Just some more backgroud information for any who cares, but I think by all the reading of the post of the 5 years or more that you seem to know all of my imformation because of all the disesions and assumptions that have aready been factored in. But until I am Told to stop I just keep hammering away.
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Historical state of the Coast Defence Artillery after the
wars end in 1945.
COLOMBO
Galle Battery: 3 x 9.2-inch in 35 deg.
Rockhouse Battery: 3 x 6-inch in 45 deg.
Colpetty Battery: 3 x 5.25-inch in CA/AA (work in progress) replacing obsolete battery
Battenburge Battery: 2 x 6-inch in 15 deg.
Breakwaters: 4 x twin 6-pdr.
TRINCOMALEE
Ostenberg Battery: 3 x 9.2-inch in 35 deg.
Fort Frederick Battery: 3 x 5.25-inch in CA/AA (only one yet installed) replacing obsolete battery
Diamond Hill (Asresa) Battery: 2 x 6-inch in 15 deg.
Hoods Tower Battery: 3 x 6-inch in 15 deg.
Elephant Point Battery: 2 x twin 6-pdr.
Elephant Island Battery: 1 x twin 6-pdr.
Clappenberg Battery: 1 x twin 6-pdr.
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Re Use of I.J.N. midget submarines
In F.F.O.: The attack on Singapore Naval Base would have been a disturbing occurrence for the British.
1. The planning of the base defences(over two decades) included a great deal of effort into preventing such an event.
2. Vic Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, C. in C. China Station was a former submariner and presumably would have had some thought of such a possibility.
3. Rear Admiral Spooner the commander of the naval base and responsible for local naval defences and security was a highly regarded navigation expert and served at the Admiralty in Hydrographic Department had been Staff Fleet Navigation Officer, Africa Station; in the same post in the Atlantic Fleet. So one would think he would have some interest in the waters in and around Singapore.
In F.F.O.: The attack on Colombo Harbour is truly remarkable considering.
1. The extremely very narrow and shallow harbour entrance.
2. That after the Singapore attack the British would be alerted to such a repeat event
3. Historically the key under water base defences were not moved to east Africa until the retreat of the Easter Fleet after the Ceylon April 1942 raids.
Historical: Refer Eastern Fleet War Diary
… “As recent experience at Sydney has shown midget submarines are unlikely to be detected by indicator loops in depths exceeding 10 fathoms (Admiralty Message 1639/13), the controlled minefield laid in all the entrances to Addu cannot be regarded as any safeguard against midget submarines.” …
Historical: The midget submarine attack on part of the Eastern Fleet at anchor in 1942 was made on an undefended (as far as submarines) port and the ships were easy prey.
In F.F.O.: The attack on the New York Navy Yard (commonly known as the Brooklyn Navy Yard).
1. The fitting out berths are like the liner berths, that is the ships are moored bow facing the shore with wharfs perpendicular to the shore.
2. The battleship in stated as having been commissioned, yet she has no crew on board and still in an incomplete state. This to me to be contradictory.
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Historical: Reference to the taking of S.S. Hauraki
12 July 1942: Indian Ocean, near Ceylon. HOKOKU and AIKOKU MARUs capture 7,113-ton New Zealand Union SS Co. merchant HAURAKI at 17-36S, 80-27S. She was enroute from Fremantle via Colombo for Egypt with supplies. After her capture, a Japanese prize crew is put aboard. The deck crew are locked below, but the engine crew are engaged under guard to run the ship's machinery. In the course of the voyage back to Japan the engine crew manages to pitch most of the spare machinery parts over the side. As a result, the Japanese never obtain much use from the ship.
In F.F.O.: With the same merchant crew and the same Japanese crews, did the S.S. Hauraki achieve the same result in saboteur or did some happen to alter events.
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In F.F.O.: Reference to re-supply missions to Singapore.
H.M.S. Porpoise class minelayer submarine Cargo capacity is 25 tons in mine casing, and 10 tons inside pressure hull, assuming torpedos are carried for self-defence. Items carried in the mine casing that can be affected by pressure are to be placed in pressure containers. Restriction of size (2 ft 6 inches x 4 ft) of cargo packages owing to dimensions of torpedo hatch. In order to facilitate easy stowage, all packages would have to be made as small possible. By the way the large U.S.N. fleet submarines despite their size have torpedo hatches less suitable for loading and unloading cargos which reduces their flexibility in convert in this type of mission.
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Historicial: On the night of 3 April 1942, five B-17Es and a single LB-30 (AL608) from the 7th BG took off from Asansol, in India, and flew to Rangoon, where they started three large fires in the dock area with bombs and incendiaries. This was the second combat mission of the newly-formed Tenth Air Force, assigned to the equally new China-Burma-India Theatre, and the first mission over the Asian mainland for the Liberator.
