A few things

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You have very logical answers, but I'm afraid the team can't face the huge challenge you are pointing out. This is the reason why we have to strictly control the variables and limit the butterfly effect.


Thank you, I think the team can handle the challenge. The amount of knowledge and energy I've seen the team put into the project makes me think it can be done. I agree there has to be controls, that is where the logical debate and conversations come in. We have to make sure all the variables are understood and that our desire for one outcome or the other does not blind us from the fact that it may not happen as we suspect. We deal with it and move on.

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After all, considering the chain of defeats Italy suffers (failed campaign of France, Sardinia lost, Libya lost, East Africa lost, failed campaign of Greece, Rhodes & Dodecanese lost), Mussolini could have been fired in 1941 ! It has been decided he would stay in power, because it would be very difficult to manage this kind of event before Barbarossa.


One could argue that but there are other factors that do help balance it out. Failed Campaign of France was sort of historical and at the end when the French troops pulled back to be evacuated could easily have been spun as a victory which was way more than could be said historically. Sardinia lost...then it and Corsica were taken. Balances out and Italy gets more territory via victory. As for North Africa, there's an interesting dynamic that is happening in FFO. Historically Italy ended up, one way or another trying to feed troops and supplies to North Africa over almost 2 years. Eventually the German's had to step in to help with the Afrika corps. During that time the home front was assaulted by continuing losses from battle, torpedoing and letters home describing the horrid conditions, how the german's treated the italians as second class soldiers and so on. This did more to degrade the italian home front and Mussolini's support than any lost battle or new ration allotment. In FFO, the north African campaign is over in Months. The German's never get a chance to "help". There are no continuing lists of dead or wounded, no list of lost at sea, less supplies lost and especially no depressing letters from Johnny , telling how bad it is over there. As for Greece and the rest...pretty much historical. So yes Mussolini is on thin ice but not more than he was in 1942 historically , I think.

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About PH, why should the Pacific theater be untouched by previous events ? You have 1) an increased Taranto raid which cuts the head of the RM 2) increased italian reactions (maiale) against the British and the French 3) the importance of radar demonstrated (Aegean 1941) . This can make the USN staff think that PH's defences should be reinforced and/or considered much more seriously. French officiers going to Nouma probably made a stay in Oahu and gave some advice. The Japanese also could modify their plans.


Ah PH, as much as I hate to say it the Americans before December 7th , 1941 were a bunch of myopic idiots when it came to there own defence. There HECP programs were way behind schedule. They would rob Peter to pay Paul in men and equipment, stripping one area to make another area look good. Even war games in 1940 and 1941 that were to supposedly to test "lessons learned" in Europe were marginalized , ignored or effectively rigged to give the outcome the commanders wanted. Thus, to answer your points:
1) Tarranto would be looked at just like it was historically. Kimmel would try to use it to improve defences at Pearl and Washington would ignore him.
2) USA - not my war, where's italy? and what does that have to do with us? Would be my expect responses at the time.
3) The US radar program would not progress any faster than historical with regards to its deployment. It would still be looked at the same way by the, then commanders in the field and the same stupid mistakes will occur as per historical.
- As for French officers giving advice, the officers that will listen in Pearl will make reports, file them in triplicate, make recommendations that will be looked at by someone in Washington sometime in June 1942. General Short will still be fixated on insurgents and sabotage and Kimmel will be constrained by what little he can do and the amount of ships he is lossing to the Atlantic every month. In fact more fighting in the Med. may increase the amount of ships transferred.
- As for the Japanese changing there plans. Do not see that happening much. They'll have less operational losses in the last half of 1941 as they wont be operating from fields in French indo china. They will order more planes and equipment to help with the invasion of French holdings but beyond that they are restricted by Logistics, manpower and the availablity of equipment. They will do whatever they can to help with there oil problems before the war starts, ongoing negotiations for help with there synthetic oil program for example. Ask for help from Germany for technical issues they are having with licenses purchased. Sure the IJN would love 2 extra carriers for PH and the IJA, 2 or 3 more divisions but that is not going to happen. Thus PH plays out as historical.

Well ttyl.

Russ / Roller007