I think that the Allies will indeed be surprised by the initial German use of ASV in the way described. I am also wondering a little at the relative ineffectiveness of the LW at this stage of teh war, and at some of the assumptions about pilot training and fuel availability.

One thing which the FFO French campaign will have done is starkly and strongly illustrated the pilot shortage. They will correct that, and fast.

They also had plenty of fat in the blitzkreig economy model to convert to production, and their OTL performance in 1943-44 bears this out. Why cannot this be done in FFO when the situation demands it?

Also, single engined acft production, from the OTL production, can apparently be 'surged' fairly quickly.

We are also vastly underestimating just how big a catastrophe for the Allies is the salvage of Prince of Wales Fleet Library. Everything is blown, the Allied electronic advantages are no more, my friends. They know even about future concepts like VT fuses from hints in teh literature, should they dig enough into it, and they have plenty of time to do just that, with free movement of couriers between Japan and Germany continuing after Barbarossa, as Japanese diplomatic couriers can freely travel to Constantinople, for example, via the USSR.

Russ has found out that at least some of PoW's library would have been microfiche, and it is sure that the Japs will provide the germans with ample data in this form. That is a lot of information in a small volume.

We have to start considering every Allied move in the context that the Allies possess no SIGINT advantages, and no radar advantages. This is a serious force multiplier for the Axis.

Cheers: Mark