The danger is very clear, as Shane notes, and a 'lid' has to be placed on the Greek campaign.

The only strategic rationale is to be drawn from the map. Occupying the Pelopponese (and perhaps picking up Zanthe and Cepahallonia for free when the Italans collapse) acts as a strategic flank guard for the Aegean and as a way to threaten the Dalmatian coast. Essentially, it opens the Strait of Otranto.

A vague general threat and a useful place for tactical acft is about it... it is pretty thin.

In the practical sense, it DOES provide a useful place to cycle raw US units through, for some combat experience. It is a nice place to refine new concepts and weapons, it HAS been very valuable in refining amphibious doctrines and concepts very early.

But that really is it as far as I can see. I suspect it will come to be seen as a valid strategic target - which did not work and became a strategic failure, from which some (rather marginal) operational benefits were later made.

Cheers: Mark