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The Vulture Report

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Roller007		#21	[-]
Posts: 1005 (06/17/09 04:43:06) Uncle Sam Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	A few things, Shane, I love the flow of how your thoughts on the engines go, I'm still worried that a Merlin based x-24 engine might go the way of the Exe if a Griffon based one and the Eagle are available. Mark, things that help the Vulture, will also help the Sabre. If that's the case and English Electric can get the production quality up after the introduction of new machine tools, it will take a monumental change in thought to prevent the Sabre from being on the Typhoon and Tempest. If Vulture gets picked up for your bombers, as I think it would, all the production would most likely end up there. Remember, production wise a Vulture would be almost twice the work of a Merlin and you'd need 4 for your bombers. Also, putting a different engine on Hurricane would not be thought of, she's at her airframe limit and any extra Hp is wasted unless we need to increase her weight considerable with ordnance or fuel and even then the later outputs from the Merlin in 1942 easily cover that. Russ / Roller007
The Argus		#22	[-]
Posts: 358 (06/18/09 06:37:30) Umpire Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Cheers Russ First off I see 'Eagle' as the Griffin based X-24 rather than the OTL sleeve valve H-24. If RR have what amounts to two generation of experience with an X layout (Vulture and Vulture II/Bustard), I really can't see them going for an H if/when they look to another 24 cylinder engine unless they hit some unforeseen (by us) snag with that layout in larger sizes. I have no proof but, I dare say one of the factors that sent RR down the H road for OtL Eagle was their experience with Vulture. Whatever the technical case for the X, Vulture poisoned that well. I should expect RR would have had a great deal of trouble pitching such an engine to the Air Ministry. Where as OTL with the sleeve valve H-24 they were taking a known/proven/accepted layout and not only piggy backing on Napier/Bristol's work, and RR had never been fussy about borrowing good ideas anyway, but they were presenting their customers with what Napier should have given them. Not only a reliable 'Sabre' but the next generation, and RR have skipped the intermediate step. In effect not only is their product an acceptable one, and a technical tour de force in both design and development, but its also one huge public raspberry, saying to Napier 'ok so you made the most powerful wartime engine in the UK - well here is how you do it properly.' Here in FFO they have sorted out the X-24 layout, Vulture II is their clean slate to wash away the sins of Vulture and they have a clear and present market niche for a bigger engine in the near term to service aircraft types already in the pipeline. Their Merlin/Griffin experience is really the frame for the whole Vulture II/Bustard business, there they needed a big slug of power in a hurry so they adapted an existing design (productionizing the R), and I believe that even if the don't go into Vulture II with the same idea in mind (and I doubt that very much), every man and his dog will be falling over themselves to suggest it. Which implies Bustard comes along with a bit of momentum, it is anticipated, incorporated in the planning matrix at RR, the AirMin and in the RAF. Vulture II is the engine with the shaky market IMHO, it is only justified by; a/ there being a need to continue to support a substantial number of Vulture powered aircraft that are not in line to be replaced by new types b/ the need to make sure they really have sorted out the X-24 layout. c/ the core issue of liner creep in long duration flying, which is what the strategically important bulk of those legacy Vulture types are doing. If it wasn't for these points, I think they would have gone directly to Bustard (Merlin-Vulture) and left Vulture to wither on the vine much as Training Command Whitley/Wellingtons were still running Merlin II's to the end of the war on exemption certificates for excessive oil consumption and plus-max oversize bores due to wear. I mean I theory these engines could have been replaced, and by the book should have been replaced, but it wasn't worth the time or effort to either build a new run of Merlin II's to support them, or convert the planes to a later Mk of engine. With the number of Vulture engined fighters, there'd be no shortage of spares for the relative handful of multi-engine planes once the fighters were withdrawn. But there is no hope either early Manchester's or B.20's are going to be relegated to training, or no more than the barest minimum for operational conversion. The bulk will fly until they die, and that operational flying demands a steady support for Vulture I, or at least it looks desirable for planning purposes, because liner creep needs depot level maintenance (and so a circulating stock) and you can't stop those liners creeping without, in effect designing a new block. In theory it makes more sense to jump straight to Bustard with the re-designed engine, its cuts out the middle step and would be fine for new production, but they need something that can slot directly into the existing supply stream for Vulture with the least disruption. RR also can't afford another mess up, not that anyone else would want one either, and Vulture II is the safer bet in that respect. Bustard is putting a lot more strain on essentially the same mechanicals, and pretty much the same parts, that were so problematic in Vulture. Then of course Vulture II needs even fewer new production steps than even Bustard, there may only be 70-80% parts commonality between the two engines (Vulture I and Vulture II) perhaps less, but the bulk of the difference is going to be the sae parts just made differently/to different specs on the same tooling. So as they want to get this new engine out fast as a matter of general wartime principal, in this case they also want to get it out into Sqn service to clock up operational hours rapidly for proof of concept and de-bugging, Vulture II does this best, and covers the wider picture at the same time. But the primary goal is Bustard and the next step up the hp ladder, Vulture II is really only a very useful means to an end. For Sabre I can't see where you're comming form here Russ. Vulture actively harms Sabre, just as Vulture's death in OTL boosted it, and in any case the key point is not English Electric improving quality control, its the engine getting into serious production in the first place. OK admittedly this is all on the political/procurement level not the technical side, but having Vulture/Tornado sets back any call for OTL Sabre/Typhoon (FFO Tornado V?) not only on the tactical level - Hurricane has been replaced, but also on the technical side as Hawkers are going to be concentrating on sorting out Tornado (and will have issues) long before they have any drive to get Sabre flying in the airframe (or some adaption of it). And until Sabre fly's in a representative front line type it is 'on the shelf', hell Napier's won't even find half the deeper OTL problems with that engine (vibration etc), and the Air MIn is certainly not going to be ordering it to mass production without an aircraft to put it in, far less allocating new tooling to the project. shane Rule .303 Shoot straight, you bastards.
Roller007		#23	[-]
Posts: 1007 (06/18/09 17:27:36) Uncle Sam Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Shane, For Sabre I can't see where you're comming form here Russ. Vulture actively harms Sabre, just as Vulture's death in OTL boosted it, and in any case the key point is not English Electric improving quality control, its the engine getting into serious production in the first place. OK admittedly this is all on the political/procurement level not the technical side, but having Vulture/Tornado sets back any call for OTL Sabre/Typhoon (FFO Tornado V?) not only on the tactical level - Hurricane has been replaced, but also on the technical side as Hawkers are going to be concentrating on sorting out Tornado (and will have issues) long before they have any drive to get Sabre flying in the airframe (or some adaption of it). And until Sabre fly's in a representative front line type it is 'on the shelf', hell Napier's won't even find half the deeper OTL problems with that engine (vibration etc), and the Air MIn is certainly not going to be ordering it to mass production without an aircraft to put it in, far less allocating new tooling to the project. First off, what saves Vulture saves Sabre earlier. Remember that both the Tornado and Typhoon were both ordered as potential successors to Hurricane and even Spitfire way back in 1938. Also that the potential for Sabre is much Higher than Vulture. The nice thing with Vulture is that it has the potential to fit on existing airframes ( this was pointed out in several ministry papers ). Now in otl Sabre was shifted to production in June 1940 with already 2200 hp ( that is POD for FFO ). The problem was that Napier, like most of the British aircraft engine producers treated each engine as if it was a single creation and Napier just could not scale up to a production company using those techniques. In fact Napier did not even try to correct these shortfalls and diminishing quality control issues until 1942 when English Electric stepped in. It was as if Napier still thought itself a specialty shop which wanted to tinker and play with its designs and not a wartime engine contractor. Here in FFO with new machine tools and an engine that powerful, the Air ministry will step in much sooner I feel. We have the Typhoon first flight in February 1940 ( before POD ) and it was seen with such high potential that it was immediately ordered into production as was Tornado in October 1939, that's a hard momentum to break for both aircraft. As for the Tornado, if Vulture survives, it wont be cancelled in 1941, which should be when Vulture is fixed. Many of the issues Vulture had should be fixed when RR begins to use coating techniques and different bearing types it learns from Packard in August 1941. That plus new machine tools should make the Vulture a very reliable engine. That means with higher quality control, new techniques and the Bristol sleave valves, both Vulture and Napier should be going to full production in Late 1942 with engines far superior and different than in otl. Now I grant you, going to a Vulture II in Late 1941 will be an easy step for RR's and later variants. Russ / Roller007
The Argus		#24	[-]
Posts: 359 (06/21/09 11:51:13) Umpire Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	I just don't see it being that easy Russ. In terms of global drivers, yes the factors that allow Vulture to be saved are favorable for sorting Sabre out too, but the details look to be set against it. OK we have both Tornado and Typhoon kicking off at the same time, Type N and Type R as they were for a period, and Typhoon (Type N) is the preferred option due to its higher potential power. But that view was essentially pre-war and before practical concerns came to the fore. Tornado moved ahead quicker as its engine was more mature almost fromr the start, and I suspect becuse Hawker's had less detail design work to do, as Rolls Royce always did a large share the installation design for their engines as a matter of company policy - If you wanted to use a RR motor then they wanted to be damn sure you didn't make a mess of it and take their reputation down with the burning wreckage. This was a major departure point between US and at least RR practice and had a lot to do how liquid cooled engines evolved in both countries. In America the customer (US Army) were apt to set the operating specifications (cooling temp etc) and call for the engine builder to produce the hp under those conditions, where with Rolls Royce the if operator wanted the hp, then they flew the engine the way the factory told them too. Anyway we have Tornado and Typhoon runing more or less in tandem to first flight, then attention shifts to Tornado as, again it is further along the development tree thanks to Vulture. Now OTL all work slumped for the BoB and then attention flipped back to Typhoon after Vulture failed, but here in FFO Tornado continues along in the lead by a short head. This again becuse Vulture is more mature and the aircraft can be bought into service faster to replace Hurricane. HOWEVER as both aircraft are so simmilar it's only to be expected that Tornado will show up many of the same airframe issues as Typhoon did, moderated by 1/ the lower power, 2/ a smoother engine, 3/ reduced urgency compared to OTL Typhoon. They are putting less stress on the aircraft and can take fewer design shortcuts. It's still going to be an 'all hands on deck' operation though, and Typhoon will end up on the back of the stove untill they have Tornado sorted out. This means Typhoon is going to follow Tornado into service, and with some hopes of superceeding it. So then Typhoon 'pot' goes back on the heat, and Napier's start to boil, becuse up to this point there has been NO call for them to depart from OTL. With Tornado in the spotlight the Air MIn will have been telling Napier's they have time to keep working on Sabre. 'Ordered into production' is a phrase of many meanings and in this case the OTl order amounted to the Air MIn informing Napier that they would order the Sabre as soon as they needed it, and that the company should look to tooling up and rounding the engine design out for full production - it was not a hard order for X thousand units by Y date with a falure on Napier's part to fulfill it.Until Typhoon starts production there is no driver for Napier to make any Sabres beyond their OTL trickle, and so no opertunity for them to show that they can't hack it. In fact there is every reason for everyone to limit the number of engines actually built to a minimum before a hard production date is set - it means Napier can still keep playing with it to get more power and the Air Min arn't stuck with a expensive stockpile of engines that may be obsolete by the time that are needed and will require an extensive modification program. So Napier are going to be left to run their own race until they fail, and that won't start to become apparent before Hawker's really start to get moving on Typhoon, which won't be until Tornado is safely established in service and by that time Vulture is well past its danger point and RR's X-24 program is back on the upswing. Right so Syd Camm and Co dust off the Tiffy prototype and pick up where they left off. They have some very valuable leassons from Tornado to incorporate, although not all the answers they got from OTL Typhoon so they're in for an interesting time. They're going to need a new prototype and in the mean time they can use the old one/s for engine work... which is first oppertunity for the cracks to show. If OTL is any guide Napier's will be slow at forwarding engines, so the test program will be delayed, Hawker's have to do the engine installation design/mod work which is not their forte and that won't speed things up, AND the Sabre/Typhoon combination will play its OTL tricks. But this is not OTL, Typhoon is not desperatly needed to replace Hurricane, Tornado is holding the fort, they have a year or so and there are now other engine options, all of which can fit into Tornado as well as Typhoon and none of which have the Sabre's still unresolved issues, like appaulingly low TBO's and heavy vibration. Russ you keep saying Sabre produces horsepower and I've got no argument with that, but hp alone isn't much good if the engine is less durable than a 1920 Liberty, as it still was in 1944. I agree its issues can be fixed too, but where are the drivers for actually doing it? The deep faults in Sabre/napier don't become apparent untill they come under some pressure to produce engines in more than prototype quantities, and that won't happen untill Typhoon picks up after Tornado is settled in. Yes the technology is there, and I suppose we can presume a seamless transfer from RR and Bristol under orders from above, English Electric didn't fix the problems overnight and none of them enter the picture untill the problem is recongised - when unlike OTL there are now other options available. I agree both Typhoon and Sabre have a lot of momentum behind them, but the easier situation in FFO means the RAF can be a lot fussier about accepting Napier's problem child and no one finds out there IS an extraordinary problem untill 42 or so. At this time they are looking for a fighter for 43/44 and Sabre is prime for that, but as it stands in OTL the engine weas bearly acceptable in lieu of any alternative and I can't see FFO offering any improvment in starting condition over that. As an engine for 44/45 Sabre still has the potential power to fit the bill, and it would have another year to be squared away by English Electric and all the kings men, but that takes it right into the period were we have Bustard in service with the same power, and the promise of Eagle - not to mention jets. So the plan is 41/42 1st Gen - Tornado 42/43 2nd Gen - Typhoon 43/44 3rd Gen - Tempest 44/45 4th Gen - Fury Each one an incemeental improvment over the last in airframe terms. For engines 1st Gen - Vulture or Sabre, Vulture wins 2nd Gen - Sabre or Vulture II/Bustard.Griffin or Centarus 3rd Gen - Bustard, Griffin, Centarus, Sabre 4th Gen - Bustard, Griffin, Centarus, Sabre, Eagle OK so for the 2nd Generation. Griffin is a possiability but demands a whole new engine installation. Centarus can piggyback on the Cent/Tornado prototypes, the engine is in service, under continued development and has future programed in through other projects Vulture II can only be a place holder engine to get the new aerodynemic platform into service as it offers no more power than can be put into Tornado. But.. Bustard SHOULD be availabel to replace Vulture II about mid way though the production run Sabre has the power but: a/ demands new expansion production facilities b/ debugging as both an engine and installation c/ a substantial amount of buggering about on both industrial and design levels to get it into service. shane . Rule .303 Shoot straight, you bastards.
MarkLBailey	Imah's Point	#25	[-]
Posts: 1029 (06/22/09 02:22:24) P-76 Pilot Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	In terms of global drivers, yes the factors that allow Vulture to be saved are favorable for sorting Sabre out too, but the details look to be set against it. This is the killer issue here, for UK practice was not US practice and vice-versa. The devil really is in the details as Shane has described, and this bodes poorly for Napier and Sabre. IMAH's POINT There is also a point here which Imah has raised, and it is a very good point indeed: FFO does not exist to solve all the problems! Oh sure, we can say 'make it so' and Sabre is magically fixed…. But FFO does not exist for that purpose. This is especially true using our methodology. Our approach is a non-handwavium, "logic-flow-and-facts" style of methodology. This MUST be held to for the Empire and for the USA as well, we have to guard very carefully against making all things perfect. We should not and cannot fix all the problems. This is why we have done, and should continue to do, 'disaster swaps'. Russ, you need to carefully consider the 'fixing' of the B-29 in FFO. OK, it avoided the 'Battle of Kansas' and effectively got something like a B-50 into service to replace B-29 and its troubled engines, and did so early. Nobody has an issue with that, you argued facts and drivers. But there is the issue of balance. So to remain true to our methodology, we need some other mess to replace 'The Battle of Kansas'. It does not have to be so spectacular or expensive, but it should really be rather significant. For example, we have worked a pretty big mess into the Vulture thing by having to retain Manchester when the whole idea of twin engined heavy bombers is gravely flawed. Yet, an expedient short-term decision in 1940-41 has led to BC losing Lancaster production potential to keep building Manchesters for Asian use! Fixing Vulture also fixes Barracuda and brings it in early compared to OTL, so we can point to Warwick as a bit of a balance. We have retained Warwick into 1941 when we could kill it a year earlier, and we have 'imposed' Gloster Reaper on the Australians and severely over-stressed their whole industry in doing so and kills Australian production of Beaufighter (which makes Shane's lower lip tremble but which 'pays' for CA-15/MB-5). So we need a 'balance' for the USA, a bad outcome to put on the scales against the good outcome for the fixed and souped up B-29 in FFO. Maybe something like the USN CV losses, focus on Hellcat and French use of Corsair delaying/denying Corsair carrier use in the USN, or a USAAF mess of some sort, like too-rapid development efforts for B-36 cocking up that program or something. But there has to be SOMETHING bad to balance each 'FFO positive benefit'. For these reasons, Napier and Sabre must experience their OTL level of issues and problems - the devil really is in the detail and it is really unrealistic to 'fix it all', as Imah so tellingly notes. If this leads to Sabre coming in late and unreliable, fine. If it leads to Sabre being written off as a disaster and replaced by an 'insurance engine', fine. If it leads to the OTL path of patch-up, make-shift and poor reliability, also fine. The only thing we should NOT do is fix Sabre! I believe that we must be very careful to adopt Imah's point, here. This point is why I am so happy with the outcome of the Frank-Shane adjudication on He-100/A7He1. I do not care that the acft 'aborts' in the production process in 1942 and is replaced. That's fine, it adds complexity and depth to FFO, adds a second set of quirky problems and issues to work through (what does Hitachi build now, what fills the VHA interceptor slot??), etc. That is good for FFO, and offers at least some balance for the obvious benefits (A7M development as planned and dropping of J2M) which result from it using our 'logical path' methodology. So here we have a number of paths for Sabre. They range from the above to Typhoon becoming a specialised low-level strike bird, and doubtless there are others I have missed, too. As with He-100D/A7He1, I do not care, provided we HAVE some major errors/blunders/disasters in the RAF (and of course USNAF/USAAF) systems. Cheers: Mark
Roller007		#26	[-]
Posts: 1008 (06/22/09 07:11:37) Uncle Sam Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Doh!@ Yuku ate my post....sigh! Shane First off we have Vulture which had issues before POD and had no even gotten to the Production stage at RR before POD. Meanwhile we have Sabre with no problems in the prototype stage before POD and was just starting Production at POD. The problems for Napier started at Production. The sleeve valves, the machining all for Napier were a mess as they just could not scale up from a one of a kind shop to mass production. There reaction to the poor quality of the engines was to try to develop a supercharger and hope the floor sorted itself out wont fly in an FFO world as long as it did but the introduction of new machine tools may mask this issue as well. The new machine tools will cut out poor machining on the older units, improving quality but hiding other issues in the plant. The Sleeves I still see needing to come from Bristol. Another issue you will have will be the your bomber program and the engine chosen. No British made engine up till 1943 can sustain an Altitude of 37000 feet with the oils used then. The Vulture, Merlin, Centaurus and Hercules based engines just cannot work at those altitudes without elaborate heating systems. The Griffon and Sabre engines on the other hand will work at those altitudes and have enough excess exhaust heat to still function and there different oil systems will be able to take advantage of that. The Griffon, or a Griffon based engine has a supercharger system where the Sabre's is inadequate for high altitude as well. If Napier had been able to finish there high altitude supercharger, it may have helped. Mark, The friction in the system is already in place on my mapping. I call it the Army, Navy Game. The gist is that the combination of the B-29 move to the V-3420 engine coupled with the attacks in August on the US and Panama canal are going to cause some serious problems one of which will be the collapse of the Navy army agreement which saw in otl the decline in production of the PBY in favour of the B-24 and the cancelling of the XPBB Sea Ranger to give the Renton plant to be used for the B-29. The Navy will need more PBY's and will also want more B-24's converted to PB4Y's. The Navy will also want the XPBB re-activated and will try to compete directly for bombing missions and funding with the B-29. The R-3350 will be the Navies problem to work the bugs out in FFO but the less restrictive cowling and less magnesium parts in the XPBB means it will need less tinkering overal to go to production. There's a whole list of things that I've mapped out that will more than make up for the B-29's in FFO. The cancelling of the B-17's in 1943 also adds another headache that I have planned as well. The Friction is planned to be system wide and not project specific. BTW Mark, I agree the British engine production system was different that the American system. The British were still trying up till 1942 to produce engines as if each one was being made as a one of a kind. Rolls Royce fought with Packard for 2 months over Packards desire to standardize the Merlin and mass produce it. They said the quality would suffer. In fact it improved the quality and it took less than 4 months for RR to put in the same production practices in 1942 after being proved wrong. Russ
MarkLBailey		#27	[-]
Posts: 1030 (06/22/09 15:23:16) P-76 Pilot Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	That friction looks OK, Russ. What will be needed is a paper laying it all out as Shane and I did with the Briish Aviation side of it. Obviously, these start small and grow by accretion, but they are a seriously useful tool in 'mapping' issues of this complexity and making them explicable. On the Merlin issue, I do not understand your comments about Merlin being poor quality. Ford UK had some productionisation issues at their Trafford Park plant "caused by a perceived need on the part of Ford to re-tool the Merlin for mass-production" (Lumsden p.201), but this seems to have been plant-specific. Ford UK produced 30,428 Merlins, but the RR plants produced 32,377 at Derby, 26,065 at Crewe and 23,647 at Glasgow. This is hardly indicative of RR having mass production problems in their three plants - RR built about half of all the Merlins ever built. I've read thru what Lumsden has to say on this, and Rubbra, and that's not mentioned. They had production issues, sure, but they were expanding using their own plants, not shadow factories. They also had some flaws with the engine's early versions but so what? Packard also does not appear to have made any significant changes off its own bat, Lumsden states that they worked very well and very cooperatively, Packard and RR (pp.201-202), built RR's newly designed 2 piece engine block as they were starting production and RR could not change over their lines at the time, but that their Merlins even used Whitworth and BSF threads. Packard did implement cadmium coating and contribute major design changes in 1942, but again this was all cooperative work.Of the 168,040 Merlins produced, Packard produced 55,523 of which 18,380 were V-1650s for exclusive US use. Or am I missing something? CHeers: Mark Last Edited By: MarkLBailey 06/22/09 22:45:46. Edited 1 times.
Roller007		#28	[-]
Posts: 1009 (06/23/09 05:53:13) Uncle Sam Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Rolls Royce through 1939 to early 1942 treated each Merlin as a one of a kind. In trying to meet the demand, this required many machinists/craftsmen and produced many engines with flaws, metal shavings, cracks, etc. Packards introduction of different coating techniques, different bearings and standardization all were quickly picked up by RR and allowed them to expand there capacity, decreased there defect percentages and produced an engine with a longer running time. Also, because of a pre war screw-up the crankshaft for the Merlin could only be made at the drop hammer facility owned by Vickers ( produced 84 per shift ) until 1941 when the first of the new machine tools arrived. This in itself also limited merlin production. As for the Ford run plant, that's irrelevant as I do not think it started when the war started ( fords policy of war production did not change till 1940 ) and it is hard to compare all the plants as the Merlin production stopped in Britain after 1943 for other engine types and the Packard built engines covered the aircraft needs after that. I'm also not trying to compare total production output, just ease of production. Russ
PMN1		#29	[-]
Posts: 30 (06/23/09 11:03:18) Reply Quote More My Recent Posts Message Me Connection Blocking Invite Ignore User's Posts	Roller007 wrote: Also, because of a pre war screw-up the crankshaft for the Merlin could only be made at the drop hammer facility owned by Vickers ( produced 84 per shift ) until 1941 when the first of the new machine tools arrived. This in itself also limited merlin production. You call it a pre-war screw up, when was this realised and did anyone suggest earlier using new tooling? What did the introduction of the new machine tools do for the production rate? Did the production of other components (and airframes) run ahead of crankshafts? 'We are showing progress. Things are getting worse at a slower rate' Last Edited By: PMN1 06/23/09 11:07:41. Edited 1 times.

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