Beaufighter in Australia as the F9/37 is superior to the Beaufighter. The F18/40 nightfigher (called the Grim Reaper) was also be built in Australia. This being a two-seat nightfighter variant of the F9/37. The British one had Merlins replacing the Taurus engines. The Australian variant retained twin Wasps.
POD: Boomerang and Woomera
The first issue is the difference in the main drivers between OTL and FFO of the decision to go ahead with the Boomerang. Traditionally, the Boomerang has been seen as a 'panic fighter' in response to an immediate threat of 1942. This is not the full picture.
There was an early recognition of the need for a fighter to be built in Australia, first expressed in the 'Wirraway Fighter' design of November 1938. We also know there was also interest in a single seat fighter in 1939. It subsided because the British wanted Australia to focus on producing training aircraft for the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS). EATS was primarily aimed at producing aircrew for bombers.
In OTL, the British promised to provide not fighters but RAF fighter SQN if Australia was threatened. It is now known this promise was not made in good faith.
In FFO, there is earlier Imperial interest in Japanese moves in Siam generating greater interest in the defence of Malaya at an earlier date. This drives the reversal of British thinking on the creation of a RAAF expeditionary force for overseas use. In OTL this concept was proposed in 1939, rejected by the RAF in 1939, proposed again in 1940, again rejected, and then imposed by the RAF on the RAAF in late 1941. In FFO, the path has been proposed in 1939 and rejected, proposed again in 1940 and not accepted (this is the first significant difference) then revisited and accepted in early 1941, with development of the expeditionary force taking place mostly in Kedah from mid-1941.
The supply of modern fighters to this force then happens in two phases. First, the Buffalo from mid 1941, and this machine proves unsuitable. It is then replaced with Hurricanes and this is only just complete when the Japanese attack.
Meanwhile, in FFO Australia, EATS personnel are being diverted to produce RAAF fighter pilots and light bomber crews. Even some of the 400 Fairey Battles provided to Australia for EATS crew training are diverted as the emergency deepens. This decision to divert EATS aircrew occurs in early 1941, when the RAAF expeditionary force concept is INITIALLY approved by the RAF.
The IMPORTANT POINT is this. The RAAF was a hugely unbalanced force in OTL. It had NO FIGHTERS except a handful of Bristol Bulldogs, and it had NO FIGHTER FORCE OR PILOTS in early 1941. This is astonishing, but true. The details are contained in Chris Coulthard-Clark's book "The Third Brother" for a history of the RAAF between the wars.
So by early 1941 in FFO there has developed an urgent Australian requirement for a fighter trainer, and the RAAF literally possesses no obsolete fighters capable of doing fighter conversion training.
The Boomerang is seen, in FFO therefore NOT as an emergency fighter, but as a fighter trainer fulfilling the same role other forces use their obsolete fighters for. Existing EATS training is not suitable to create fighter pilots, but Wirraway Trainer qualified pilots can be converted to fighters in something like the Boomerang, instead of being sent to the UK by sea to convert to bombers within RAF Training Command bomber OCU (or to fighter pilots, for that matter, in Fighter OCU). Not only that, it can be developed and placed in to production quicker than obsolete fighters can be imported from overseas by sea in sufficient numbers to do the job. It also avoids the logistic mess of adopting a new (obsolete fighter) type in to RAAF service, which would overstress the maintenance training schools. The Buffalo cannot be used for this job, the RAF/RAAF Buffalo fleet is the only strategic reserve of fighters for the NEI and AdA.
So in FFO we are forced down this path quite early. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THE BOOMERANG IS AVAILABLE FOR COMBAT. It means that a Boomerang fighter trainer will be in production by about August 1941. This aircraft is a TRAINER and full production does not involve very large numbers, perhaps 60 machines. It would have a fighter-like fit, but no armour, no drop tank, no self-sealing tanks, only 2 .303 wing mounted MG, and a camera gun. To create a Boomerang FIGHTER as in AH, it has to be redesigned to a considerable degree. It needs armour, an armoured windscreen, belly drop tank which can also carry a 500lb bomb in the same position, self-sealing tanks and probably the addition of 2 x 20mm to the armament. The 4 x 20mm gunned Boomerang would come later and be a fighter-bomber as the Mk III version. It would be a specialist ground-attack aircraft actively exploiting the low speed of the aircraft
The decision to make the Boomerang fighter-trainer in to a fighter will take place in about late August 1941. The aircraft can still be used as a trainer, of course, but is also prudent contingency planning by Government in case the Japanese can cut the trade routes to Australia's Allies and choke off supplies of modern aircraft.
The point has been raised that at this time the Australian aircraft industry was really in its beginning. The Wirraway program and the Beaufort licence one were already taxing the limited pool of skilled workers and engineers.
This is correct, but again is not the entire picture. The genesis of the industry in this form dated to a decision by leading Australian industrialist Mr Essington Lewis, in 1935. So the industry was 6 years old in 1941 and had been building aircraft locally since 1939. It was NOT mature, but it was a healthy adolescent rather than a baby. The point on the Beaufort is absolutely correct. The British told Australia that it could no longer support the project in any way in early 1940. This was devastating (it was partly rescinded in early 1941), and should have killed the project. The effort which had to be made to complete it within local resurces was enormously underestimated. That the project succeeded is amazing.
In FFO line the UK is sending more fighter planes (not enough but nearly so, most are Hurricanes, but some refurbished Defiant Night Fighters are among them). We are a far cry from OTL. However the light attack force is weak (Battle and Blenheim I/II). The DAP Beaufort production line is gaining steam but still, the Beaufort can be seen as too specialised a plane even though it was built as a generalised late 1930s battleplane in original concept.
The distance from OTL has already generated an Australian requirement for a fighter-trainer in 1941, as above, and this requirement is both valid and internally consistent with the demands of FFO. But there is still no guarantee that the Japanese cannot cut Australia off from overseas suppliers. IN fact, the submarine offensive would later be seen as trying to do so.
CA-11 Woomera
This line of reasoning leads to something Jacques noted.
"If I had to put my money, I would bet on an increased priority on the CA-11 design, which was intended to perform various tasks from ground attack and light bombing to torpedo attack (with 2 x 18in torpedoes) and even long-range fighter job had the G-39 not been imposed for that role. Such a plane would give the RAAF the punch needed assuming that GB would provide more fighters (and the US industry too).
We know, with hindsight, that Wackett went a step too far with the remote-controlled barbettes in the end of engine casing for the Woomera (CA-11). Not only debugging the remote control system took time but the barbettes spoiled the CA-11 aerodynamics, creating a major air-flow disturbance. Still, if fighter planes are less scarce than in OTL, pushing for the CA-11 would have been a more rationale option than pushing for what would have been at best a plane with limited fighter abilities. Remember too that for people in power it was by 1941 far from clear that current "advanced" US fighters like the P-39 were not as good as the builder pretended them to be. Testing the Boomerang against the P-39 showed the first to be a much better fighter than the second, which came to a shock. But this test happened in 1942 in OTL.
In FFO Japan had announced putting forces in Thailand in June 41, officially as "peace-keepers" after the French-Thai war.
By July/August 41 it would have been clear for the Australian government that Japanese troops in Thailand were soon to exceed what would have been necessary for peace-keeping. The French government would have warned by late July that it was under pressure by the Tokyo. In this time line France reacted by increasing - even on a limited scale - its forces in Indochina by August 41, and the decision to send the GBMS was taken also in August even if the actual transfer took place in September."
This is a very interesting insight from the French perspective. It clearly states a series of new requirements for the Australian government. An implication of this (an obvious one) is that the RAAF would in any way be forced down the path of developing a long range 'Pacific Fighter' even had the Gloster Reaper not been imposed on it. The fighter-trainer Boomerang requirement is completely unsuitable for this role.
It is at this point in the process that the CA-11 Woomera becomes the strike replacement for the older Beaufort, which is of a type rapidly becoming outdated in the eyes of the RAF, the light bomber. What saves the Beaufort is its more powerful engines, its role in the Pacific as a medium bomber, its ease of maintenance and its versatility. Although displaced on production lines by 1944 by the Woomera, the Beaufort would remain in front line service for the duration of the war, then be converted to target towing and transport duties.
However, Australian capacity would be beyond full stretch, and must take a second (small) influx of French staff from Potez with expertise in this class if aircraft to solve the CA-11s problems.
The CA-11 WOOMERA program "go-ahead" occurred in July 1941 once the provision of the Potez staff was finalised. The Woomera still had to be developed and tested, and the type did not reach IOC until December 1942. From that time it began to establish a reputation as a very rugged and capable strike aircraft.
Martin-Baker to CAC
The development of a first class fighter for the RAAF in FFO was both a complex and difficult task for Australia to perform. Building this into FFO has not been lightly undertaken.
The move to POD has to be as in OTL. Australia, under the guidance of the estimable Mr Essington Lewis (industrialist), would develop an aircraft industry based on the Wirraway. This has been described above.
The RAAF would want a modern bomber, as per the OTL Beaufort program. The outbreak of war would temporarily place this program in grave danger, until bold decisions were made to use Wasp engines instead of Taurus, and some British help resumed.
The plan to start local development of a replacement for the Beaufort would occur as in OTL. It was normal practise to start development of the replacement as the aircraft entered production, in those days, Woomera would be under development. The collapse of metropolitan France in May-August 1940 would have a huge impact, but it is Japanese responses which will drive Australian actions. This has also been described above.
POD starts for Australia late in 1940, as Japanese intentions towards Thailand start to become clear, following French rejection of Japanese demands for access to Cochin-China.
In terms of single engined fighters in FFO, we have only one Australian response, early development not of the Boomerang fighter, but of a Boomerang fighter-trainer which is not a combat aircraft. There is a deliberate intention of building a potential capability in this decision, and it is based solely on Japanese relationships with Thailand. The actual orders to cease production of Boomerang I and produce an emergency fighter (Boomerang II same as OTL Boomerang) will not occur in FFO until late in 1941, with the machine appearing on the production lines within about 4 months. Therefore, the decision to switch to Boomerang II will be taken in about October 1941 and the machine will in production from about February 1942, with IOC Squadron service in about April, implying that the machine will see action in about June-July 1942.
These dates are important, because it is on them that the decision to build new plant for a first-class fighter depends. This is a very considerable investment, about ₤2,000,000. It cannot be made without external assistance via provision of engines, design engineers and draftsmen.
Very fortunately, the requisite number of personnel, which is quite small, can be provided by the French and has been in the second tranche of French assistance (the first being those to assist with the Gloster G-39 long range twin engine fighter). Even better, these men will have spent the past 8-10 months in British companies mixing their expertise with British industry. It is also probable that at least some of the small Martin-Baker design team for the MB-3 will be seconded to Australia.
And yet, the need would be most urgent, as the Japanese threat is severe enough to force Boomerang II to be produced, speed up Beaufort deliveries, and force radical simplification on to the Woomera project so as to hasten its development and productionisation as a strike aircraft.
The Martin-Baker fighter series were clearly being developed by the Air Ministry as optional backups, and to encourage new thought and new technology. They were deliberately designed as cheap and simple to build, and to be very easy to maintain. They would therefore be available for transfer in terms of all documents and existing jigs and tooling, and are the only modern designs to fit this criteria which use existing Australian production methods for Wirraway and Boomerang.
Very importantly, their tubular steel construction was very similar to Boomerang and Wirraway construction. These machines also used tubular steel fuselage skeletons with a non-load bearing frame and skinning system added to it. With the G-39 stressed skin monococque machine also being built in Australia, there is absolutely no ability to build another such stressed skin design.
This presupposes a series of discussions between the Australian Minister for the Air Force and the UK Air Ministry about the future path for Australian production from late 1940. These occurred in OTL, but were mainly negative, the panicked British telling Australia what they could not have.
Major POD in late 1940. The major departure here is that this is reversed: the British are not panicked, the threat of invasion is very low, the Luftwaffe threat much reduced. The talk will therefore be about how Australia can best contribute to the Allied effort with a restricted but not shut-off flow of assistance. Ironically, this is in accordance with OTL planning in teh late 1930s! It is from this root that the British deision to transfer G-39 production to Australia comes. It is likely that, at this time, the Air Ministry agrees that a direct threat to Australia would see them shipping Hurricanes. This is a subsidiary trigger for the Boomerang fighter-trainer to be developed.
Other Decisions. This is also when the issue of an escort LR fighter for the RAAF Beaufort force would arise. The issue of engines for this fighter will be the decider, and the RAAF has decided to use P&W twin Wasp for the Beaufort. Therefore, the fighter should also use this powerplant. These is simply no way that Australia can possibly manufacture another engine type at this stage beyond the single and twin Wasps, and even there production will not match airframe production, and some must be imported from the USA.
This is the issue which leads to the decision to accept the British idea of building the Gloster G-39 rather than Beaufighter. The latter machine can indeed be built on Beaufort production lines but those aircraft are essential, and are only just entering production (late), their production cannot be disrupted at this stage. The RAF will find it extremely hard to release Beaufighters or assistance to the RAAF due to the great need for these machines themselves at this stage of the war.
Therefore, a new line is needed in Australia, and extensions to the existing plant have to be built. Whether Beaufighter or Gloster G-39 is build is immaterial, BOTH will have to be redesigned to take Wasp engines and productionised to suit Australian methods.
This will give the Air Ministry pause for thought. It has two modern fighter types to offer, the single engined MB-3 and the twin engined G-39. The MB-3 is actually a given, the RAF can spare it, it uses Australian production methods, and is specially designed to be simple to build and to maintain. The Beaufighter/Gloster question is equivalent, the choice of types therefore came down to which was the better machine which also causes least disruption to Beaufort production. The result of that is inevitably going to be the Gloster G-39.
Selection of this Gloster machine reinforced the issue of using the Air Ministry backup designs as a deliberate choice to explore additional design types and technologies for Imperial industry and to offer tangible rewards to non-mainstream design teams. Simultaneously, these machines are not second-rate in any way, and their production in Australia (or Canada for that matter) clearly demonstrates Imperial solidarity and support which not exposing UK industry to excessive operational demands for their standard types. It also reduces to vanishing point demands for the best types the RAF has in production, and allows slightly older types, such as Hurricane, to be shipped to meet local emergencies.
This is therefore an example of a carefully coordinated GLOBAL Imperial industrial strategy.
So, by early 1941, facilities will be a-building and initial subcontracting getting underway for the Gloster twin-engined fighter type using twin Wasp engines.
MB-3. The decision on the MB-3 will be second to the twin-engined fighter decision, but quite early on it will become obvious that the MB-3 is the obvious choice.
HOWEVER, there is a serious problem. The MB-2 used the Napier Dagger engine, and the MB-3 is supposed to use the Napier Sabre. But the Sabre cannot be in production before mid-late 1942 and is permanently beyond the ability of Australian industry to build because it is a sleeve-valve engine. Therefore the CA-15 fighter to be developed from MB-3 cannot use Sabre. However, there is a bright side. The requirement for this machine to be a low-altitude mudbasher is not there. There are Wirraways, Boomerangs, Beauforts and Woomeras and Hurricanes available for this task. That is the requirement change which killed the program in OTL. The CA-15 will be a medium to higher altitude escort fighter and interceptor.
A solution, then.
There are only two options for fighter engines in the required power range in 1941 as this decision starts to translate in to buildings and orders flowing to subcontractors. These are Griffon and Vulture. One is, as yet, a paper engine (but RR is very confident and it has letter-perfect ancestry), and the other is not working very well (but RR say it can be fixed enough for a fighter to use). At this stage (1940-41)NEITHER can be built in Australia, but EITHER could be by late 1942 mid 1943, depending on development time and when the plant investment and training investment is made.
Factors in this are that the Air Ministry thinks that a Merlin-ancestry Griffon is a proper fighter engine, while Vulture is under a cloud. RR will be supremely confident of Griffon even at this stage of its development, and will say that while they can fix Vulture enough that Tornado can use it, they have less expertise in that type than with in-lines. Vulture cannot yet be fixed to be reliable in bomber use, that will take a bit more time, but at least most of the problems will be corrected (for Tornado) for the poor benighted RAAF Manchester force. With Griffon, of course, nobody did incremental development from a well-known baseline than RR.
Another very important factor is that the Australian environment is tropical and maritime, with long distances and few airfields. This will weight somewhat against Vulture in a single-engined application, where it would NOT do so in Europe. So Tornados will not be seen in Burma or elsewhere east of Suez, although Vultures will be in the surviving original Manchesters, before the Centaurus Manchester solves that problem. (This may lead to RAAF Manchester aircrew setting up shrines to the Centaurus.)
So the decision has to be for Griffon when it is made in 1941.
When is the decision made? The decision to go ahead with the MB-5/CA-15 is difficult to pin down. The investment involved is the usual, about ₤2,000,000 investment in plant, training and development before the first machine is actually ordered, and at least as much again for the engine plant to start building Griffons in Australia. Both are do-able, but there is a year of lead time on training before the workers can assemble aircraft, before the subcontractors are ready, and before the new annexes are built and commissioned. But at least this time is needed anyway to redeisgn MB-3 from Sbare to MB-5 standard with Griffon.
The Air Ministry in the UK will fund the initial stages of changing the machine from Sabre to Griffon this is simply in their interests, as it saves time and the MB-3 and MB-5 is one of their own backups. Transfer of development and funding will occur in a phased way, and Australia will also be asked for a contribution to Griffon development costs to tropicalise the engine. This will be accepted, and this will allow CAC engineers and senior production managers to work with RR as the Griffon is developed. This factor is critically important.
Building the engine in Australia is a huge task, and will probably commence with Merlin construction (actually a mix of assembly and manufacture) for the Mosquito production program, leveraging off that engine for Griffon.
So the decision must actually date from the day the Griffon is ordered in to development. MB-3/5/CA-15 is intimately linked to Griffon, and will be the test case for it, if not the first machine to fly with it. But it WILL be the first fighter designed for it, by a very brief time. As the aircraft had to be again redesigned for the Griffon, it will become the MB-5 as in OTL but will be produced as CA-15.
The MB-5/CA-15 will probably enter production in 1943 and IOC would be some time in early-mid 1944. At this period, it would be one of the most impressive fighters in the world, literally able to fly rings around the Mustang, Hellcat, Thunderbolt and Corsair operating in the theatre and much faster than them. The machine would stay in Australian service for a very long time.
Material on MB-2, MB-3, and MB-5
(erm, where did the photographs go??? How do I get them in here??? The answer is more Galway Pipe!)
Cheers: Mark
MB-2
]www.fortunecity.com/tatto...20/mb2.jpg
Like its predecessor, the civilian MB-1, the MB2 was constructed of steel tubing, but many detailed improvements were made which further simplified production as well as repair and maintenance.
MB2 was powered by a special Napier Dagger III 24-cylinder H-type engine of 805 nominal bhp, but capable of operation at plus 13 lb boost to give over 1,000 h.p. for take-off, driving a fixed-pitch two-blade propeller. The undercarriage was, for simplicity, fixed and cleanly faired in two trouser-type fairings, the port one carrying the oil-cooler. Later a scheme was worked out for making the undercarriage retractable to improve performance.
The fuselage lines were square cut and exceptionally clean, with almost constant depth from nose to sternpost. An unusual feature, at that time, was that the fuselage was slightly longer than the span of 34ft 6in, a feature contributing to good stability and control in the yawing plane, and which was retained in later Martin-Baker designs. The wing carried eight Browning.303 machine-guns, disposed in two groups outboard the undercarriage, which made MB2 the first British eight-gun fighter
The clean and orderly cockpit was set well back, allowing a good view downwards behind the wing. A crash post was fitted, which automatically extended to minimise structure damage and injury to the pilot in the event of a nose-over landing.
A small tapered tail-plane war mounted on the top of the fuselage well forward of the sternpost, while the fin and rudder combination was roughly triangular in side elevation. This arrangement placed most of the effective rudder area below the tail-plane, thus providing an adequate balance to the keel surface and assuring good recovery from spins. In earlier designs, there was no fin and the rudder had lacked entirely the part above the tail-plane, lateral stability being provided by the fuselage and the undercarriage trouser fairings. However, this was found to be not entirely satisfactory, and the fixed fin was later added.
The MB2 was first flown by Captain Baker at Harwell on 3 August, 1938. A report in "The Aeroplane" stated that "in spite of its fixed undercarriage, the MB2 had a performance as good as that of contemporary fighters and a capacity for quick and cheap production by the simplicity of its structure and easy assembly. Repair and maintenance were also simple, and these factors might have influenced the authorities towards putting the MB2 into production when the country's fighter strength was disproportionately low."
The decision of the authorities not to go ahead with the development of this design was a disappointment and a setback of some magnitude to a company as yet youthful and largely inexperienced in these matters.
Summary: MARTIN-BAKER MB.2 - Single private-venture prototype broadly responding to Specification F.5/34 and first flown at Denham on August 3, 1938. Powered by a 725 hp Napier Dagger HIM, the Martin-Baker MB.2 carried eight 0.303-in (7.7-mm) Brownings in the wings and had a fixed, trousered undercarriage. Initially tested with markings M-B-1 (G-AEZD not carried), the MB.2 was acquired by Air Ministry in June 1939 as
P9594 and returned to A & AEE for second assessment after mods to tail control surfaces. It also spent some time at the AFDU, Northolt, before returning to Martin-Baker late in 1939, where it still survived in December 1941, although probably flown little or not at all after outbreak of war.
Max speed, 320 mph (515 km/h). Gross weight, 5,537 Ib (2,512 kg). Span, 34ft 0 in (10.36 m). Length, 34ft 6 in (10.51 m).
MB-3
The lessons learned in the design and construction of the two previous low-wing monoplanes were embodied in a new design, the MB3, which was powered by a 2,000 h.p. Napier Sabre 24cylinder H-type engine, driving a De Havilland variable-pitch three-blade propeller.
MB3 was projected to meet an Air Ministry fighter specification. It carried six 20-mm cannon, each with 200 rounds of ammunition, which made it the most heavily armed fighter in existence at the time. The armament installation was very good from an operational point of view, and a quick turnaround was ensured by the excellent accessibility of guns and ammunition.
While retaining the essential characteristics of the earlier designs, MB3 included many new features. The fuselage primary structure was still the round steel tube arrangement, but metal panels had taken the place of wood and fabric of earlier models. The wing, of torsion-box construction about a laminated steel spar, gave a remarkably strong and stiff structure in which flexing was not perceptible
A pneumatically controlled undercarriage, of Martin design was simple, sturdy, effective and notably reliable. As the wing flaps were also pneumatically operated, the need for hydraulics, with all their attendant operational hazards and maintenance problems, was eliminated. Radiators were installed underneath the wings, the coolant radiator on the starboard and the oil-cooler on the port side.
This aeroplane proved to be highly manoeuvrable and easy to fly, and could have been developed into a good fighter aircraft. It was a double tragedy when, on 12 September, 1942 the engine failed soon after take-off, and Captain Baker, in an attempt to save the aircraft whilst executing a difficult forced landing, crashed in a field and was killed.
The personal loss to James Martin was immeasurable. It has already been stated that a deep friendship had grown up between these two men. James Martin never forgot the fearless, skilful and resolute pilot, and many consider that it was this painful tragedy that really fired the passionate interest in the safety of aircrews, which was later to become the very pivot of his life. At the time, the material loss was also a bitter pill. The MB3 was completely wrecked, and building to the same design would have resulted in immense loss of time - that commodity so essential to the successful production of a new aeroplane - so it was decided to design another prototype with a Rolls Royce Griffon engine, to be the MB4. In the event, this project was eventually dropped in favour of a new design, which became the MB5
Summary: MARTIN-BAKER MB.3 - First of three prototypes ordered mid-1939 to conform to Specification F. 18/39 for a heavily-armed high-performance fighter. Powered by a 2,300 hp Napier Sabre II, the Martin-Baker MB.3
(R2492) first flew at Wing on August 31, 1942, but was lost 12 days later when making a dead-stick landing. Second prototype appeared two years later as Martin-Baker MB.5 <http://www.jaapteeuwen.com/ww2aircraft/html%20pages/MARTIN-BAKER%20MB5.htm>).
Max speed (estimated), 415 mph (668 km/h). Gross weight, 11,497 Ib
(5,215 kg). Span, 35 ft 0 in (10.67 m). Length, 35 ft 4 in (10.77 m).
MB5
The MB5, a low-wing monoplane, fitted with a 2,340hp. Rolls-Royce Griffon 83 engine driving a pair of three-bladed counter-rotating propellers, was an aircraft of sleek and pleasing lines. Underslung radiators were placed beneath the belly of the fuselage, aft of the cockpit. This arrangement, as well as reducing the cooling drag, led to a slim and clean nose which, with the long spinner enclosing the propeller hubs, gave an exceptionally good view over the nose and leading edge of the wings. Fighter pilots flying this aircraft for the first time were full of praise of this essential tactical feature.
The fuselage primary structure of MB5 was of the now familiar steel tube construction, covered and faired with light, detachable metal panels, which offered exceptional accessibility to the equipment installations and for servicing. The engine-mounting consisted of two molybdenum-steel tapered cantilever booms, and here too the layout provided easy access to engine components and accessories. The engine was neatly cowled with panels which could be removed easily to lay bare the engine in a few minutes.
The wing was of the single-spar type, with the spar and leading edge forming a torsion-box of remarkable stiffness and strength; primary wing structure details were simple to produce and easy to repair. Flying controls were operated by torsion bars, which gave excellent positive control coupled with light operation. A sturdy wide-track undercarriage gave exceptionally good taxiing qualities, whilst its pneumatic operation was simple, effective and entirely trouble free.
It was, however, in the pilot's cockpit that one of MB5's main attractions lay. The cockpit was exceptionally well laid out, with all controls coming easily and readily to hand, within the pilots reach. Instruments were grouped in an orderly fashion, allowing routine cockpit checks to be done in logical sequence. Fuel control was centred in one lever - a feature dear to the hearts of fighter pilots. Accessibility for servicing was provided by mounting the instruments on hinged panels, which opened into the cockpit. A special primary control-unit was neatly installed in a manner economical in space, yet effective in operation, and having the advantage of bringing vital control components within the easy scrutiny of routine inspection. The cockpit was cleanly floored, an unusual feature then in British military aircraft, which gave a pleasing impression of spaciousness combined with businesslike utility.
Official reports of the day stated that the cockpit could advantageously be copied as standard for fighter aircraft. A one-piece transparent tear-drop canopy of neat design was fitted, provided with wheel control for operation by the pilot. The mechanism was perfectly balanced and easy to operate, whilst jettisoning was clean, safe and effective.
The four-cannon installation, utilising Martin-Baker flat belt-feed mechanisms, was exceptionally well arranged. The functional efficiency and destructive power of this weapon was noteworthy among contemporary aircraft, whilst the excellent accessibility of the installation permitted easy servicing and ensured a quick turnaround under operational conditions.
Not all its virtues rested in the excellence of its engineering, for in the air MB5 was unquestionably ahead of contemporary piston-engined fighters, with a top speed of 460 m.p.h. Early flight trials, in the capable hands of Bryan Greensted, quickly established it as an exceptionally good aircraft, and some older readers will remember the polished demonstration of MB5 by Squadron-leader Zurakowski as an outstanding event at the Farnborough Air Display of 1946.
Pilots liked the ease of taxiing provided by a wide-track undercarriage, the excellent all-round view, the absence of swing on take-off and landing, the spectacular rocket-like climb, the surge of power, quickly responding to throttle openings, with a corresponding bite into the air urging the aircraft forward, and the feeling of confidence given by a robust structure. They also liked sitting in a clean cockpit from which the aircraft could be flown effectively with precision and safety.
Why this aircraft was not put into production remains one of the aircraft industry's minor mysteries, and one which is often the subject of interesting speculation. Some will say that, as a piston-engined aircraft, it came too late to be acceptable in the advent of jet fighters. However, had a decision about its future been taken early by the authorities, it could have gone into production soon enough for it to have reached squadrons in sufficient numbers to have been engaged effectively in World War II. Disappointment in failing to put MB5 into production was felt keenly by all at Martin-Baker and shared by many Royal Air Force officers and other officials
Summary: MARTIN-BAKER MB.5 - Second of the F.I8/39 fighter prototypes ordered
in 1939 (see Martin-Baker MB.3
<http://www.jaapteeuwen.com/ww2aircraft/html%20pages/MARTIN-BAKER%20MB3.htm>),
the Martin-Baker MB.5 (R2496) was a much-developed version, featuring a
1,900 hp R-R Griffon 83 with centra-props, and four cannon armament.
First flown at Harwell on May 13,1944, but requirement overtaken by
advent of jet-powered fighters, and second Martin-Baker MB.5 (R2500) not
built. Flight demonstrations with R2496 continued until end-1947.
Max speed, 460 mph (740 km/h) at 20,000ft (6,100 m). Rate of climb,
3,800 ft/min (19.3 mlsec). Service ceiling, 40,000 ft (12,192 m). Range,
1,100 mis (1,770 km). Empty weight, 9,233 Ib (4,192 kg). Max gross
weight, 12,090 Ib (5,489 kg). Span, 35 ft 0 in (10.67 m). Length, 37 ft
0 in (11.30 m). Wing area, 263 sqft (24.4m2).
The development of the Australian aviation industry will follow the OTL path from 1936, with the formation of a syndicate of far-sighted men under the leadership of the leading Australian industrialist Mr Essington Lewis and the selection of the NA-33, which became the Wirraway.
The following selection of the Bristol Beaufort as the combat aircraft of the RAAF will follow, as in OTL. The difficulties of this program will also follow the OTL path.
Gloster F9/37 (G39 Reaper) to Australia.
This excellent single seat twin engined fighter was powered by two Taurus engines (1050HP each). The machine was heavily armed (5 x 20mm), docile, manoeuvrable and a delight to fly. However, it could not be built in the UK as Gloster had too many commitments with their jet program.
At POD, the British received an influx of French designers, draftsmen and engineers from the French aviation industry. The Australian government was active at this time, requesting assistance for the reworking of the Bristol Beaufort from a Taurus-engined machine to one powered by twin Wasps (1200HP). A unilateral decision was taken in the Air Ministry to outsource production of the G39 to Australia as a twin-Wasp machine.
From the UK perspective this made sense because this aircraft could not be built in the UK without delaying the jet program. As that program had No.1 priority among all RAF projects, this could not occur. However, this decision left the Australian government incredulous. Having abrogated agreements to deliver most of the complex systems of the Beaufort and forced the local redesign of the machine to take twin Wasps, London proposed to simply dump a second complex (and worse,monocoque) machine on an Australian industry utterly incapable of building it. A reply was fired back that this was an impossible decision to implement unless the aircraft was delivered with full documentation, some tooling, all jigs, French designers, draftsmen and engineers who had at least minimal some experience at Gloster, and machinery to greatly boost CACs ability to build monocoque fuselages.
The chokepoint was the ability to make more monocoque aircraft, Australia concentrated on tubular steel with unstressed skin for very good reason. All of these points were quickly acceded to, and a number of French workers, experienced in stressed-skin construction, were also sent. Algiers followed this development closely, eventually deciding that the concept was worth supporting if only to get a French voice and a small amount of political influence spread a little further.
Even so, production of the F9/37 inevitably reduced the number of Beauforts which could be built and scotched later suggestions to build the Beaufighter in Australia as the F9/37 is superior to the Beaufighter. The F18/40 nightfigher (called the Grim Reaper) was also be built in Australia. This being a two-seat nightfighter variant of the F9/37. The British one had Merlins replacing the Taurus engines. The Australian variant retained twin Wasps.
POD: Boomerang and Woomera
The first issue is the difference in the main drivers between OTL and FFO of the decision to go ahead with the Boomerang. Traditionally, the Boomerang has been seen as a 'panic fighter' in response to an immediate threat of 1942. This is not the full picture.
There was an early recognition of the need for a fighter to be built in Australia, first expressed in the 'Wirraway Fighter' design of November 1938. We also know there was also interest in a single seat fighter in 1939. It subsided because the British wanted Australia to focus on producing training aircraft for the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS). EATS was primarily aimed at producing aircrew for bombers.
In OTL, the British promised to provide not fighters but RAF fighter SQN if Australia was threatened. It is now known this promise was not made in good faith.
In FFO, there is earlier Imperial interest in Japanese moves in Siam generating greater interest in the defence of Malaya at an earlier date. This drives the reversal of British thinking on the creation of a RAAF expeditionary force for overseas use. In OTL this concept was proposed in 1939, rejected by the RAF in 1939, proposed again in 1940, again rejected, and then imposed by the RAF on the RAAF in late 1941. In FFO, the path has been proposed in 1939 and rejected, proposed again in 1940 and not accepted (this is the first significant difference) then revisited and accepted in early 1941, with development of the expeditionary force taking place mostly in Kedah from mid-1941.
The supply of modern fighters to this force then happens in two phases. First, the Buffalo from mid 1941, and this machine proves unsuitable. It is then replaced with Hurricanes and this is only just complete when the Japanese attack.
Meanwhile, in FFO Australia, EATS personnel are being diverted to produce RAAF fighter pilots and light bomber crews. Even some of the 400 Fairey Battles provided to Australia for EATS crew training are diverted as the emergency deepens. This decision to divert EATS aircrew occurs in early 1941, when the RAAF expeditionary force concept is INITIALLY approved by the RAF.
The IMPORTANT POINT is this. The RAAF was a hugely unbalanced force in OTL. It had NO FIGHTERS except a handful of Bristol Bulldogs, and it had NO FIGHTER FORCE OR PILOTS in early 1941. This is astonishing, but true. The details are contained in Chris Coulthard-Clark's book "The Third Brother" for a history of the RAAF between the wars.
So by early 1941 in FFO there has developed an urgent Australian requirement for a fighter trainer, and the RAAF literally possesses no obsolete fighters capable of doing fighter conversion training.
The Boomerang is seen, in FFO therefore NOT as an emergency fighter, but as a fighter trainer fulfilling the same role other forces use their obsolete fighters for. Existing EATS training is not suitable to create fighter pilots, but Wirraway Trainer qualified pilots can be converted to fighters in something like the Boomerang, instead of being sent to the UK by sea to convert to bombers within RAF Training Command bomber OCU (or to fighter pilots, for that matter, in Fighter OCU). Not only that, it can be developed and placed in to production quicker than obsolete fighters can be imported from overseas by sea in sufficient numbers to do the job. It also avoids the logistic mess of adopting a new (obsolete fighter) type in to RAAF service, which would overstress the maintenance training schools. The Buffalo cannot be used for this job, the RAF/RAAF Buffalo fleet is the only strategic reserve of fighters for the NEI and AdA.
So in FFO we are forced down this path quite early. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THE BOOMERANG IS AVAILABLE FOR COMBAT. It means that a Boomerang fighter trainer will be in production by about August 1941. This aircraft is a TRAINER and full production does not involve very large numbers, perhaps 60 machines. It would have a fighter-like fit, but no armour, no drop tank, no self-sealing tanks, only 2 .303 wing mounted MG, and a camera gun. To create a Boomerang FIGHTER as in AH, it has to be redesigned to a considerable degree. It needs armour, an armoured windscreen, belly drop tank which can also carry a 500lb bomb in the same position, self-sealing tanks and probably the addition of 2 x 20mm to the armament. The 4 x 20mm gunned Boomerang would come later and be a fighter-bomber as the Mk III version. It would be a specialist ground-attack aircraft actively exploiting the low speed of the aircraft
The decision to make the Boomerang fighter-trainer in to a fighter will take place in about late August 1941. The aircraft can still be used as a trainer, of course, but is also prudent contingency planning by Government in case the Japanese can cut the trade routes to Australia's Allies and choke off supplies of modern aircraft.
The point has been raised that at this time the Australian aircraft industry was really in its beginning. The Wirraway program and the Beaufort licence one were already taxing the limited pool of skilled workers and engineers.
This is correct, but again is not the entire picture. The genesis of the industry in this form dated to a decision by leading Australian industrialist Mr Essington Lewis, in 1935. So the industry was 6 years old in 1941 and had been building aircraft locally since 1939. It was NOT mature, but it was a healthy adolescent rather than a baby. The point on the Beaufort is absolutely correct. The British told Australia that it could no longer support the project in any way in early 1940. This was devastating (it was partly rescinded in early 1941), and should have killed the project. The effort which had to be made to complete it within local resurces was enormously underestimated. That the project succeeded is amazing.
In FFO line the UK is sending more fighter planes (not enough but nearly so, most are Hurricanes, but some refurbished Defiant Night Fighters are among them). We are a far cry from OTL. However the light attack force is weak (Battle and Blenheim I/II). The DAP Beaufort production line is gaining steam but still, the Beaufort can be seen as too specialised a plane even though it was built as a generalised late 1930s battleplane in original concept.
The distance from OTL has already generated an Australian requirement for a fighter-trainer in 1941, as above, and this requirement is both valid and internally consistent with the demands of FFO. But there is still no guarantee that the Japanese cannot cut Australia off from overseas suppliers. IN fact, the submarine offensive would later be seen as trying to do so.
CA-11 Woomera
This line of reasoning leads to something Jacques noted.
"If I had to put my money, I would bet on an increased priority on the CA-11 design, which was intended to perform various tasks from ground attack and light bombing to torpedo attack (with 2 x 18in torpedoes) and even long-range fighter job had the G-39 not been imposed for that role. Such a plane would give the RAAF the punch needed assuming that GB would provide more fighters (and the US industry too).
We know, with hindsight, that Wackett went a step too far with the remote-controlled barbettes in the end of engine casing for the Woomera (CA-11). Not only debugging the remote control system took time but the barbettes spoiled the CA-11 aerodynamics, creating a major air-flow disturbance. Still, if fighter planes are less scarce than in OTL, pushing for the CA-11 would have been a more rationale option than pushing for what would have been at best a plane with limited fighter abilities. Remember too that for people in power it was by 1941 far from clear that current "advanced" US fighters like the P-39 were not as good as the builder pretended them to be. Testing the Boomerang against the P-39 showed the first to be a much better fighter than the second, which came to a shock. But this test happened in 1942 in OTL.
In FFO Japan had announced putting forces in Thailand in June 41, officially as "peace-keepers" after the French-Thai war.
By July/August 41 it would have been clear for the Australian government that Japanese troops in Thailand were soon to exceed what would have been necessary for peace-keeping. The French government would have warned by late July that it was under pressure by the Tokyo. In this time line France reacted by increasing - even on a limited scale - its forces in Indochina by August 41, and the decision to send the GBMS was taken also in August even if the actual transfer took place in September."
This is a very interesting insight from the French perspective. It clearly states a series of new requirements for the Australian government. An implication of this (an obvious one) is that the RAAF would in any way be forced down the path of developing a long range 'Pacific Fighter' even had the Gloster Reaper not been imposed on it. The fighter-trainer Boomerang requirement is completely unsuitable for this role.
It is at this point in the process that the CA-11 Woomera becomes the strike replacement for the older Beaufort, which is of a type rapidly becoming outdated in the eyes of the RAF, the light bomber. What saves the Beaufort is its more powerful engines, its role in the Pacific as a medium bomber, its ease of maintenance and its versatility. Although displaced on production lines by 1944 by the Woomera, the Beaufort would remain in front line service for the duration of the war, then be converted to target towing and transport duties.
However, Australian capacity would be beyond full stretch, and must take a second (small) influx of French staff from Potez with expertise in this class if aircraft to solve the CA-11s problems.
The CA-11 WOOMERA program "go-ahead" occurred in July 1941 once the provision of the Potez staff was finalised. The Woomera still had to be developed and tested, and the type did not reach IOC until December 1942. From that time it began to establish a reputation as a very rugged and capable strike aircraft.
Martin-Baker to CAC
The development of a first class fighter for the RAAF in FFO was both a complex and difficult task for Australia to perform. Building this into FFO has not been lightly undertaken.
The move to POD has to be as in OTL. Australia, under the guidance of the estimable Mr Essington Lewis (industrialist), would develop an aircraft industry based on the Wirraway. This has been described above.
The RAAF would want a modern bomber, as per the OTL Beaufort program. The outbreak of war would temporarily place this program in grave danger, until bold decisions were made to use Wasp engines instead of Taurus, and some British help resumed.
The plan to start local development of a replacement for the Beaufort would occur as in OTL. It was normal practise to start development of the replacement as the aircraft entered production, in those days, Woomera would be under development. The collapse of metropolitan France in May-August 1940 would have a huge impact, but it is Japanese responses which will drive Australian actions. This has also been described above.
POD starts for Australia late in 1940, as Japanese intentions towards Thailand start to become clear, following French rejection of Japanese demands for access to Cochin-China.
In terms of single engined fighters in FFO, we have only one Australian response, early development not of the Boomerang fighter, but of a Boomerang fighter-trainer which is not a combat aircraft. There is a deliberate intention of building a potential capability in this decision, and it is based solely on Japanese relationships with Thailand. The actual orders to cease production of Boomerang I and produce an emergency fighter (Boomerang II same as OTL Boomerang) will not occur in FFO until late in 1941, with the machine appearing on the production lines within about 4 months. Therefore, the decision to switch to Boomerang II will be taken in about October 1941 and the machine will in production from about February 1942, with IOC Squadron service in about April, implying that the machine will see action in about June-July 1942.
These dates are important, because it is on them that the decision to build new plant for a first-class fighter depends. This is a very considerable investment, about ₤2,000,000. It cannot be made without external assistance via provision of engines, design engineers and draftsmen.
Very fortunately, the requisite number of personnel, which is quite small, can be provided by the French and has been in the second tranche of French assistance (the first being those to assist with the Gloster G-39 long range twin engine fighter). Even better, these men will have spent the past 8-10 months in British companies mixing their expertise with British industry. It is also probable that at least some of the small Martin-Baker design team for the MB-3 will be seconded to Australia.
And yet, the need would be most urgent, as the Japanese threat is severe enough to force Boomerang II to be produced, speed up Beaufort deliveries, and force radical simplification on to the Woomera project so as to hasten its development and productionisation as a strike aircraft.
The Martin-Baker fighter series were clearly being developed by the Air Ministry as optional backups, and to encourage new thought and new technology. They were deliberately designed as cheap and simple to build, and to be very easy to maintain. They would therefore be available for transfer in terms of all documents and existing jigs and tooling, and are the only modern designs to fit this criteria which use existing Australian production methods for Wirraway and Boomerang.
Very importantly, their tubular steel construction was very similar to Boomerang and Wirraway construction. These machines also used tubular steel fuselage skeletons with a non-load bearing frame and skinning system added to it. With the G-39 stressed skin monococque machine also being built in Australia, there is absolutely no ability to build another such stressed skin design.
This presupposes a series of discussions between the Australian Minister for the Air Force and the UK Air Ministry about the future path for Australian production from late 1940. These occurred in OTL, but were mainly negative, the panicked British telling Australia what they could not have.
Major POD in late 1940. The major departure here is that this is reversed: the British are not panicked, the threat of invasion is very low, the Luftwaffe threat much reduced. The talk will therefore be about how Australia can best contribute to the Allied effort with a restricted but not shut-off flow of assistance. Ironically, this is in accordance with OTL planning in teh late 1930s! It is from this root that the British deision to transfer G-39 production to Australia comes. It is likely that, at this time, the Air Ministry agrees that a direct threat to Australia would see them shipping Hurricanes. This is a subsidiary trigger for the Boomerang fighter-trainer to be developed.
Other Decisions. This is also when the issue of an escort LR fighter for the RAAF Beaufort force would arise. The issue of engines for this fighter will be the decider, and the RAAF has decided to use P&W twin Wasp for the Beaufort. Therefore, the fighter should also use this powerplant. These is simply no way that Australia can possibly manufacture another engine type at this stage beyond the single and twin Wasps, and even there production will not match airframe production, and some must be imported from the USA.
This is the issue which leads to the decision to accept the British idea of building the Gloster G-39 rather than Beaufighter. The latter machine can indeed be built on Beaufort production lines but those aircraft are essential, and are only just entering production (late), their production cannot be disrupted at this stage. The RAF will find it extremely hard to release Beaufighters or assistance to the RAAF due to the great need for these machines themselves at this stage of the war.
Therefore, a new line is needed in Australia, and extensions to the existing plant have to be built. Whether Beaufighter or Gloster G-39 is build is immaterial, BOTH will have to be redesigned to take Wasp engines and productionised to suit Australian methods.
This will give the Air Ministry pause for thought. It has two modern fighter types to offer, the single engined MB-3 and the twin engined G-39. The MB-3 is actually a given, the RAF can spare it, it uses Australian production methods, and is specially designed to be simple to build and to maintain. The Beaufighter/Gloster question is equivalent, the choice of types therefore came down to which was the better machine which also causes least disruption to Beaufort production. The result of that is inevitably going to be the Gloster G-39.
Selection of this Gloster machine reinforced the issue of using the Air Ministry backup designs as a deliberate choice to explore additional design types and technologies for Imperial industry and to offer tangible rewards to non-mainstream design teams. Simultaneously, these machines are not second-rate in any way, and their production in Australia (or Canada for that matter) clearly demonstrates Imperial solidarity and support which not exposing UK industry to excessive operational demands for their standard types. It also reduces to vanishing point demands for the best types the RAF has in production, and allows slightly older types, such as Hurricane, to be shipped to meet local emergencies.
This is therefore an example of a carefully coordinated GLOBAL Imperial industrial strategy.
So, by early 1941, facilities will be a-building and initial subcontracting getting underway for the Gloster twin-engined fighter type using twin Wasp engines.
MB-3. The decision on the MB-3 will be second to the twin-engined fighter decision, but quite early on it will become obvious that the MB-3 is the obvious choice.
HOWEVER, there is a serious problem. The MB-2 used the Napier Dagger engine, and the MB-3 is supposed to use the Napier Sabre. But the Sabre cannot be in production before mid-late 1942 and is permanently beyond the ability of Australian industry to build because it is a sleeve-valve engine. Therefore the CA-15 fighter to be developed from MB-3 cannot use Sabre. However, there is a bright side. The requirement for this machine to be a low-altitude mudbasher is not there. There are Wirraways, Boomerangs, Beauforts and Woomeras and Hurricanes available for this task. That is the requirement change which killed the program in OTL. The CA-15 will be a medium to higher altitude escort fighter and interceptor.
A solution, then.
There are only two options for fighter engines in the required power range in 1941 as this decision starts to translate in to buildings and orders flowing to subcontractors. These are Griffon and Vulture. One is, as yet, a paper engine (but RR is very confident and it has letter-perfect ancestry), and the other is not working very well (but RR say it can be fixed enough for a fighter to use). At this stage (1940-41)NEITHER can be built in Australia, but EITHER could be by late 1942 mid 1943, depending on development time and when the plant investment and training investment is made.
Factors in this are that the Air Ministry thinks that a Merlin-ancestry Griffon is a proper fighter engine, while Vulture is under a cloud. RR will be supremely confident of Griffon even at this stage of its development, and will say that while they can fix Vulture enough that Tornado can use it, they have less expertise in that type than with in-lines. Vulture cannot yet be fixed to be reliable in bomber use, that will take a bit more time, but at least most of the problems will be corrected (for Tornado) for the poor benighted RAAF Manchester force. With Griffon, of course, nobody did incremental development from a well-known baseline than RR.
Another very important factor is that the Australian environment is tropical and maritime, with long distances and few airfields. This will weight somewhat against Vulture in a single-engined application, where it would NOT do so in Europe. So Tornados will not be seen in Burma or elsewhere east of Suez, although Vultures will be in the surviving original Manchesters, before the Centaurus Manchester solves that problem. (This may lead to RAAF Manchester aircrew setting up shrines to the Centaurus.)
So the decision has to be for Griffon when it is made in 1941.
When is the decision made? The decision to go ahead with the MB-5/CA-15 is difficult to pin down. The investment involved is the usual, about ₤2,000,000 investment in plant, training and development before the first machine is actually ordered, and at least as much again for the engine plant to start building Griffons in Australia. Both are do-able, but there is a year of lead time on training before the workers can assemble aircraft, before the subcontractors are ready, and before the new annexes are built and commissioned. But at least this time is needed anyway to redeisgn MB-3 from Sbare to MB-5 standard with Griffon.
The Air Ministry in the UK will fund the initial stages of changing the machine from Sabre to Griffon this is simply in their interests, as it saves time and the MB-3 and MB-5 is one of their own backups. Transfer of development and funding will occur in a phased way, and Australia will also be asked for a contribution to Griffon development costs to tropicalise the engine. This will be accepted, and this will allow CAC engineers and senior production managers to work with RR as the Griffon is developed. This factor is critically important.
Building the engine in Australia is a huge task, and will probably commence with Merlin construction (actually a mix of assembly and manufacture) for the Mosquito production program, leveraging off that engine for Griffon.
So the decision must actually date from the day the Griffon is ordered in to development. MB-3/5/CA-15 is intimately linked to Griffon, and will be the test case for it, if not the first machine to fly with it. But it WILL be the first fighter designed for it, by a very brief time. As the aircraft had to be again redesigned for the Griffon, it will become the MB-5 as in OTL but will be produced as CA-15.
The MB-5/CA-15 will probably enter production in 1943 and IOC would be some time in early-mid 1944. At this period, it would be one of the most impressive fighters in the world, literally able to fly rings around the Mustang, Hellcat, Thunderbolt and Corsair operating in the theatre and much faster than them. The machine would stay in Australian service for a very long time.
Material on MB-2, MB-3, and MB-5
(erm, where did the photographs go??? How do I get them in here??? The answer is more Galway Pipe!)
Cheers: Mark
MB-2
]www.fortunecity.com/tatto...20/mb2.jpg
Like its predecessor, the civilian MB-1, the MB2 was constructed of steel tubing, but many detailed improvements were made which further simplified production as well as repair and maintenance.
MB2 was powered by a special Napier Dagger III 24-cylinder H-type engine of 805 nominal bhp, but capable of operation at plus 13 lb boost to give over 1,000 h.p. for take-off, driving a fixed-pitch two-blade propeller. The undercarriage was, for simplicity, fixed and cleanly faired in two trouser-type fairings, the port one carrying the oil-cooler. Later a scheme was worked out for making the undercarriage retractable to improve performance.
The fuselage lines were square cut and exceptionally clean, with almost constant depth from nose to sternpost. An unusual feature, at that time, was that the fuselage was slightly longer than the span of 34ft 6in, a feature contributing to good stability and control in the yawing plane, and which was retained in later Martin-Baker designs. The wing carried eight Browning.303 machine-guns, disposed in two groups outboard the undercarriage, which made MB2 the first British eight-gun fighter
The clean and orderly cockpit was set well back, allowing a good view downwards behind the wing. A crash post was fitted, which automatically extended to minimise structure damage and injury to the pilot in the event of a nose-over landing.
A small tapered tail-plane war mounted on the top of the fuselage well forward of the sternpost, while the fin and rudder combination was roughly triangular in side elevation. This arrangement placed most of the effective rudder area below the tail-plane, thus providing an adequate balance to the keel surface and assuring good recovery from spins. In earlier designs, there was no fin and the rudder had lacked entirely the part above the tail-plane, lateral stability being provided by the fuselage and the undercarriage trouser fairings. However, this was found to be not entirely satisfactory, and the fixed fin was later added.
The MB2 was first flown by Captain Baker at Harwell on 3 August, 1938. A report in "The Aeroplane" stated that "in spite of its fixed undercarriage, the MB2 had a performance as good as that of contemporary fighters and a capacity for quick and cheap production by the simplicity of its structure and easy assembly. Repair and maintenance were also simple, and these factors might have influenced the authorities towards putting the MB2 into production when the country's fighter strength was disproportionately low."
The decision of the authorities not to go ahead with the development of this design was a disappointment and a setback of some magnitude to a company as yet youthful and largely inexperienced in these matters.
Summary: MARTIN-BAKER MB.2 - Single private-venture prototype broadly responding to Specification F.5/34 and first flown at Denham on August 3, 1938. Powered by a 725 hp Napier Dagger HIM, the Martin-Baker MB.2 carried eight 0.303-in (7.7-mm) Brownings in the wings and had a fixed, trousered undercarriage. Initially tested with markings M-B-1 (G-AEZD not carried), the MB.2 was acquired by Air Ministry in June 1939 as
P9594 and returned to A & AEE for second assessment after mods to tail control surfaces. It also spent some time at the AFDU, Northolt, before returning to Martin-Baker late in 1939, where it still survived in December 1941, although probably flown little or not at all after outbreak of war.
Max speed, 320 mph (515 km/h). Gross weight, 5,537 Ib (2,512 kg). Span, 34ft 0 in (10.36 m). Length, 34ft 6 in (10.51 m).
MB-3
The lessons learned in the design and construction of the two previous low-wing monoplanes were embodied in a new design, the MB3, which was powered by a 2,000 h.p. Napier Sabre 24cylinder H-type engine, driving a De Havilland variable-pitch three-blade propeller.
MB3 was projected to meet an Air Ministry fighter specification. It carried six 20-mm cannon, each with 200 rounds of ammunition, which made it the most heavily armed fighter in existence at the time. The armament installation was very good from an operational point of view, and a quick turnaround was ensured by the excellent accessibility of guns and ammunition.
While retaining the essential characteristics of the earlier designs, MB3 included many new features. The fuselage primary structure was still the round steel tube arrangement, but metal panels had taken the place of wood and fabric of earlier models. The wing, of torsion-box construction about a laminated steel spar, gave a remarkably strong and stiff structure in which flexing was not perceptible
A pneumatically controlled undercarriage, of Martin design was simple, sturdy, effective and notably reliable. As the wing flaps were also pneumatically operated, the need for hydraulics, with all their attendant operational hazards and maintenance problems, was eliminated. Radiators were installed underneath the wings, the coolant radiator on the starboard and the oil-cooler on the port side.
This aeroplane proved to be highly manoeuvrable and easy to fly, and could have been developed into a good fighter aircraft. It was a double tragedy when, on 12 September, 1942 the engine failed soon after take-off, and Captain Baker, in an attempt to save the aircraft whilst executing a difficult forced landing, crashed in a field and was killed.
The personal loss to James Martin was immeasurable. It has already been stated that a deep friendship had grown up between these two men. James Martin never forgot the fearless, skilful and resolute pilot, and many consider that it was this painful tragedy that really fired the passionate interest in the safety of aircrews, which was later to become the very pivot of his life. At the time, the material loss was also a bitter pill. The MB3 was completely wrecked, and building to the same design would have resulted in immense loss of time - that commodity so essential to the successful production of a new aeroplane - so it was decided to design another prototype with a Rolls Royce Griffon engine, to be the MB4. In the event, this project was eventually dropped in favour of a new design, which became the MB5
Summary: MARTIN-BAKER MB.3 - First of three prototypes ordered mid-1939 to conform to Specification F. 18/39 for a heavily-armed high-performance fighter. Powered by a 2,300 hp Napier Sabre II, the Martin-Baker MB.3
(R2492) first flew at Wing on August 31, 1942, but was lost 12 days later when making a dead-stick landing. Second prototype appeared two years later as Martin-Baker MB.5 <http://www.jaapteeuwen.com/ww2aircraft/html%20pages/MARTIN-BAKER%20MB5.htm>).
Max speed (estimated), 415 mph (668 km/h). Gross weight, 11,497 Ib
(5,215 kg). Span, 35 ft 0 in (10.67 m). Length, 35 ft 4 in (10.77 m).
MB5
The MB5, a low-wing monoplane, fitted with a 2,340hp. Rolls-Royce Griffon 83 engine driving a pair of three-bladed counter-rotating propellers, was an aircraft of sleek and pleasing lines. Underslung radiators were placed beneath the belly of the fuselage, aft of the cockpit. This arrangement, as well as reducing the cooling drag, led to a slim and clean nose which, with the long spinner enclosing the propeller hubs, gave an exceptionally good view over the nose and leading edge of the wings. Fighter pilots flying this aircraft for the first time were full of praise of this essential tactical feature.
The fuselage primary structure of MB5 was of the now familiar steel tube construction, covered and faired with light, detachable metal panels, which offered exceptional accessibility to the equipment installations and for servicing. The engine-mounting consisted of two molybdenum-steel tapered cantilever booms, and here too the layout provided easy access to engine components and accessories. The engine was neatly cowled with panels which could be removed easily to lay bare the engine in a few minutes.
The wing was of the single-spar type, with the spar and leading edge forming a torsion-box of remarkable stiffness and strength; primary wing structure details were simple to produce and easy to repair. Flying controls were operated by torsion bars, which gave excellent positive control coupled with light operation. A sturdy wide-track undercarriage gave exceptionally good taxiing qualities, whilst its pneumatic operation was simple, effective and entirely trouble free.
It was, however, in the pilot's cockpit that one of MB5's main attractions lay. The cockpit was exceptionally well laid out, with all controls coming easily and readily to hand, within the pilots reach. Instruments were grouped in an orderly fashion, allowing routine cockpit checks to be done in logical sequence. Fuel control was centred in one lever - a feature dear to the hearts of fighter pilots. Accessibility for servicing was provided by mounting the instruments on hinged panels, which opened into the cockpit. A special primary control-unit was neatly installed in a manner economical in space, yet effective in operation, and having the advantage of bringing vital control components within the easy scrutiny of routine inspection. The cockpit was cleanly floored, an unusual feature then in British military aircraft, which gave a pleasing impression of spaciousness combined with businesslike utility.
Official reports of the day stated that the cockpit could advantageously be copied as standard for fighter aircraft. A one-piece transparent tear-drop canopy of neat design was fitted, provided with wheel control for operation by the pilot. The mechanism was perfectly balanced and easy to operate, whilst jettisoning was clean, safe and effective.
The four-cannon installation, utilising Martin-Baker flat belt-feed mechanisms, was exceptionally well arranged. The functional efficiency and destructive power of this weapon was noteworthy among contemporary aircraft, whilst the excellent accessibility of the installation permitted easy servicing and ensured a quick turnaround under operational conditions.
Not all its virtues rested in the excellence of its engineering, for in the air MB5 was unquestionably ahead of contemporary piston-engined fighters, with a top speed of 460 m.p.h. Early flight trials, in the capable hands of Bryan Greensted, quickly established it as an exceptionally good aircraft, and some older readers will remember the polished demonstration of MB5 by Squadron-leader Zurakowski as an outstanding event at the Farnborough Air Display of 1946.
Pilots liked the ease of taxiing provided by a wide-track undercarriage, the excellent all-round view, the absence of swing on take-off and landing, the spectacular rocket-like climb, the surge of power, quickly responding to throttle openings, with a corresponding bite into the air urging the aircraft forward, and the feeling of confidence given by a robust structure. They also liked sitting in a clean cockpit from which the aircraft could be flown effectively with precision and safety.
Why this aircraft was not put into production remains one of the aircraft industry's minor mysteries, and one which is often the subject of interesting speculation. Some will say that, as a piston-engined aircraft, it came too late to be acceptable in the advent of jet fighters. However, had a decision about its future been taken early by the authorities, it could have gone into production soon enough for it to have reached squadrons in sufficient numbers to have been engaged effectively in World War II. Disappointment in failing to put MB5 into production was felt keenly by all at Martin-Baker and shared by many Royal Air Force officers and other officials
Summary: MARTIN-BAKER MB.5 - Second of the F.I8/39 fighter prototypes ordered
in 1939 (see Martin-Baker MB.3
<http://www.jaapteeuwen.com/ww2aircraft/html%20pages/MARTIN-BAKER%20MB3.htm>),
the Martin-Baker MB.5 (R2496) was a much-developed version, featuring a
1,900 hp R-R Griffon 83 with centra-props, and four cannon armament.
First flown at Harwell on May 13,1944, but requirement overtaken by
advent of jet-powered fighters, and second Martin-Baker MB.5 (R2500) not
built. Flight demonstrations with R2496 continued until end-1947.
Max speed, 460 mph (740 km/h) at 20,000ft (6,100 m). Rate of climb,
3,800 ft/min (19.3 mlsec). Service ceiling, 40,000 ft (12,192 m). Range,
1,100 mis (1,770 km). Empty weight, 9,233 Ib (4,192 kg). Max gross
weight, 12,090 Ib (5,489 kg). Span, 35 ft 0 in (10.67 m). Length, 37 ft
0 in (11.30 m). Wing area, 263 sqft (24.4m2).
