Well.... yes and no.

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BUt I still consider that the loss of PoW in such circumstances and in water so shallow was the most significant single event of FFO. It will have a striking effect on FFO and we really have not discussed the wheres and whys of what happens yet."
With this sentence you point out yourself that this event means that it's no longer a FFO story but a FFO-POW one.


Not understood. We departed OTL at POD, adn events continue from there. The chance of PoW being sunk where she was and int eh way she was was a chance of war. Now we are merely dealing with the consequences of an event in FFO. That is all it is. If it had not been that, then something else would have been the most significant event in FFO.

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But we wanted to write a FFO one... So one decision has to be made: which one si to be used?

Nothing has changed. FFO continues, generating it own events, to which poeple and powers react.

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We have now THREE major points of divergence: FFO, PoW and Mac Arthur's death (well four with Panama).

We have thousands! barbarossa being delayed, FFO North Africa, no western desert campaign, attacks on Rumanian oil, more allied shipping, use of French airbases for A/S, differing production issues and so from that.
PoW is a significant one, Macarthuirs death is NOT, becuase teh Empire is very much in teh game in the Indian Ocean thanks to the tremendous stress relief provided by the MN in 1940-41.

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As for Mac Arthur this means the end on the southern strategy and a Nimitz one, with a norther island fast approach... meaning a possible economic knock out as soon as 44 with the Guam-Bonin-Okinawa-blockade strategy.

Maybe. It does NOT mean the death of the southern strategy, it means it changes into the strategic spoiling attack from Australia into the east of the NEI in support of BOTH a powerful Anglo-French offensive from Pegu/Moulmein and teh US thrust vie the island chains. Cutting off a load of Japs will not win the war from the perspective of 1942, becuase they just won't surrender and you have to go in and kill them all anyway.

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No need for a strategic offensive in the south. Australian forces should remain on the defensive and use as few ressources as needed. the idea being "fill the southern bag full of Japanese and then cut it from the top, at Okinawa".

This is strategically unthinkable in FFO. Who goes in afterwards and kills them all? We sorted this out early last year.

On the issue of the Germans and Japanese not sharing highly sensitive data, history does not concur. The Allies obtained much knowledge of secret German projects from Japanese diplomatic codes, and the Germans shared the information from SS Automedon (full details of the defences of Malaya and Singapore) with the Japanese very quickly indeed.

Cheers: Mark