Dear All,
Here under some comments on various debates we had recently.
Best regards
Jacques
----
I would here go back to three points where some major disagreements have surfaced during last months.
(1) Impact of the POD on Japan.
From various discussions I had with people specialist of Japan both at EHESS and at the French War Collage (CID), the following consensus had appeared (actually some discussions dated from 2005).
The Japanese political and military elite can't understand quickly the signification of the "great move" to North Africa. Not because they were "stupid" but because fighting a war after leaving its national territory is just out of cognitive bounds for the 1940-vintage Japanese elite. Some would have interpreted the "big move" as a kind of political show. Others would have interpreted French forces as "mercenaries" on the behalf of the British Empire. The true significance would certainly not have been grasped quickly. Add to this the fact France has not been considered as a probable enemy by IJA (to the contrary of GB and USA).
For people with probably the least ideological biased analysis (IJN) the "Big Move" would imply that the French Navy would concentrate on the Mediterranean. They knew that the French Navy had never deployed in the Far East more than symbolical forces in the XXth Century.
Assuming that Japanese policy would have diverged from OTL since August 1940 is plainly unrealistic. The Japanese analysis would slowly evolve during winter 1940 but with a distinct asymmetry between the IJA and the IJN. High losses the MN suffered during the battle of Corsica and Sardinia (FTL February-March 41) would convince IJN planners that the MN and RN were to be fully committed to the Mediterranean for a while. However with the loss of Vittorio Veneto (FTL alternate Matapan or Battle of Gaudo Island 16-17 May 41) and the loss of KM Bismarck (May 24th 41), the IJN staff is to revise its analysis and accept the fact a significant British-French squadron could operate in the South China Sea would a war erupt between Japan and the Allies. This is putting a possible POD for the IJN by late May or early June 1941.
For the IJA, the trigger is the war between France and Siam and the armistice (May 20th 1941).
The already accepted chronology is making early June 41 the time for a major Japanese reassessment of the French impact on the strategic situation in the Far East. The Japanese policy is then to begin diverging with the OTL panel then and not before. By the way, the divergence is actually an incremental process but with a snow-balling effect on the Australian policy.
We have assumed a Japanese political decision of sending troops to Siam by late June early July 41, with troops beginning to arrive in August 41. It is clear that this would involve changes in the Australian military policy and generally speaking in the deployment of Commonwealth forces. On this point there is no disagreement.
Considering this I would oppose any change in the Japanese military or industrial policy by comparison with the OTL pattern before May 25th, 1941 and more realistically, early June 1941. This means the technical co-operation with Germany is to stay at its OTL level till early June 1941. Increase of technical exchanges after June 41 is strictly dependent of identification by IJA and IJN of specific needs GIVEN THE OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE and the historical reluctance of the Japanese military establishment to adopt equipments "not developed here".
Any attempt to build a "Strong Japan" on the ground that Japanese policy could have diverged much earlier (September/October 1940) is not consistent with the "realistic" approach adopted before.
This of course is not contradictory with a brutal awakening in December 41/January 42, leading to a strong technical and doctrinal adaptation process.
(2) Tom Phillips' fateful decision.
We had a long discussion when debriefing the gaming of the FTL Battle of South China Sea. We even voted to validate the result!
What won the day was the following statement made by the CID professor of Military History whose arguments I am summing up here:
Adm. Phillips OTL proved a willingness to take unwarranted risks for the sake of supporting land forces. Would Phillips had been more "reasonable" he would never had turned back to investigate a possible Japanese landings on the basis of very scarce intelligence, putting the only two RN capital ships available in the area at risk. We know he did it and we know the result.
FTL Phillips knows for sure that if the Japanese naval force supporting the landing in Kuching is not destroyed, Singapore is lost. The responsibility on RN shoulders is even greater than in OTL because land forces are putting a much better show in FTL than in OTL. But this was not all. In the chronology you can read:
"The previous day Japanese air raid on Tarakan, the effectiveness of amphibious operations at Davao and Jolo, seemed a good indication that the enemy was preparing a major push south through the Makassar Stait. Protecting the eastern part of the Malay Barrier was a vital requirement if US reinforcements shipped to Darwin were to be allowed to Flow to Java and Singapore. Would Japanese forces able to interdict naval and air transit between Darwin and Java the Allies logistical situation would be seriously weakened".
The decision to sortie on December 30th is then perfectly logical. It is only once the Formidable lost that Phillips would have understood that Force Z could have to face a much bigger Japanese fleet than though initially (remember that communications were bad and that an important French submarine message has been long delayed).
Still, because the loss of Formidable happens late in the day, Phillips can expect a night battle, something where the RN was supposed to excel. He was taking then a risk, but a calculated one. We know from OTL that he was ready to take risks (he lost his both ships and his life on a dubious gambleŠ). Considering what was at stake and the fact the battle-tested RN would have been supremely confident of its ability to master even a superior force at night, Adm. Phillips' FTL decision is not stranger than his fateful OTL decision.
This argument won the debate and we validated the gaming result. Note here that would the "Japanese" team had been a bit more cautious, keeping two IJN Battlecruisers with Nagumo's carrier, Phillips' gamble would have paid off and Kondo's force would have been crushed.
Actually we had a second vote to validate the "Japanese" team decision. We validated it on the ground that it was consistent with known IJN doctrine AND that the poor situation of Japanese land forces in Malaya would have implied that Kondo could not at any rate risk a major failure at Kuching Bay.
(3) Luftwaffe situation after June 1940.
We assumed that German aircraft production has been higher than in OTL to make good losses suffered by a longer Campaign of France.
OTL figures were the following ones (first number is total number of produced planes, the second is for fighters, the third for bombers and the fourth for ground attack). Data are coming from LW Dptm. 6 documents in German archives (now in Potsdam).
1939: 2518 / 605 / 737 / 134
1940: 10,247 / 2746 / 2852 / 603
1941: 12,401 / 3744 / 3373 / 507
1942: 15,409 / 5,515 / 4,337 / 1,249
1943: 24,807 / 10,898 / 4,649 / 3266
1944: 40,593 / 25,285 / 2,287 / 5,496
It is quite clear that production increased along two different curves. The first one, which applies for 1940-42 corresponds to the normal war mobilization process. The second, for 1943 and 44, corresponds to a massive industrial reorganization.
The 1943 reorganization did not came out of the blue. On the military side it was a reaction to tremendous losses suffered in Soviet Union in 41 and 42 and - and this factor was militarily the most important - the threat of US strategic bombing. On the political side, it was the result of a long and hard fought battle inside the RLM. The victory of "industrialist-minded" people against the LW staff and the RLM staff was possible only with the death of Udet and Jeschonnek. Many post-war books are putting the blame of inept leadership on Goering's shoulder. This is not completely true. Goering was indeed an inept commander, but Udet and Jeschonnek blocked for 18 months proposals for a complete industrial reorganization. Note that Kesselring, who had hold important positions in the RLM before the war, had made some important mistakes too and opposed, at least till fall 42 a complete RLM reorganization. The fact that some plane designers could directly appeal to Hitler didn't help too.
The "Goering factor" so frequently is then to be understood not as a single man effect on the war but as a metaphor of the bureaucratic situation inside the RLM. Even if German leaders could have fully understood all consequences of the POD by July 1940, the 18 months battling process inside the RLM would have been needed. Actually our decision has been to put the OTL reorganization some months earlier, with the production curve switching from the "normal war mobilization" to the "special" path not by Spring 1943 but by December 1942. This would have corresponded to a reaction to losses induced by air operations during the first part of 1941 and percolation of intelligence data about the presence of US crews inside the AdA. The possibility of having the USAAF in Europe by 1943 would have been to be reckoned from a German point of view. However, even if planners have reached this conclusion by September/October 41 the bureaucratic battle is still to be fought and won, Udet is to commit suicide and Jeschonnek tooŠ
However the most important point is not planes but crews.
In OTL the LW recovered quickly crews who were French PoW. Actually this was a perquisite for the Armistice convention.
In FTL not only is the LW not to recover crews in French hands (including Werner Moelders) but is to lose a significant number of crews in airfights between June 20th and early August (FTL combat induced losses for the extended Campaign of France are to be in the 250-275 range, with non-combat losses amounting to 75%-80% of combat losses).
The LW is to be significantly shorter on EXPERIENCED crews than in FTL. Never forget that the LW is a relatively "young" service, having began to expand only by 34/35. This is considerably constraining the training programme already at hand and preventing its expansion. To state it bluntly, in FTL by August 1940 the LW could fight the Battle of Britain (in September) or train new crews but not both.
For obvious political and strategic reasons, trying to push GB out of the war is to take precedence on every other consideration. This is why FTL includes a delayed (and weaker) Battle of Britain. But the FTL BoB is possible only by taking some instructors away from flying schools to send them to operational units in September and October 40. The LW training programme is then to be seriously interrupted during fall 40.
It would however regain steam by mid-November 1940 and by January 1941 would have been at a higher level than in OTL.
However, losses suffered during FTL "Merkur", which are much higher than losses the LW suffered in OTL between January and April 1941 would have made mandatory to again interrupt a large part of the training programme to boost operational units. The LW would have had only 6 weeks to recover before operations in Yugoslavia and Greece. Losses on the FTL campaign of Greece are again much higher than in OTL and they are actually higher than losses the LW suffered in combining the OTL air operations in Greece and in the whole Mediterranean theatre of operations. It would have then been impossible to take some experienced crews back to training units.
The situation is to improve after September 1941. FTL losses are to be much lower than in OTL during Fall 1941 because we don't have Barbarossa. However remember that TOTAL losses for 1941 are to be significantly higher than in OTL. Concentration of losses during February-July is to have a high disruptive effect as the LW can't afford to disband JGs or KGs. The LW training programme is then again to gain steam during Fall and winter 1941 (but after many disruptions by comparison with OTLŠ). However, by early 1942, air operations are stepped up again in the Med. It is impossible to send experienced pilots to work as instructors in Flaying schools. The LW is also preparing for FTL Barbarossa. When Allied landings are taking place in Peloponnesus on February 28th, LW losses are to mount again to a significant level.
We know from OTL data that the LW constantly sacrificed training programmes to make good demands from front units. To make good losses suffered during OTL Barbarossa, training programmes were reduced (instructors have been sent to the front) and the production of training planes went down from September 1941 to summer 1942.
Here are OTL figures for training planes production :
1939: 588
1940: 1870
1941: 1121
1942: 1078
1943: 2274
The brutal drop of trainers production for 41 and 42 is a good indication of how far training programmes have been curtailed in OTL once Barbarossa on the way. This was the typical short-sighted policy we could in many other aspects of the German war policy.
In a 1954 written paper (Statement made on March 17th, 1954), Kesselring explained that LuftWaffe development in 1941 and 1942 was constrained not so much by a lack of planes but by a lack of trained crews. Note that this happens in a situation more favorable than FTLŠ
To sum up, the main difference between FTL and OTL is a total loss of a significant number of experienced crews early in the war, making impossible for the LW to implement even the training programme it developed OTL during Fall and winter 40. Combat operations during 1941 are to disrupt again to a large extent the LW training programme.
If the German industry is to build more planes than in OTL crew training is to be a major problem much earlier than in OTL.
The LW staff in OTL considered as "vital" for the LW to recover crews fallen into French hands (to the point that Petain's emissaries were told that talks for the Armistice would not begin if LW PoWs were not immediately releasedŠ). If we assume that these crews are not to be released late June 40 and that more crew are to be killed or made prisoners between June 20th and early August 1940, the LW situation is considerably bleaker than in OTL.
The FTL total production is then to be:
1940: 12,500
1941: 14,000
1942: 17,000 (assuming a strong surge by December 1941)
1943: 32,000 to 36,000
1944: no more than 35,000 with major disruptions induced by day and night bombings on factory and the steady deterioration of the situation.
(4) Specificities of Alternate History
I would just here point to a recurrent problem. We have used wargaming to test various fictional battles. However there is a major difference between wargaming and simulation and what we have to do IS simulation. In a simulation game you don't play from your point of view, but trying to replicate what the simulated decision-maker would have done, considering his/her known patter of action and decision.
I think that most of differences we have about German and Japanese FTL actions are coming from the fact they are "gamed" and not "simulated".
I have nothing about wargaming, but FTL is an exercise in alternate history simulation. This makes a lot of difference.
We have to ever keep in mind the fact that if FOR US the French decision to move to North Africa in June 1940 is a considerable improvement compared to the OTL situation, to actual German and Japanese decision-makers in June 1940 this decision amount to a resounding French defeat.
Hitler wanted to avoid at any price such a scenario not because he was afraid of French residual potential but because he believed that French capitulation would induce a government change in GB leading to Peace talks. Because he was already committed to an attack against Soviet Union what mattered for him was ending the war with GB. But OTL this didn't worked. In FTL, he would still have dismissed France as fighting actor and would have tried to bluff London into a compromise by an air offensive. This is why we maintained the Battle of Britain.
The point is that for actual German and Japanese decision-makers by June/July 1940 the actual implication of the "great move" is to be lost. The main reason, beside ideological prejudices, is the known underestimation of the US industrial power by Axis powers.
Without the US industry, French forces could not expect survive for long in North Africa. The US ability to raise industrial production from the June 1940 level was not understood in Germany or Japan (but may be for Yamamoto, but he was not a major political player in 1940).
It is then very important not to apply "OUR" knowledge of events to simulated German of Japanese decisions.
(5) a note on Senegalese riflemen.
On a completely different topic, I just ran on a book written by a German historian on how the German Army (and not the SSŠ) systematically murdered Senegalese Riflemen in May and June 1940.
Rafael Scheck, "Une saison noire - Le massacre des tirailleurs sénégalais mai-juin 1940", Tallandier, Paris, 2008.
Scheck, using German and French police archives, shows that that Senegalese riflemen when captured were very frequently murdered, even by units supposed to be "clean" (like Rommel's 7th Panzer).
The fact France has not systematically prosecuted these war crimes after 1945 is a shame on us.
Here under some comments on various debates we had recently.
Best regards
Jacques
----
I would here go back to three points where some major disagreements have surfaced during last months.
(1) Impact of the POD on Japan.
From various discussions I had with people specialist of Japan both at EHESS and at the French War Collage (CID), the following consensus had appeared (actually some discussions dated from 2005).
The Japanese political and military elite can't understand quickly the signification of the "great move" to North Africa. Not because they were "stupid" but because fighting a war after leaving its national territory is just out of cognitive bounds for the 1940-vintage Japanese elite. Some would have interpreted the "big move" as a kind of political show. Others would have interpreted French forces as "mercenaries" on the behalf of the British Empire. The true significance would certainly not have been grasped quickly. Add to this the fact France has not been considered as a probable enemy by IJA (to the contrary of GB and USA).
For people with probably the least ideological biased analysis (IJN) the "Big Move" would imply that the French Navy would concentrate on the Mediterranean. They knew that the French Navy had never deployed in the Far East more than symbolical forces in the XXth Century.
Assuming that Japanese policy would have diverged from OTL since August 1940 is plainly unrealistic. The Japanese analysis would slowly evolve during winter 1940 but with a distinct asymmetry between the IJA and the IJN. High losses the MN suffered during the battle of Corsica and Sardinia (FTL February-March 41) would convince IJN planners that the MN and RN were to be fully committed to the Mediterranean for a while. However with the loss of Vittorio Veneto (FTL alternate Matapan or Battle of Gaudo Island 16-17 May 41) and the loss of KM Bismarck (May 24th 41), the IJN staff is to revise its analysis and accept the fact a significant British-French squadron could operate in the South China Sea would a war erupt between Japan and the Allies. This is putting a possible POD for the IJN by late May or early June 1941.
For the IJA, the trigger is the war between France and Siam and the armistice (May 20th 1941).
The already accepted chronology is making early June 41 the time for a major Japanese reassessment of the French impact on the strategic situation in the Far East. The Japanese policy is then to begin diverging with the OTL panel then and not before. By the way, the divergence is actually an incremental process but with a snow-balling effect on the Australian policy.
We have assumed a Japanese political decision of sending troops to Siam by late June early July 41, with troops beginning to arrive in August 41. It is clear that this would involve changes in the Australian military policy and generally speaking in the deployment of Commonwealth forces. On this point there is no disagreement.
Considering this I would oppose any change in the Japanese military or industrial policy by comparison with the OTL pattern before May 25th, 1941 and more realistically, early June 1941. This means the technical co-operation with Germany is to stay at its OTL level till early June 1941. Increase of technical exchanges after June 41 is strictly dependent of identification by IJA and IJN of specific needs GIVEN THE OPERATIONAL DOCTRINE and the historical reluctance of the Japanese military establishment to adopt equipments "not developed here".
Any attempt to build a "Strong Japan" on the ground that Japanese policy could have diverged much earlier (September/October 1940) is not consistent with the "realistic" approach adopted before.
This of course is not contradictory with a brutal awakening in December 41/January 42, leading to a strong technical and doctrinal adaptation process.
(2) Tom Phillips' fateful decision.
We had a long discussion when debriefing the gaming of the FTL Battle of South China Sea. We even voted to validate the result!
What won the day was the following statement made by the CID professor of Military History whose arguments I am summing up here:
Adm. Phillips OTL proved a willingness to take unwarranted risks for the sake of supporting land forces. Would Phillips had been more "reasonable" he would never had turned back to investigate a possible Japanese landings on the basis of very scarce intelligence, putting the only two RN capital ships available in the area at risk. We know he did it and we know the result.
FTL Phillips knows for sure that if the Japanese naval force supporting the landing in Kuching is not destroyed, Singapore is lost. The responsibility on RN shoulders is even greater than in OTL because land forces are putting a much better show in FTL than in OTL. But this was not all. In the chronology you can read:
"The previous day Japanese air raid on Tarakan, the effectiveness of amphibious operations at Davao and Jolo, seemed a good indication that the enemy was preparing a major push south through the Makassar Stait. Protecting the eastern part of the Malay Barrier was a vital requirement if US reinforcements shipped to Darwin were to be allowed to Flow to Java and Singapore. Would Japanese forces able to interdict naval and air transit between Darwin and Java the Allies logistical situation would be seriously weakened".
The decision to sortie on December 30th is then perfectly logical. It is only once the Formidable lost that Phillips would have understood that Force Z could have to face a much bigger Japanese fleet than though initially (remember that communications were bad and that an important French submarine message has been long delayed).
Still, because the loss of Formidable happens late in the day, Phillips can expect a night battle, something where the RN was supposed to excel. He was taking then a risk, but a calculated one. We know from OTL that he was ready to take risks (he lost his both ships and his life on a dubious gambleŠ). Considering what was at stake and the fact the battle-tested RN would have been supremely confident of its ability to master even a superior force at night, Adm. Phillips' FTL decision is not stranger than his fateful OTL decision.
This argument won the debate and we validated the gaming result. Note here that would the "Japanese" team had been a bit more cautious, keeping two IJN Battlecruisers with Nagumo's carrier, Phillips' gamble would have paid off and Kondo's force would have been crushed.
Actually we had a second vote to validate the "Japanese" team decision. We validated it on the ground that it was consistent with known IJN doctrine AND that the poor situation of Japanese land forces in Malaya would have implied that Kondo could not at any rate risk a major failure at Kuching Bay.
(3) Luftwaffe situation after June 1940.
We assumed that German aircraft production has been higher than in OTL to make good losses suffered by a longer Campaign of France.
OTL figures were the following ones (first number is total number of produced planes, the second is for fighters, the third for bombers and the fourth for ground attack). Data are coming from LW Dptm. 6 documents in German archives (now in Potsdam).
1939: 2518 / 605 / 737 / 134
1940: 10,247 / 2746 / 2852 / 603
1941: 12,401 / 3744 / 3373 / 507
1942: 15,409 / 5,515 / 4,337 / 1,249
1943: 24,807 / 10,898 / 4,649 / 3266
1944: 40,593 / 25,285 / 2,287 / 5,496
It is quite clear that production increased along two different curves. The first one, which applies for 1940-42 corresponds to the normal war mobilization process. The second, for 1943 and 44, corresponds to a massive industrial reorganization.
The 1943 reorganization did not came out of the blue. On the military side it was a reaction to tremendous losses suffered in Soviet Union in 41 and 42 and - and this factor was militarily the most important - the threat of US strategic bombing. On the political side, it was the result of a long and hard fought battle inside the RLM. The victory of "industrialist-minded" people against the LW staff and the RLM staff was possible only with the death of Udet and Jeschonnek. Many post-war books are putting the blame of inept leadership on Goering's shoulder. This is not completely true. Goering was indeed an inept commander, but Udet and Jeschonnek blocked for 18 months proposals for a complete industrial reorganization. Note that Kesselring, who had hold important positions in the RLM before the war, had made some important mistakes too and opposed, at least till fall 42 a complete RLM reorganization. The fact that some plane designers could directly appeal to Hitler didn't help too.
The "Goering factor" so frequently is then to be understood not as a single man effect on the war but as a metaphor of the bureaucratic situation inside the RLM. Even if German leaders could have fully understood all consequences of the POD by July 1940, the 18 months battling process inside the RLM would have been needed. Actually our decision has been to put the OTL reorganization some months earlier, with the production curve switching from the "normal war mobilization" to the "special" path not by Spring 1943 but by December 1942. This would have corresponded to a reaction to losses induced by air operations during the first part of 1941 and percolation of intelligence data about the presence of US crews inside the AdA. The possibility of having the USAAF in Europe by 1943 would have been to be reckoned from a German point of view. However, even if planners have reached this conclusion by September/October 41 the bureaucratic battle is still to be fought and won, Udet is to commit suicide and Jeschonnek tooŠ
However the most important point is not planes but crews.
In OTL the LW recovered quickly crews who were French PoW. Actually this was a perquisite for the Armistice convention.
In FTL not only is the LW not to recover crews in French hands (including Werner Moelders) but is to lose a significant number of crews in airfights between June 20th and early August (FTL combat induced losses for the extended Campaign of France are to be in the 250-275 range, with non-combat losses amounting to 75%-80% of combat losses).
The LW is to be significantly shorter on EXPERIENCED crews than in FTL. Never forget that the LW is a relatively "young" service, having began to expand only by 34/35. This is considerably constraining the training programme already at hand and preventing its expansion. To state it bluntly, in FTL by August 1940 the LW could fight the Battle of Britain (in September) or train new crews but not both.
For obvious political and strategic reasons, trying to push GB out of the war is to take precedence on every other consideration. This is why FTL includes a delayed (and weaker) Battle of Britain. But the FTL BoB is possible only by taking some instructors away from flying schools to send them to operational units in September and October 40. The LW training programme is then to be seriously interrupted during fall 40.
It would however regain steam by mid-November 1940 and by January 1941 would have been at a higher level than in OTL.
However, losses suffered during FTL "Merkur", which are much higher than losses the LW suffered in OTL between January and April 1941 would have made mandatory to again interrupt a large part of the training programme to boost operational units. The LW would have had only 6 weeks to recover before operations in Yugoslavia and Greece. Losses on the FTL campaign of Greece are again much higher than in OTL and they are actually higher than losses the LW suffered in combining the OTL air operations in Greece and in the whole Mediterranean theatre of operations. It would have then been impossible to take some experienced crews back to training units.
The situation is to improve after September 1941. FTL losses are to be much lower than in OTL during Fall 1941 because we don't have Barbarossa. However remember that TOTAL losses for 1941 are to be significantly higher than in OTL. Concentration of losses during February-July is to have a high disruptive effect as the LW can't afford to disband JGs or KGs. The LW training programme is then again to gain steam during Fall and winter 1941 (but after many disruptions by comparison with OTLŠ). However, by early 1942, air operations are stepped up again in the Med. It is impossible to send experienced pilots to work as instructors in Flaying schools. The LW is also preparing for FTL Barbarossa. When Allied landings are taking place in Peloponnesus on February 28th, LW losses are to mount again to a significant level.
We know from OTL data that the LW constantly sacrificed training programmes to make good demands from front units. To make good losses suffered during OTL Barbarossa, training programmes were reduced (instructors have been sent to the front) and the production of training planes went down from September 1941 to summer 1942.
Here are OTL figures for training planes production :
1939: 588
1940: 1870
1941: 1121
1942: 1078
1943: 2274
The brutal drop of trainers production for 41 and 42 is a good indication of how far training programmes have been curtailed in OTL once Barbarossa on the way. This was the typical short-sighted policy we could in many other aspects of the German war policy.
In a 1954 written paper (Statement made on March 17th, 1954), Kesselring explained that LuftWaffe development in 1941 and 1942 was constrained not so much by a lack of planes but by a lack of trained crews. Note that this happens in a situation more favorable than FTLŠ
To sum up, the main difference between FTL and OTL is a total loss of a significant number of experienced crews early in the war, making impossible for the LW to implement even the training programme it developed OTL during Fall and winter 40. Combat operations during 1941 are to disrupt again to a large extent the LW training programme.
If the German industry is to build more planes than in OTL crew training is to be a major problem much earlier than in OTL.
The LW staff in OTL considered as "vital" for the LW to recover crews fallen into French hands (to the point that Petain's emissaries were told that talks for the Armistice would not begin if LW PoWs were not immediately releasedŠ). If we assume that these crews are not to be released late June 40 and that more crew are to be killed or made prisoners between June 20th and early August 1940, the LW situation is considerably bleaker than in OTL.
The FTL total production is then to be:
1940: 12,500
1941: 14,000
1942: 17,000 (assuming a strong surge by December 1941)
1943: 32,000 to 36,000
1944: no more than 35,000 with major disruptions induced by day and night bombings on factory and the steady deterioration of the situation.
(4) Specificities of Alternate History
I would just here point to a recurrent problem. We have used wargaming to test various fictional battles. However there is a major difference between wargaming and simulation and what we have to do IS simulation. In a simulation game you don't play from your point of view, but trying to replicate what the simulated decision-maker would have done, considering his/her known patter of action and decision.
I think that most of differences we have about German and Japanese FTL actions are coming from the fact they are "gamed" and not "simulated".
I have nothing about wargaming, but FTL is an exercise in alternate history simulation. This makes a lot of difference.
We have to ever keep in mind the fact that if FOR US the French decision to move to North Africa in June 1940 is a considerable improvement compared to the OTL situation, to actual German and Japanese decision-makers in June 1940 this decision amount to a resounding French defeat.
Hitler wanted to avoid at any price such a scenario not because he was afraid of French residual potential but because he believed that French capitulation would induce a government change in GB leading to Peace talks. Because he was already committed to an attack against Soviet Union what mattered for him was ending the war with GB. But OTL this didn't worked. In FTL, he would still have dismissed France as fighting actor and would have tried to bluff London into a compromise by an air offensive. This is why we maintained the Battle of Britain.
The point is that for actual German and Japanese decision-makers by June/July 1940 the actual implication of the "great move" is to be lost. The main reason, beside ideological prejudices, is the known underestimation of the US industrial power by Axis powers.
Without the US industry, French forces could not expect survive for long in North Africa. The US ability to raise industrial production from the June 1940 level was not understood in Germany or Japan (but may be for Yamamoto, but he was not a major political player in 1940).
It is then very important not to apply "OUR" knowledge of events to simulated German of Japanese decisions.
(5) a note on Senegalese riflemen.
On a completely different topic, I just ran on a book written by a German historian on how the German Army (and not the SSŠ) systematically murdered Senegalese Riflemen in May and June 1940.
Rafael Scheck, "Une saison noire - Le massacre des tirailleurs sénégalais mai-juin 1940", Tallandier, Paris, 2008.
Scheck, using German and French police archives, shows that that Senegalese riflemen when captured were very frequently murdered, even by units supposed to be "clean" (like Rommel's 7th Panzer).
The fact France has not systematically prosecuted these war crimes after 1945 is a shame on us.