Search this Topic:
Jun 1 15 9:58 AM
Just call me Author
MarkLBailey wrote:geoff, dry priods in Kedah are january-February (avg 3" rain) and June-July (6").
1st quarter 44 is when northern Sumatra has to get taken (Culverin), so landing in Kedah should occur then too.
The Straits will be busy - it will be like a boiling cauldron as there will be a major fleet action there too, as well as the aerial campaign from hell (Kondo'2 2nd Fleet, Ozawa's 2nd Air Fleet and the land-based IJNAF: hell, even coastal forces can be in the game in those waters.
Culverin very early Jan 44
Battle of the Malacca Strait (Somerville vs Kondo)
Robinet Feb 44
advance north into Thailand (where?)
advance east (to where?)
main thrust south to the IJA MLR at Slim River, with some serious fighting enroute.
Singapore coup de main
Michael, any clashes there with your work? None I can see - Whiff of Powder currently on October 43, and we've already specified that HAILSTORM (operation to attrit Japanese air power) is launched early to support it, so no clash there.
This would make 1Q and 2Q 44 forcing attention on to Sumatra-northern malaya, then a coup de main in the end of 3Q 44..
Does this timeline seem OK?This timeline points to two HAILSTORMs in 44HAILSTORM I - launched Jan 44 - intention to support Somervilles push on Kondo by writing down IJA/IJN land based air threatHAILSTORM II - launch maybe 1-2 weeks before Singapore thrust planned, aim is to write down remaining/reconstituted Japanese air threat (potentially a serious risk to the landing) and to keep the Japanese busy playing defence against the airborne threat, as a distraction from the buildup of landing craft etc that points to a seaborne threat.
USN is taking the Carolines at this time.
M Edit - yes agree on the tanks and do not forget Tetrarch.7.5 tons, 2 for a Valentine. hell, MkVI still has a role here, 'banzai hunting' in behind the lines security and battlefield mop up.Think 'logistically light', and Valentine can take a 75mm bored out 57mm for bunker busting needs.OTL we had Churchill crocadiles, could we have a Valentine crocadile for anti bunker work?Please excuse the rambling/
Jun 1 15 10:03 AM
borys68 wrote:How about using those 4,5" barrels, with a sleeve, to make 4,2" mortars?
Or, the other way around, bore them out to 12cm?
Jun 1 15 10:14 AM
MarkLBailey wrote:I injured my back yestrday and I am fairly heavily medicated right now, kinda woozy.
Jun 1 15 2:28 PM
Two Valentine tanks were modified to carry flame-throwers and were tested by the Petroleum Warfare Department to determine which system was best for a tank-mounted flame projector. One used a projector pressurised by slow burning cordite charges (designed by Ministry of Supply) and one designed by AEC with the PWD using a projector operated by compressed hydrogen gas. Both carried the flame-thrower fuel in a trailer and the flame projector was mounted on the hull front. Trials started in 1942 and it showed that the gas-operated system was better. From this test installation was developed the Crocodile equipment for the Churchill Crocodile flame-thrower used in the North West Europe campaign in 1944–45.
Valentine 9.75 inch flame mortar
Experimental vehicle with turret replaced by fixed heavy mortar intended to fire 25 lb TNT incendiary shells to demolish concrete emplacements. Trials only by Petroleum Warfare Dept, 1943–45. Effective range was 400 yards (370 m) (maximum range 2,000 yards (1,800 m)).
Jun 1 15 9:36 PM
Born Again P-76 Pilot
I believe that the 3,7" mountain howitzer, even though it was state of the art 1915? 1917? was a handsome piece of kit, with split trail, the legs allowing for four-point support on uneven ground. Maybe it could serve as a cross between "heavy infantry gun" and indirect fire support weapon? A lighter version of the 15cmIG?
Jun 1 15 10:05 PM
I know this is taken for granted by all and sundry, but I think the below must remembered as factors in the planning process for these operations. With care all these operations would be possible with extensive and though integrated training of individuals, sub-units, units, formation, etc or all services and nationalities. Thus many months of training and full scale practices and meticulous logistical preparations in all fields required.
During 1944-45 the British Army had an embarrassment of riches of field, medium and heavy artillery as well as using light and heavy anti-aircraft artillery to support its rapidly wasting away infantry. Infantry casualty rates in British infantry battalions in Europe 1943-45 were higher than those of 1914-18. There were just more and better weapons for killing infantry; the German infantry casualties in Europe from 1941-45 reflected this as well.
Not only RAF Regiment men were retraining as infantry replacements, Royal Marines who had served as landing barge crews etc at Normandy landings were reformed into 3 infantry brigades and fought as part of the 1st Canadian Army; British tank crews at times dismounted from their tanks to clear road blocks and then reman their tanks. Whole infantry brigades were formed from search-light and anti-aircraft units.
Thus the greater commitment of British infantry manpower in large scale meat-grinding fighting against the Germans and the Japanese is a major consideration.
Some British and US researches studying WWII battles in Europe concluded that UK attacks used less men and lost less men in attacks on the Germans with their dead & wounded (excluding POW) with approaching equality. This was the British perfection of the set piece assault of their unbroken succession of great victories of later 1918. The US and Russian Armies been prepared to use more men and have high losses in men to obtain quicker victories than the British.
So by 1944-45 the British have the equipment to send to the Far East War but fearful of the "butchers bill" to a war weary British population.
Thus these Far Eastern battles have to be very much "British & Imperial/Commonwealth" battles and "British & Imperial/Commonwealth" victories.
P.S. The 6-inch howitzer that fought from the Battle of the Somme 1916 had its combat farewell with the British 14th Army helping to drive the Japanese from Burma.
Jun 3 15 2:18 AM
mid-1945 the Japanese historically had built dispersement strips; aircraft splinter
proof shelters; additional airfields; adding extra runways to runways;
extending existing runways for longer range and heavier aircraft; 75mm and 25mm
AA gun emplacements; armament and ordinance storages; etc. The Japanese built
bunker systems; tunnels; etc.
Japanese had done all this to the limit of their labour, equipment and engineering
resources. The simple fact was that no more could have been done without shutting
down of the local economy and the total conscription of the civil population to
increase the labour force.
Japanese added an extra airfield to the cluster of ex-RAF airfields northeast
of Butterworth; extra airfield at Port Sweetenham; extra airfield at Johore
Bahur; completion or expansion 3 airfields and building of 1 new airfield at
defence of the north-west airfields in Malaya would dictate that the Japanese
MUST hold the Gurun line in Kedah. If well garrisoned with large reserves this
excellent position combined with the Japanese skill at field defences would
provide the Japanese with confidence in holding this position and costing the
British very heavy losses.
Japanese would be fighting a manpower battle against the British fighting a
material battle. “Flesh and blood” v “high explosives and steel”
the British the ground in part of the centre and coastal sections is so low
lying and with rain would eventually result in “Passchendaele” style battlefield,
but not “Passchendaele” fighting. The rest of the battlefield, especially as
the British break into the Japanese front would result in the expanding of the
battle area into the large rubber plantations were the British late WWI style combined
arms fighting would result in a battle of attrition as the Japanese cannot
afford to abandone their position because:
speedy loss of all NW Malaya north of Taiping
RAF immediately gaining of at least 6 good airfields
retreat of the Japanese would degenerate into a confused rabble with the entire
army with all its troops, transport, guns, etc. having funnel into very few
escape routes under the close pursuit of British armour. Moving men and
equipment to Penang Island under RAF attack would be a very costly undertaking.
type of retreat is the same as what happened to Army Group Centre of the German
Army on the Russian Front in 1944. Too many formations converged into a handful
of lines of retreat and formations, units and sub-units became intermixed and
army organisation collapsed.
for the Japanese forces in the Battle Gurun must be a all or nothing battle
with everything committed to holding the line. Once the Japanese right flank bends
too far, the British move into a large area of rubber plantations. That area in
effect becomes a large vulnerable front. This stretched front eventually
becomes a fluid area where British infantry& armoured columns could push
through to access the rear of the Japanese divisional and army HQ support
Jun 3 15 4:29 PM
Jun 3 15 5:16 PM
Ideally, the level of threat will force the IJA penang garrison to evacuate as the very last thing we need is for the swine to fort up in georgetown as it's crammed with Imperial subjects. So a 'golden road' to allow them to 'escape' will be needed to get them off teh island and to the mainland
I really don't think you're going to be able to evict the Japanese from Malaya without a "Little Manila" somewhere.
Jun 3 15 6:39 PM
Jun 3 15 7:38 PM
As far as Penang Island and street fighting in Georgetown, the Japanese reinforcing Penang Island to hold on as long as possible, or reduce the forces to a token rear-guard to as a sacrifice for "honour" and to cover demolition parties. If the Japanese have sufficient troops to garrison to the last is logical. However if the Japanese are desperate scraping together effective formations to form blocking positions on the road south to Taiping the Japanese will need at least the equivalent of a good steady division with at least a regiment for field security duties on line of communication and retreat.
From a logistical purposes the British can repair the railway bridges but between Taiping and Kuala Kangsar there are 3 railway tunnels (6,000 yards between the first & third: ref map sheet 2 M/4). I am checking other maps for railway tunnels. The seizure and holding by the British of these tunnels would be good if possible but extremely difficult to arrange. In 1944 I think the Indians had a parrachute brigade as part of their airbourne division. Also there existed small anti Japanese local forces operating with British intelligence forces. I think if the confusion and disruption of the Japanese is great enough it may be possible.
Jun 3 15 8:43 PM
Information SIPS, HQ SAGSEA G.S.I., HQ, ALFSEA
Town map shows that reinforced concrete bridge destroyed in 1941 by the British still not repaired. The river crossing by "Jap Bridge" less than 200 yards down stream.
East of Alor Star "200 yards East of level crossing - Large JAP Transit Camp (C3. Jan. ,43)
"Ammunition Dump - N.E. of Airfield (C3. Dec. '45)"
"English School - 50 JAP. tps. billeted (C2. Jun, '45)"
"Police Barracks - 50 JAP tps. billeted (C2. Jun. '45)"
"Malay School - 50 JAP tps. billeted (C2. Jun. 45)"
"Arab School - 50 JAP tps. billeted (C2. Jun. '45)'
"Map reference 1264 - 500 JAP tps billeted (F3. Aug. '45)
Jun 3 15 9:54 PM
From 1945 town map of Sungei Patani "complied and drawn by A.C,I.U. and War Office."
"Information in black supplied by I.S.T.D."
If British amphibious attack is to drive inland to cut the Japanese lines of communications north for the Japanese Army by taking Sungei Patani then following maybe of use:
The British colonial habit of recreating a piece of Surrey in the Far East is present in Sungei Patani. North and NW of the town there was open lawns, sporting fields and gardens greater in area than the town. This open area is roughly divided east-west by very small patches of jungle, bush, trees, and officical residences. The southern part of the area was bounded to the west by jungle and to the south by the town with the Chinese school, the Vernacular school, the Chinese Secretariat, and the cinema, and to the east the Bus Company (North) Depot, Judge's Residence, District Office and Police Club. This main area been the grounds of the Sungei Patani Club and the Golf Course. To the west there is open strip 150 to 200 yards wide and approx. 500 yards long with the District Officer's residence and lesser Official residences leading north to the Church of England church and the Volunteer Headquarters. The Volunteer HQ adjoins the main open area which is the Emergency Landing Ground (civil airfield). NE of the X shaped landing ground was the Ibrahim School with adjoining open ground that extends over the railway line. (Note this not the ex-RAF Sungei Patani airfield which was further north)
With so much good quality accommodation and as communication chock point Sungei Patani would make a logical command and communication hub, even if only a lesser one. An attack by parachut and glider borne troops even if failing to cut the rail and road lines of communications would throw the HQ and 2nd line support and logistic troops into total confusion.
To interfere with the rail and road communications virtually risk free attacks by infiltration parties would be very effective. However these parties could be more valuable in not stirring-up trouble but rather gathering intelligence.
Jun 3 15 10:05 PM
Jun 4 15 12:04 AM
Jun 4 15 1:09 AM
The Japanese deployment is logical as the stocks of military stores would have to be already in the expected areas of combat. The rapid movement of reserve troops and mobile equipment would stretch the road, rail, coastal and river transport. So the addition of move large tonnages of supplies and heavier equipment would cause traffic congestion.
As a diversion and part of general clearing out of flanks do the British roll up the airfields in NE Malaya?
The importance of the central Malaya reserve position was important to the British and so logical the same for the Japanese in APOD.
The Japanese have to hang on to Kuntan airfield and the SE coastal airfields to defend their shipping.
KL, Port Sweetenham (general cargo and assorted fuel imports and main fuel storages) and Port Dickerson (import and main storage of aviation fuel) were the logistical and maintenance hub for Malaya.
The Japanese 18th Division in APOD would be a very sad and sorry division as it was very badly battered in APOD at least twice in the 1941/42. Historically the crack 18th Division after the capture of Singapore went to Burma. The British in Burma who fought it considered in very inferior to the Japanese troops they had fought to date. So possibly the British in Malaya/Singapore had taken the edge of the Japanese 18th Division.
Historically the Japanese with far less ground and air forces knew that they did not have resources to defend Malaya; had approx. 20,000 in Malaya and 60,000 in the Singapore area.
Jun 4 15 2:26 AM
Jun 4 15 7:17 AM
So I have find and do a lot of transcribing on things like the width and surface composition of roads; which roads were lined by monsoon drains and which had very wide canal dividers; load bearing capacity of bridges; location of stairways and other accesses on steep concrete lined river banks; e.g. the tunnel that runs from the Collyer Pier under the road into the basement of the General Post Office; Japanese Command, Control & communications e.g. names and locations the civilian buildings used as Japanese W/T stations, Robinson Road Detective Station = Japanese Garrison HQ (1944 British intelligence) and/or used as a interrogation location or maybe both; etc ?
As far the Prisoners of War, historically they were scattered all over the place doing manual labour at times under ridiculously small numbers of guards. The guards were of troops of declining quality, increasingly of reservists of older age groups of the non-fanatical type - definitely 3rd class troops. So it would be a lottery if the guards will fight it out to the death taking the prisoners of war and civilian internees down with them ranging through to only putting up token resistant before surrendering to the prisoners who they knew as opposed to unpredictable fate at the hands of "British" fighting troops. The prisoners had relationships of sorts with the Japanese guards and had a good idea of what would be their fate depending on the presence of the Military Police and/or the more determined Japanese troops to intimidate the much older troops. On average the most hated guards were the Koreans, and Sikh traitors. The Koreans were trying to be more Japanese than the Japanese to proven themselves to their Japanese over-lords. The Sikhs guards were despised (at times humiliated and beaten) by the Japanese and hated by the "British". So how the Koreans and Sikhs behave with the change of the fortunes of war I have no idea.
Historically in 1942 the prisoners of war had enough hidden arms and ammunition and other military equipment for more than two thousand men from pistols to Vickers machine guns. My own father was hiding a hand grenade for six months. However by 1944 the condition of the men meant that putting up any fight was effectively out of the question. Also most prisoners had no longer access to the locations of the hidden arms or in some cases the men who knew the secret locations were dead or sent off Singapore Island. Many arms would probably not been safe to use as maintenance was impossible and those hidden in proper packaging may require some warning to be made ready. It must be recognised that it had been hoped that the allies where going to push the Japanese back in 1942 or early 1943. As the time of the fall of Singapore it was inconceivable that the Japanese would hang-on well into 1945. By late 1944 the prisoners still confidently believed that victory would eventually come, but when? There was no longer confidence that they would survive to see final victory, survival was now only a matter hope and pray.
Jun 4 15 7:30 AM
MarkLBailey wrote:So what are the logical Japanese dispositions?The Allies are on the Kra and are advancing south along the coast, leapfrogging ahead in quite small increments. This is deliberate.it's to get the IJA into the habit of this as the Imperial MO, and teh main force opposing them is 4 Divisions in Thailand.Logically, Ishiguro's going to think that he has no threat from the sea south of Port Swettenham, and this is the area his reserve will be in (Kuala Lumpur's about 30 miles inland from Port Swettenham and this is a critically important transport, tin-mining and rubber producing region).The assessment of the Sea threat depends on the briefing he's getting from the Navy - if they think they can hold it/make it untenable for the British to mount large scale operations then yes, if however thay're doubtful then they might cause the Army to alter theirr dispositions "just in case".The IJA will have powerful air forces, probably 600 machines, half fighters and the rest battlefield aircraft and bombers etcIs that IJA only or does it include IJN air?
Jun 4 15 10:09 AM
© 2017 Yuku. All rights reserved.