"Before Barbarossa do the Allies have any guarantee that the Soviet Union will not join the Axis?"


In August 1939, while the Anglo-French-Soviet talks were going in Moscow, Polish C-in_C Marshal Rydz-Smigly asked the French officers sent from Moscow to ask about the Polish government accepting Soviet aid "What guarantee do we have that the Soviets will fight the Germans?" 

That kind of question, and the categorical refusal to even consider the idea of accepting Soviet aid if Germany attacked behind the question, got Poland conquered by Germany and divided between the Germans and the Soviets:

"We feel that this is no time for half measures and that every effort should be made to persuade Poland and Roumania to agree to the use of
their territory by Russian forces.  In our opinion it is only logical that the Russians should be given every facility for rendering
assistance and putting their maximum weight into the scale on the side of the anti-aggression powers.  We consider it so important to
meet the Russians in this matter that, if necessary, the strongest pressure should be exerted on Poland and Roumania to persuade them to
adopt a helpful attitude. 

It is perfectly clear that without early and effective Russian assistance, the Poles cannot hope to stand up to a German attack for
more than a limited time...  The supply of arms and war material is not enough.  If the Russians are to collaborate in resisting German
aggression against Poland or Roumania they can only do so effectively on Polish or Roumanian soil; and...if permission for this were
withheld till war breaks out, it would then be too late.  The most the Allies could then hope for would be to avenge Poland and Roumania and
perhaps restore their independence as a result of the defeat of  Germany in a long war. 

Without immediate and effective Russian assistance the longer that war would be, and the less chance there would be of either Poland or
Roumania emerging at the end of it as independent states in anything like their present form.
 

We suggest that it is now necessary to present this unpalatable truth with absolute frankness to both the Poles and to the Roumanians.  To
the Poles especially it ought to be pointed out that they have obligations to us as well as we to them; and that it is unreasonable
for them to expect us blindly to implement our guarantee to them if, at the same time, they will not co-operate in measures designed for a
common purpose. 

The conclusion of a treaty with Russia appears to us to be the best way of preventing a war. ... At the worst if the negotiations with
Russia
break down, a Russo-German rapproachment may take place of which the probable consequence will be that Russia and Germany
decide to share the spoils and concert in a new partition of the Eastern European States." 

Committee on Imperial Defense, Deputy Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee
meeting of August 16, 1939.  Quoted in Sidney Aster "1939  The Making
of the Second World War"  and Michael Carley "1939 - The Alliance that
Never Was and the Coming of World War II" 


I expect after the experience of 1939, people asking unaswerable questions, demanding "guarantees" for future Soviet actions, and rejecting cooperation with the Soviets in the absence of such an ungivable "guarantee", will be given short shrift.

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